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SUMMARY 
This thesis examines the joint venture relationship in the context of 
the exploration phase of the development of an oil and gas field in Great 
Britain and Australia. It considers a number of issues relating to the 
relationship between the Participants of a typical Joint Operating 
Agreement within the legal regimes of Great Britain and Australia. 
Against this background the main issues addressed in this thesis are- 
1. the nature of the joint venture?; 
2. the relationship between the Participants inter se; and 
3. the relationship between the Operator and the Participants. 
In addressing these issues the following questions are addressed: - 
(i) what is a joint venture?; 
(ii) is a joint venture a separate legal relationship?; 
(iii) how is a joint venture distinguished from a partnership?; 
(iv) what is the relationship between the participants inter se?; 
(v) what rights does a participant of a joint venture have in 
relation to the joint venture and the other participants of a joint 
venture?; 
(vi) what interest, contractural or proprietary, does a 
participant of a joint venture have in the joint venture and the 
property thereof?; 
xxi 
(vii) what duties does a participant of a joint venture have to 
the joint venture and the other participants of the joint venture?; 
and 
(viii) what is the legal position when a participant of a joint 
venture defaults in complying with its duties? 
xxii 
DEFINITIONS 
1. In this thesis, unless the context otherwise requires, the following 
terms shall have the following meaning: 
"accounting procedure" means the method of 
recording debits and 
Account'; 
accounting applied in 
credits to the Joint 
"Apea proforma"" means the proforma Joint Operating Agreement 
issued by the Australian Petroleum Exploration 
Association Limited entitled "Guidelines for an 
Exploration Joint Operating Agreement" (1984 
Edition) and a reference in the footnotes to 
"Apea"" followed by a clause number is a reference 
to the designated clause in the Apea proforma; 
"Britoil proforma" means the proforma Joint Operating Agreement 
issued by the Britoil Limited for the eighth 
round of offshore licencing in Great Britain and 
dated 12th August, 1982 and a reference in the 
footnotes to "Britoil" followed by a clause 
number is a reference to the designated clause in 
the Britoil proforma; 
"Commonwealth adjacent 
area" means the area of the offshore area that is 
adjacent to and appertains to an Australian State 
or Territory 
2; 
"Designated Authority" means the relevant Minister for mining affairs of 
a particular Australian State or Territory in his 
xxiii 
capacity as administrator of the Commonwealth 
adjacent area of the particular Australian State 
or Territory 
3; 
"Development Phase" means the development phase of a field 
development in an off-shore area; 
"Exploration Phase" means the exploration phase of a field 
development in an offshore area; 
"field" means an oil and gas field; 
"field development" means all of the phases of the development of a 
field before, when and after it is brought into 
commercial operation; 
"first right of 
acquisition" 
"Great Britain" 
"host government" 
"Industry" 
includes the right of first refusal and the right 
of pre-emption; 
means England, Wales and Scotland; 
means the government within whose jurisdiction 
the project is to be or is being undertaken; 
means the oil and gas industries; 
"Interest" means the undivided share held from time to time 
pursuant to the Joint Operating Agreement by a 
Participant in: 
1. the petroleum title, all production 
from the petroleum title and the proceeds of sale 
of the production from the petroleum title; 
2. all the property of whatsoever kind, 
be it real or personal, acquired by the 
Participants in the conduct, or for the purpose, 
xxiv 
of the joint undertaking of the Operations; and 
3. all other estate, right, title, 
interest or obligation of the Participants 
arising under or by virtue of the Joint Operating 
Agreement4; 
"Joint Account" means the account established and maintained by 
the Operator to record debits and credits made 
pursuant to the Joint Operating Agreements; 
"Joint Authority" means the relevant authority consisting of a 
federal Minister and the Minister for mining 
affairs of a particular Australian State or 
Territory established in respect of the 
Commonwealth adjacent area of the particular 
State or Territory6; 
"Joint Operating 
Agreement" means a joint operating agreement or a joint 
venture agreement; 
"Joint 
Property" means all property acquired or held for use in 
connection with the Operations; 
"juridicial persons" includes governments and parastatal enterprises; 
"Licence" means the production licence issued by the 
Secretary of State for Energy pursuant to the 
Petroleum (Production) Act 1934; 
"offshore area" means, in the case of Great Britain, the area 
which extends outwards from the territorial 
seal to the outer limits of the Continental 
Shelf adjacent to the coast of Great Britain, 
and, in the case of Australia, means the area 
xxv 
which extends outwards from the three-mile limit 
to the outer limits of the Continental Shelf 
adjacent to the coast of Austalia8; 
"Operations" means activities undertaken by the operator that 
are considered to be necessary or desirable in 
order to implement and give effect to the terms 
and purpose of the Joint Operating Agreement; 
"Operator" means the person from time to time who, pursuant 
to the terms of the Joint Operating Agreement, is 
designated, appointed or for whatever reason, 
becomes the operator for the joint venture formed 
by the Participants9; 
"parastatal enterprise" includes governmental bodies and 
quasi-governmental bodies; 
"Participant" means a party to the Joint Operating Agreement 
and the successor or assignee thereof and the 
term "Participants" shall have a corresponding 
10 
meaning ; 
"Partnership Act 
1890" means the Partnership Act 1890 (53 & 54 Vict., c. 
39) (UK); 
"Permit" means an exploration permit issued pursuant to 
the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 
(C'th)11; 
"petroleum title" means a Licence or Permit; 
"project" means one or more, or part of one or more, of the 
phases in the development of a field; 
xxvi 
"three-mile limit" means the area which extends three miles outwards 
from the mean low water mark of an Australian 
State or Territory. 
2. Terms such as "Non Consent Operations", "Non Consent Participants", 
"Sole Risk Drilling", "Sole Risk Operations", "Sole Risk 
Participants" and "Non Sole Risk Participants" have the meanings 
assigned to them in the relevant chapters of this thesis. 
3. Until very recently the general view has been that the Commonwealth 
of Australia alone does not have clear constitutional power to pass 
companies and securities legislation to apply throughout Australia. 
As a result of this view a scheme was developed whereby the 
Commonwealth Parliament would enact comprehensive companies and 
securities legislation and each of the States of Australia would 
then enact legislation to give force and effect to the Commonwealth 
legislation. The Commonwealth Parliament enacted the Companies Act 
1981 (C'th). It applies only to the Australian Capital Territory. 
Each State of Australia and the Northern Territory thereafter passed 
an enabling Act in order that the provisions of the Companies Act 
1981 (C'th), with some modifications, may apply in its 
jurisdiction. The resultant legislation is referred to as a code. 
For example, the relevant resultant legislation in the State of 
Western Australia is called the "Companies (Western Australia) 
Code". In this thesis the Companies (Western Australia) Code 1981 
(WA) and sections thereof has ordinarily been used as the basic 
reference. Where appropriate, variations from the legislation of 
other States of Australia, the Northern Territory and the Companies 
Act 1981 (C'th), will be noted. 
For the time being the scheme remains operative in Australia. The 
success of the challenge has meant that the package of legislative 
regulation has not been brought into force. 
It should be noted that this general view as to the constitutional 
power of the Commonwealth of Australia is under challenge since the 
enactment, by the Commonwealth Parliament, of the Corporations Act 
xxvii 
1989 (C'th) and fifteen additional, but closely associated, Acts. 
This package of legislation will have the effect, once brought into 
force, of placing the legislative regulation of companies and the 
securities industry within the domain of the Commonwealth of 
Australia. A successful challenge has been mounted in the High 
Court of Australia to test the validity of this package of 
12 legislation. 
FOOTNOTES 
1. Britoil 27(i); Apea 1.1(a). 
2. See section 10 of the Petroleum (Sul 
the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 
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(Submerged Lands) Act 1982 (Tas); 
(Submerged Lands) Act 1982 (Vic); 
(Submerged Lands) Act 1982 (WA). 
)merged Lands) Act 19 
1982 (NT); section 
1982 (Qld); the 
section 8 of the 
section 9 of the 
section 11 of the 
82 (NSW); 
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Petroleum 
Petroleum 
Petroleum 
Petroleum 
3. Section 5(i) of the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 (C'th). 
4. Britoil 3.0 and 27 (xxix); Apea 1.1. (aa) and 3.1. 
5. Britoil 27(xiv); Apea 1.1(m). 
6. Section 8A of the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 (C'th). 
7. See the Territorial Sea Act 1987 (UK) and the Continental Shelf 
(Designated Areas) (Extended Territorial Sea) Order 1987. 
8. Section 5A of the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 (C'th). See 
section 5(1) of the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 (C'th) for 
the definition of "continental shelf". 
9. Britoil 27 (xxvii); Apea 1.1(n). 
10. Britoil 27 (xxviii); Apea 1.1 (bb). 
11. Apea 1.1(cc). 
12. New South Wales v Commonwealth of Australia [1990] 90 A. L. R. 355. 
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COMPARATIVE TABLE OF PARTNERSHIP ACTS 
In this thesis, rather than refer on each ocassion to the various 
partnership acts of the United Kingdom, each of the States of Australia 
and the Australian Capital Territory, the Partnership Act 1890 and 
sections thereof has ordinarily been used as the basic reference. A 
comparative table of the various partnerships is set out below. 
l 
1. The Various Partnership Acts 
The United Kingdom: 53 & 54 Vict., c. 39. 
New South Wales: No. XII of 1892, as amended by Supreme Court Act 1970 
and supreme court (Amendment) Act 1972. 
Queensland: No. 7 of 1891, as amended by Statute Law Revision Act 1908 
and the Decimal Currency Act 1965. 
South Australia: No. 506 of 1891, as amended by the Statute Law Revision 
Act, No. 2246 or 1935, and Statute Law Revision Act (No. 2) 1975. 
Tasmania: No. 3 of 1891, as amended by the Statute Law Revision Act 1985 
and the Statute Law Revision Act 1982. 
Victoria: No. 6330 of 1985. 
Western Australia: No. XXIII of 1895. 
Australian Capital Territory: Ordinance No. 5 of 1963. 
2. Comparative Table 
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CHAPTER I 
THE OBJECT OF THIS THESIS AND THE CONTEXT WITHIN WHICH THAT OBJECTIVE IS 
PURSUED 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In the Industry in Great Britain and Australia it is not unusual for 
each of the various phases through which a field develops to be undertaken 
by more than one participant'. Where more than one participant 
undertakes a project in relation to a field, the participants usually set 
out with the objective of all acting together and, more or less, in 
unison. The coming together of the participants in such a co-operative 
endeavour to undertake a project is rather the case than the exception in 
so far as the development of large fields are concerned. In Great Britain 
and Australia it is only necessary to look at the development of offshore 
petroleum resources in order to find examples of co-operative endeavours 
in the undertaking of a project2. 
2. THE PHASES OF A FIELD DEVELOPMENT 
The evolution of a field development involves a number of different 
phases, each of which has its own particular and, in many cases, unique 
requirements. No two field developments are the same and the precise 
nature of such phases and their requirements will depend, in each field 
development, upon a number of varied factors and the manner in which those 
factors are dealt with will depend upon those circumstances peculiar to 
each field. Neither is the manner in which the factors are dealt with 
uniform through out the Industry. For this reason, among others, it 
is 
not within the scope of this thesis to consider the factors and the 
possible manner in which each may be dealt with. 
-2- 
As the result of considering a substantial number of field 
developments it is possible to generalise, in so far as the phases of such 
developments are concerned and, in so doing, state that there are several 
3 
reasonably well recognised phases . These phases may be summarised as: - 
1. the bidding phase; 
2. the exploration phase, which includes geological surveying4, 
prospecting (when the field is reconnoitred), exploration (when the 
reserves of the field are determined) and feasibility evaluation 
(when the technical, economic and political consequences of 
proceeding further with the development and exploitation of the 
reserves are appraised); 
3. the development phase, which includes construction of any 
necessary facilities; 
4. the exploitation phase, which includes the extraction or 
production and the primary removal of the reserves; 
5. the processing phase, which includes concentration and 
refining; 
6. the marketing phase; and 
7. the abandonment or decommissioning phase. 
The terminology used to describe the phases of a field development in 
this generalisation, and as is used in this thesis, is not uniform 
throughout the Industry. Notwithstanding, what the generalisation does do 
is illustrate the evolutionary process involved in a field development 
from beginning to end. 
Not all fields proceed through all of the phases of development; the 
bidding phase is a prime example of a phase that is not always present. 
Furthermore, not all fields evolve through all of the phases. The 
development of a particular field may, for the combination of any number 
-3- 
of reasons, be halted and abandoned by the participants undertaking the 
development at any point in the chain between beginning and end. Most of 
the casualties of this nature occur either during, or at the end of, the 
exploration phase. 
3. THE PARTICIPANTS OF A PROJECT 
The participants who come together in a co-operative endeavour to 
undertake a project may be natural or juridical persons. Governments 
throughout the world, either themselves or through parastatal 
enterprises, have made ever-increasing use of state participation with 
other participants in a co-operative endeavour to undertake projects5. 
State participation in a co-operative endeavour to undertake a project is 
not, as is often incorrectly assumed, limited to the non-western and 
so-called third world countries. Throughout the world, including the 
western and so-called developed countries, participation by the host 
government in a co-operative endeavour to undertake a project within the 
jurisdiction of that host government, either itself or through a 
parastatal enterprise, has become the paradigm of field development in the 
Industry in recent times 
6 
There are few projects entered into in this 
day that do not provide, in one way or another, for either: - 
1. an initial share, or gradual acquisition of a share, in the 
equity of the project for the host government or a parastatal 
enterprise thereof7; 
2. an option for the host government or a parastatal enterprise 
thereof to acquire, be it in the initial phases of the project or at 
a deferred date, a share in the equity of the project8; or 
3. an obligation on the investors in the project to offer, be it 
in the initial phases of the project or at a deferred date, a share 
in the equity of the project to nationals of the country of the host 
9 
government 
In Great Britain the roles played in the past in offshore field 
10 
developments by the National Coal Board, the British Gas Corporation 
-4- 
and the British National Oil Corporation illustrate many of these 
features. The role of these parastatal enterprises in the development of 
the Industry in Great Britain does not fall within the scope of this 
thesis for it is dealt with adequately elsewhere11. It will suffice to 
point out that, primarily through the British National Oil Corporation, 
the host government participated in co-operative endeavours to undertake 
projects within its jurisdiction. This began in earnest in 1975 with the 
creation of the British National Oil Corporation12 and continued until 
the election of a Conservative government in the United Kingdom in 1979. 
Since 1979 the British National Oil Corporation has been gradually 
dismembered and thereby followed the gradual dismembering of state 
participation. The British National Oil Corporation was formally 
dissolved on March 27,1986 consequence to the establishment of the Oil 
13 
and Pipelines Agency 
The ending of the taking of royalty by taking oil in kind after 
December 1988 and the proposed winding-up of participation agreements 
entered into by the parastatal enterprise with oil companies, marked the 
conclusion of direct host government participation in co-operative 
endeavours to undertake projects within the jurisdiction at Great 
Britain 
14 
In so far as Australia is concerned it is not possible to point to 
examples of state participation in co-operative endeavours to undertake 
projects of a similar nature to that which briefly existed in Great 
Britain. Attempts were made to establish a Petroleum and Minerals 
Authority with a mandate to explore for and develop Australia's petroleum 
and mineral resources and to promote Australian ownership and control of 
petroleum and mineral resources. The High Court of Australia subsequently 
held that the Petroleum and Minerals Authority Act, 1973 (C'th) was not a 
valid law in that it was not enacted in the required manner 
15. 
With the 
defeat of the Labor government in 1975, the establishment of state 
participation in the Industry in Australia collapsed. There have been 
suggestions that the present Labor government will seek to resurrect the 
idea of state participation in the Industry by establishing an Australian 
Hydrocarbons Corporation for the purpose of participating in the 
-5- 
development of Australia's oil and gas resources16. To date no attempt 
has been made to introduce the requisite bill to establish the Australian 
Hydrocarbons Corporation. 
The participants of co-operative endeavours to undertake projects in 
Great Britain and in Australia are today invariably companies. In the 
course of research for this thesis not one instance was uncovered in which 
an entity other than a company was involved in a co-operative endeavour to 
undertake a project. The reason for this is no doubt associated with the 
nature of the protection that the company offers to individuals who 
aspire, for whatever reason, to participate in a co-operative endeavour to 
undertake a project. The assumption is therefore made in this thesis that 
the Participants will always be companies. 
4. WHY A PARTICIPANT SEEKS OTHER PARTICIPANT CO-OPERATION TO UNDERTAKE A 
PROJECT 
The reasons for a participant seeking to act in unison with other 
participants to undertake a project as a co-operative endeavour rather 
than choosing to proceed with the project by itself are many, varied and 
complex. The basis of the reasoning of the participant, in most cases, 
involves a recognition by the participant that it lacks some or all of the 
skills or resources necessary to enable it to proceed with the project 
itself. The participant therefore finds it to be advantageous to obtain 
the requirements that it lacks from other participants, so as to enable it 
at least to participate in the undertaking of the project'7. The skills 
and resources in question include such matters as capital, technology, 
markets, experience, information and expertise. 
The situations that give rise to a participant choosing to act in 
unison with other participants to undertake a project as a co-operative 
endeavour may be divided into a number of categories: - 
1. where the participant seeks the capital investment of other 
participants with similar needs or interests to itself so as to: - 
-6- 
(i) reduce the risk 
18 
and cost of undertaking the project; 
or 
(ii) create a presence that is, or may be, large enough or 
requisite to overcome any barriers that may exist to prevent 
19 
entry into a project ; 
2. where the participant possesses skills or resources that can be 
combined with the skills or resources of other participants to enable 
them, in a co-operative endeavour, to enter into the project, being 
one in which they as individuals have not prior thereto been 
20 
engaged; and 
3. where the participant seeks to form an association with other 
participants so as to insulate itself from adverse market 
fluctuations or so as to expand its operations and maximise its 
21 
existing investment . 
These categories may also be described in economic terms on the basis 
of the nature of the relationship of the participants to one another prior 
to their choosing to enter into the co-operative endeavour to undertake a 
project. These are: - 
1. horizontal integration; 
2. conglomerate intergration; and 
3. vertical integration. 
The description of the categories in economic terms assumes some 
importance when consideration is given to the restrictive trade practices 
or anti-trust aspects of participants acting in unison in a co-operative 
endeavour to undertake a project22. However, the description of the 
categories in economic terms as such is of little importance in the 
context of this thesis where the participants had a different relationship 
from the relationships mentioned, prior to their choosing to act in unison 
in a co-operative endeavour to undertake a project. 
-7- 
5. SHARING OF RISK AND COST 
The risks involved in undertaking a project take many forms, may vary 
with the circumstances of and surrounding the project and in most cases, 
but certainly not all, are not man made or capable of being controlled or 
eliminated by man. There are, or course, risks that can be reduced or 
eliminated by man. 
The range of risks that have a bearing upon the undertaking of a 
project is extremely wide. They include such matters as environmental 
risk, climatic risk23, reserve or reservoir risk, drilling risk, 
logistical risk, the risk of nationalisation24, the risk of compulsory 
renegotiation of the terms of agreements, the risk of civil war, the risk 
of rising costs or cost overrun, tariff barriers, foreign exchange costs, 
royalties and taxation, other economic risk, technological or production 
risk25, social risk, the risk of inhibited access to product, the risk 
of deferment of cost recovery, geological risk26 and other political 
risks27; to name but a few28. It is risks of this nature that must be 
taken into account when a participant considers the undertaking of a 
project. Furthermore, the risks must be viewed against the background of 
what appears to be the basic characteristics of field developments. These 
are: - 
1. a high failure to success ratio29; 
2. high exploration cost30; 
3. high development costs 
31. 
associated with this is the 
difficulty in accurately projecting the actual development cost 
together with the high fixed to variable cost ratio; 
4. the long lead time to production coupled with the long pay back 
period 
32; 
and 
5. the instability of prices, markets and sales for production. 
-g- 
It is the costs and the risks combined, considered against the 
background of the characteristics of a field development that a 
participant, in so far as is possible, seeks to share with other 
participants when it seeks to undertake a project as a co-operative 
endeavour33. This is particularly the case at the Exploration Phase, 
where the risk of failure is high and the technology, particularly in the 
case of offshore exploration, is intensive; even more so in new and 
inhospitable areas. However this is not limited to the Exploration Phase; 
new commercial discoveries are difficult to make and expensive to 
develop. High risk is equally applicable to the development and 
production phases. This is particularly evident in respect of the 
continually changing market economics associated with oil and gas, such as 
have been experienced since late 1985 in the Industry and the demands upon 
available technology where refining or other processing is required. 
The approach of a participant at the Exploration Phase may be summed 
up as being one of seeking to spread the "exploration dollar" to many 
projects rather than concentrate it on a few. Thus, by seeking to 
undertake an exploration project as a co-operative endeavour, a 
participant is able to obtain two major benefits: - 
1. it is able to spread its exploration risk; and 
2. it is able to spread its "exploration dollar". 
Mr. Justice Kennedy of the Supreme Court of Western Australia gave 
judicial recognition to the approach of participants in the Industry to 
the high risk and cost involved in undertaking a project and in 
particular, a project which involved the exploration phase of a field 
development, in Monarch Petroleum N. L. v Citco Australia Petroleum 
Limited 
34 
:- 
"Oil exploration is an extremely high risk operation, accompanied by 
high costs. The area to which the permit relates was an exceedingly 
high risk area. Offshore drilling, due primarily to weather and 
drilling conditions, carries with it particular risks. The cost of 
drilling an offshore well can vary in a normal case from $5,000,000 
-9- 
to $15,000,000; 
Vulcan well, to 
is to share the 
permit. As one 
cent of 10 well 
scarce. " 
but the cost can blow 
a figure in the order 
risks by having a num 
witness expressed it, 
s than 100 per cent of 
out, as in the case of the 
of $28,000,000. The tendency 
ber of participants in each 
it is better to have 10 per 
one well. High-risk capital is 
That companies in the Industry do spread the risk and cost of 
undertaking a project can be illustrated by considering the table of 
Britoil P. L. C. 's principle United Kingdom field assets in 198535 _ 
FIELD EQUITY INTEREST 
OIL 
Thistle 18.41% 
Area 6 15.60% 
Beatrice 28.00% 
Deveron 15.95% 
Clyde 51.00% 
Dunlin 9.77/, 
Ninian 21.37% 
Murchison 24.98% 
Statfjord 5.30% 
South Brae 20.00% 
Hutton 20.00% 
North Brae 20.00% 
ý` 
umbly Grove 7.50% 
GAS 
Viking 50.00% 
Victor 25.00% 
Sean 25.00% 
6. BARRIERS TO PARTICIPATION 
There are numerous types of barriers that may prevent a participant 
from undertaking a project. Many of these barriers are imposed by 
governments36. Government-imposed barriers may be overt in that they 
are imposed by legislation or standard clauses in petroleum titles, or 
they may be covert in that they rely upon administrative discretion, as in 
Great Britain. One of the main barriers that a participant may seek to 
overcome by acting in unison with other participants, other than that of 
the magnitude of the finance required to undertake the project, is 
- 10 - 
government restriction on the entry into the market to undertake a 
particular project. In the main, this type of barrier is aimed at 
restricting foreign investment in the host country. Such foreign 
investment restrictions usually take the form of requiring a minimum local 
participation in the equity of the company or other entity established or 
utilised to enter the market to undertake a particular project 
37 
. 
Such a barrier is present in Australia in so far as foreign 
investment in, inter alia, natural resource developments is concerned. 
The foreign investment policy of the Australian government will not be 
discussed in this thesis; it is not part of the subject matter and is 
dealt with elsewhere38. It will suffice to point out the salient 
features of the policy. Prior to 20th January 1988, where it was proposed 
to develop a new natural resource project, even if it was part of an 
existing business, involving expenditure of A$10 million or more, such 
proposal was required to be examined by the Foreign Investment Review 
Board to determine whether the development would produce net economic 
benefits to Australia and as such should proceed. Among the criteria that 
the Foreign Investment Review Board took into account, other than the net 
economic benefits to Australia in certain areas, was the amount of 
Australian participation in the equity, and the management and control of 
the proposed project. On 20th January 1988 the policy changed. The 
Australia government announced that thereafter, where the national 
resource project was an oil and or gas project involving expenditure of 
A$10 million or more, such proposal would be approved unless judged 
contrary to the national interest. 
7. RELATIONSHIPS AVAILABLE FOR PARTICIPANTS TO UTILISE 
There are a number of relationships that participants seeking to act 
in unison in a co-operative endeavour to undertake a project may elect to 
utilise in order to create the legal structure within which they can 
conduct their co-operative activities. The relationships that the 
participants may elect to utilise include: - 
1. a company 
39; 
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2. a partnership40; 
3. a limited partnership41; 
4. a trust 
42; 
and 
5. a joint venture. 
8. MERGER AND CONTRACT 
It is the desire of participants to preserve their independence, 
whilst at the same time gaining secure access to the skills or resources 
that they as individuals lack to enable them to undertake a project on 
their own, that rules out many of the relationships that the participants 
may elect to utilise in order to create the legal structure within which 
they can undertake a project as a co-operative endeavour. 
Two options available to the participants which, although not 
relationships of the nature mentioned above, do require brief 
consideration are: - 
/ 
1\ 1. merger; and 
2. contract. 
The problem that the merger poses for the participants is that it is 
a drastic step which is practically irreversible. Each participant 
irrevocably abandons its independence in a particular area of business and 
this case a company is usually, although not inevitably, the result. The 
company or other relationship formed undertakes the particular area of 
business, or the whole business abandoned by the individual participants 
to the joint enterprise. Alternatively, one participant is absorbed into 
the framework of the legal structure of the other participants. Either 
way, the situation gives rise to a single economic relationship in the 
area of business or the business concerned with a single area of 
decision-making for all important activities, including financial and 
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investment planning and the distribution of economic risk. It could be 
said that where a merger occurs, control is substituted for co-operation. 
In a purely contractual relationship, each participant must rely upon 
the other to fulfill its obligations without having the right to be 
directly involved in the manner in which those obligations are carried 
out. Each participant must rely on the other participant's ability 
without having the right to contribute. Risks, skills, know-how, 
experience, investment and resources are not shared, although 
confidentiality is preserved. A joint venture offers considerable 
advantages to the participants thereto when compared with a purely 
contractual relationship. The major advantages are: - 
1. a joint venture is usually managed by a board or committee on 
which the participants will be represented, usually in proportion to their 
interest in the joint venture. When there is an unequal distribution of 
control, that is, when there are minority interest holders, a joint 
venture will not be effective unless the minority interest holder has, or 
holders have, a meaningful share in the control of the joint venture. 
This is often attained by the requirement of unaniminity in decisions of 
major importance, coupled with a sole risk provision which gives 
participants the right to pursue objectives pursuant to individual 
theories. In this manner a joint venture affords a participant a greater 
degree of power of co-determination than does a contractual relationship; 
2. joint control by joint decision allows the participant to 
consider matters of common interest as they arise and to deal with them in 
common, without either participant losing any right to protect its own 
interest or gaining any power to advance its own interest to the 
disadvantage of the other participants. In this respect a joint venture 
is more flexible than a purely contractual relationship; 
3. as a result of co-determination a joint venture makes it easier 
for participants to undertake a project, particularly in places where one 
of the participants is not otherwise represented; and 
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4. a joint venture affords the psychological advantage that the 
participants meet on equal terms within the framework of the joint 
venture, irrespective of the size and importance of each participant 
outside the joint venture. In effect, unlike a purely contractual 
relationship, neither participant is seen as seeking advantage from the 
other participant leaning upon it. 
It can be said, therefore, that unlike a purely contractual 
relationship, each participant to a joint venture has a closer involvement 
with the other participants in the project that is being undertaken as a 
co-operative endeavour, and a more equitable share of the risks and 
profits. 
A joint venture can therefore be seen in the Industry as being 
something more than a contract although it is obviously less than a merger 
between the participants. 
9. THE INCREASING UTILISATION OF JOINT VENTURES 
The reasons for the participants seeking to undertake a project as a 
co-operative endeavour, selecting one relationship in preference to 
another, are many, varied and complex and for the most part have little or 
no direct bearing on the matters to be considered in this thesis. What is 
dealt with in this thesis is an examination of one of the relationships 
that, at present, is becoming increasingly43 the selection of the 
participants where the project to be undertaken is capital intensive and 
highly technological. Field developments in the Industry are 
capital-intensive and highly technological by nature and as such it is not 
surprising that the joint venture is common-place in the Industry. 
An illustration of the increasing use of the joint venture in the 
Industry can be constructed, for Great Britain, using information relating 
to Licences 
44 
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ROUND BLOCKS ON NUMBER OF NUMBER OF COMPANIES 
OFFER APPLICANTS IN CONSORTIA 
First (1964) 960 31 61 
Second (1965) 1,102 21 54 
Third (1970) 157 34 63 
Fourth (1971/72) 436 123 301 
Fifth (1976/77) 71 53 133 
Sixth (1978/79) 46 55 94 
Seventh (1980/81) 125 204 
Eighth (1982/83) 184 60 141 
Ninth (1984/85) 195 149 186 
Tenth (1986/87) 127 75 84 
Eleventh (1988/89) 212 125 84 
The term "consortia" used in the table usually, but not always, 
refers to a joint venture of the nature discussed in this thesis. In 
Great Britain there has been a tendency to refer to such relationships as 
consortia rather than joint ventures. 
10. THE CONTEXT IN WHICH THE TERM "JOINT VENTURE" IS USED IN THIS THESIS 
In the context of the transactions entered into by governments with 
transnational corporations in order to develop oil and gas resources 
through all of the phases of development, the term "joint venture" 
has 
been used. As the use of the term in that context is not part of the 
45 
subject matter of this thesis and is dealt with adequately elsewhere 
only a brief comment upon the use of the term will be offered. The term 
has been used in two ways: - 
1. to describe a relationship whereby the host government and the 
transnational corporation come together and establish an operating 
company in which each holds a percentage of the issued share 
capital. The operating company undertakes the particular field 
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development. The host government thereby participates in the 
particular field development through its various phases. This is 
often referred to as an "equity joint venture"46; and 
2. to describe a relationship whereby the host government and the 
transnational corporation enter into a contract somewhat akin to a 
partnership to undertake the particular field development. By 
participating in the contract the host government thereby 
participates in the field development through its various phases. 
This is often referred to as a "contractural joint venture" 
7. 
This thesis considers the joint venture where it is utilised by 
non-government persons to achieve a desired object; to undertake in unison 
a project as a co-operative endeavour. However, even within the scope in 
which the joint venture is considered in this thesis, it is necessary to 
make clear the context in which the term "joint venture" is used. 
A number of commentators 
48 
have made reference to two classes of 
joint venture, if they can be so called. These are: - 
1. the class often referred to as incorporated joint ventures, 
which includes such descriptions as corporate joint venture, joint 
corporate venture and equity joint venture; and 
2. the class often referred to as unincorporated joint ventures, 
which includes such descriptions as contractual joint venture and 
non-equity joint venture. 
The above-mentioned division and the terminological variations 
thereof is not the only attempt at the division of the term "joint 
venture" so as to arrive at classes of joint venture. For the purpose of 
this thesis the division above will suffice to illustrate the comments 
which follow. 
It is submitted, with all due respect to the commentators, that in 
Great Britain and in Australia in so far as the joint venture is concerned 
the law does not recognise such division. 
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If the commentators are using the terms in a non-legal sense in order 
to differentiate between two of the choices that are open for selection by 
participants who wish to undertake in unison and as a co-operative 
endeavour a project, that is, whether to conduct their relationship 
through an incorporated body or not, then, although that choice is 
acknowledged as being one that is available to the participants, it is 
submitted that the use of the term "joint venture" is misleading. 
Crommelin has described the use of the term as "unfortunate"49 and as 
50 inviting "confusion". However, despite this confusing or unfortunate 
situation, it is not suggested that a new name should be sought for the 
joint venture as considered in this thesis. This is particularly the case 
in Australia where the term is often used to distinguish an association of 
participants that is not a partnership, from one that is a partnership for 
taxation purposes. 
An examination of what is called an incorporated joint venture 
reveals that, stripped to its bare essentials, it is nothing more than a 
company, usually in the form of a limited liability public or private 
company, created to carry out a particular project51. As such the law 
relating thereto is, in the main, to be found in the various highly 
developed company statutes and codes of law. Why not call what is 
referred to as an incorporated joint venture what it really is, that is, a 
company? It is submitted that it is a misnomer to use the term "joint 
venture" in relation to a company. 
If it is necessary to differentiate between a company incorporated 
for the purpose of participants undertaking, in unison, a project as a 
co-operative endeavour and a company incorporated for some other purpose 
then, it is submitted, the type of company first mentioned should be 
called something other than by a name that contains the term "joint 
venture. " The fact that a so-called incorporated joint venture is a 
company, and nothing more, is recognised in American jurisprudence. In 
America it has been said that 
52. 
- 
"Two individuals who form a corporation have chosen to have their 
dealings with third parties governed by the law of corporations which 
necessarily supersedes the common law of joint venture by imposing 
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limits on liability, on authority to bind the business by contract, 
and on the ability to terminate the association. To this extent a 
corporation must be distinguished from a joint venture or 
partnership. " 
The passage quoted above is based on dictum of Dill J. in Jackson v 53 
Hooper _ 
"If the parties have the rights of partners, they have the duties and 
liabilities imposed by law, and are responsible in solido to all 
creditors. If they adopt the corporate form, with the corporate 
shield extended over them to protect them against personal liability, 
they cease to be partners, and have only the rights, duties, and 
obligations of stockholders. They cannot be partners inter se and a 
corporations as to the rest of the world. " 
In so far as the writings of American commentators are concerned the 
following comment is apposite 
54 
"Corporate joint ventures are now often themselves incorporated so 
that the vehicle is technically a commonly owned subsidiary rather 
than a joint venture. " 
What then of the so-called unincorporated joint venture? It is this 
class of joint venture, if class it be, that this thesis considers. 
Bearing in mind the comments made in relation to the so-called 
incorporated joint venture, the use of the term "unincorporated" adds 
nothing whatsoever, in the legal sense, to the term "joint venture". It 
is submitted that the use of the term "unincorporated" is superflous. It 
is submitted that what is being called an unincorporated joint venture is 
a joint venture and that it exactly what it should be called. 
By its nature a joint venture must be a relationship that is other 
than incorporated; otherwise it would be called a company. The joint 
venture is an relationship of a non-corporate co-operative form. 
Furthermore, the rules of law governing the relationship between the 
participants to a joint venture are not to be found in legislation (as 
none of the legal systems of the major western industrial nations address 
themselves specifically to joint ventures55), but in the terms of the 
agreement establishing the joint venture, the legislation controlling or 
having a bearing on the subject matter in relation to which the joint 
venture was established, and in the principles of general law, for 
example, the law of contract, the law of agency, the law of real and 
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personal property and the law of trusts56. The relationship is 
nevertheless perceived as being essentially a contractural ones' 
Although no major western industrial nation has legislation 
specifically relating to the law applicable to joint ventures, some other 
countries, such as the People's Republic of China58, Bulgaria59 
Yugoslavia, Romania, the Soviet Union60 and Hungary61 have taken steps 
to legislate in relation to joint ventures. 
In Western Europe entities have been developed which enable 
participants to undertake in unison a project as a co-operative endeavour 
that do not take the strict form of a company but a form somewhere between 
a company and the joint venture discussed in this thesis. Such entities 
depend for their existence and form upon the legislative development 
within a particular legal system62, such as the Groupement d'Interet 
Economique in France63, the Gemeinschaftsunternehmen in Germany and the 
European Interest Grouping in the European Economic Community 
64 
These entities do not create the joint venture relationship between 
the participants thereto, nor does the legislation pursuant to which they 
are established attempt to provide by statute what participants entering 
into a joint venture seek to create by contract. A detailed consideration 
of the entities and a comparison thereof with the joint venture falls 
outside of the ambit of this thesis. 
Returning to the joint venture as considered in this thesis, the 
comment of Straube cited below is reflective of the true position of the 
western world (including Great Britain and Australia) in so far as the 
development of legislation and case law about, and dealing with, the joint 
65 
venture is concerned _ 
"It is interesting to note that, in general, legal systems have not 
kept pace with the growing economic importance of joint-venture 
groups;... " 
11. FACTORS INFLUENCING THE USE OF THE JOINT VENTURE 
In the context of the legal regimes of Great Britain and Australia 
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there are a number of considerations that help explain why the joint 
venture is chosen by participants seeking in unison to undertake a project 
as a co-operative endeavour, in preference to some other relationship. In 
the main all the considerations may be summed up in one word 
- "flexibility". It has been said that the "keystone" to the joint 
- venture is flexibility 
66 
"As Professor Schmitthoff has rightly emphasised, when it comes to joint ventures, the important factor commercially is flexibility - flexibility to meet changing political situations, flexibility to 
meet the needs of the different participants in respect of the 
regulatory requirements and tax laws of both the country in which the 
venture is to operate and of the countries in which each of the 
participants has its seat. " 
It is this flexibility which allows a joint venture to take on almost 
any contractural form and have an almost unlimited number of 
participants 
67 
In the economic terms referred to earlier, a joint 
venture may be horizontal, vertical or conglomerate. The participants 
that make up a joint venture may be unrelated in business interest or they 
may be complimentary or even competitive. The purposes, that is, the 
projects, for which the joint venture is formed are numerous. However, 
for whatever purpose a joint venture is formed, a joint venture will only 
exist because the participants thereto are prepared to co-operate together 
as independent participants. It is this co-operation together by the 
participants which, whilst preserving their independence at the same time 
gains secure access to the skills and resources that the individual 
participants themselves lack so as to enable them to undertake the purpose 
for which the joint venture is formed, on their own, that can give rise to 
the restrictive trade practice or anti-trust aspects mentioned above. 
Such restrictive trade practice or anti-trust aspects are not within the 
ambit of this thesis and as such are not considered in this thesis. 
The considerations that help explain why the joint venture is chosen 
in preference to some other relationship by the participants wishing to 
preserve their independence, whilst at the same time desiring to gain, 
secure access to the skills and resources that the individual participants 
themselves lack so as to enable them to undertake the purpose for which 
the joint venture was formed on their own, include: - 
0 
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1. the taxation regime applicable to each participant to, and, if 
it is relevant, to the joint venture itself68. It is submitted 
that it is this consideration which is one of the main reasons, if 
not the main reason, that participants choose the joint venture as 
the appropriate relationship for the legal structure through which 
they can conduct the project in unison, as a co-operative endeavour. 
Each participant to the joint venture will seek to preserve or 
maintain its individual position in relation to such taxation options 
as are open to it whilst in the joint venture relationship with other 
participants. In particular the joint venture is seen to be tax 
efficient. 
In the Australian context the main objective of the 
participants is to avoid coming within the 
of a partnership for taxation purposes 
69 
that the definition of the terms "company" 
taxation purposes does not correspond with 
the various statutes relating to companies 
definition of a company or 
It must be appreciated 
and "partnership" for 
the definitions set out in 
70 
and partnerships 
71. 
Section 6(1) of the Income Tax Assessment Act72 defines the 
term "company" for income tax purposes as including: - 
"all bodies or associations corporate or unincorporate, but 
does not include partnerships. " 
and defines the term "partnership" for income tax purposes as 
meaning: - 
"an association of persons carrying on business as partners or 
in receipt of income jointly, but does not include a company". 
As will become evident when the definition of the term 
"partnership" as set out in the various partnership acts is 
considered, the definition in the Income Tax Assessment Act of the 
term "partnership is wider than in the said statutes". 
73 
It has been argued, and to date accepted by the Federal 
Commissioner of Taxation, that a joint venture is not a company or a 
partnership for income tax purposes. 
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It is difficult to see what is the argument for a joint venture 
falling outside the definition of a company for income tax purposes. 
It is submitted that, after all, a joint venture is an unincorporated 
74 
association 
The main thrust of the argument, in so far as a joint venture 
falling outside of the definition of a partnership for income tax 
purposes is concerned, is twofold: - 
(i) the participants, by receiving their respective shares of 
production in specie and separately dealing with their share of 
production, or by each separately authorising a participant or 
a third party to deal with their separate share of production 
as agent for each of them individually, are not "in receipt of 
income jointly"; and 
(ii) the participants to a joint venture do not carry "on 
business as partners". 
The relationship between the participants being held to be that 
of joint venture rather than a company or partnership for income tax 
purposes is particularly important as certain taxation write-offs and 
other taxation benefits can, to a significant degree, be taken in 
such manner as to suit the individual participant's taxation 
requirements when a joint venture is utilised75. The taxation 
benefits include: - 
(i) each participant, by receiving its share of the 
production in specie and then separately dealing with 
its share 
of the production, is treated as directly carrying on 
prescribed petroleum operations under the Income Tax Assessment 
Act (C'th)76 and is thereby severally qualified for special 
taxation treatment77. The special taxation treatment 
includes allowing a deduction in respect of certain expenditure 
of a capital nature incurred by a taxpayer in connection with 
the carrying on by it of such operations; 
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(ii) each participant is able to make its own election under 
the Income Tax Assessment Act (C'th) as to how its interest in 
the joint venture property is to be dealt with for taxation 
purposes, particularly in the areas of write-offs and 
depreciation78. Thus a participant, without regard to the 
election of the other participants to the joint venture, can 
elect to make use of either the general depreciation 
provisions79, or special depreciation provisions80 of the 
Income Tax Assessment Act (C'th), and in so doing may elect to 
adopt various differing rates of depreciation. A participant, 
without regard to the election of the other participants to the 
joint venture, can also elect to treat its expenditure in such 
manner as suit its individual requirements. Further, and again 
without regard to the election of the other participants to the 
joint venture, a participant can elect a different valuation 
for income taxation purposes, of stock in hand at the end of an 
accounting period 
81; 
(iii) each participant is able to set off its expenditure, 
including capital expenditure82 in some cases, in one or more 
projects that it is engaged in as a joint venture participant 
or on its own, or, other non-project expenditure of a 
tax-deductible nature against income received as a result of it 
separately dealing with its share of production from such one 
or more projects that it is engaged in as a joint venture 
participant or on its own, or, other non-project income of a 
taxable nature83. Likewise, each participant is able to 
determine its own method of valuing its share of product on 
hand at balance sheet date84; 
(iv) the possibility, where international business is 
involved, to relocate, to some extent, as to place and to time, 
sales income and/or profit85; 
(v) there are no difficulties relating to the transfer of 
trading stock between associated persons by a participant to a 
86 
joint venture retaining its individual share of production ; 
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(vi) if a participant to a joint venture is a foreign 
corporation it might enjoy certain taxation benefits under its 
domestic laws (be it to claim a deduction for expenditure or to 
obtain credits for any Australian taxes): such as was the case 
with American corporations, in relation to investment in the 
Industry87; 
(vii) a joint venture is not required to lodge an income tax 
return with the Commissioner of Taxation88; and 
(viii) where interest is consolidated, a participant to a joint 
venture, if Australian, could utilise the exemption from 
withholding tax in respect of overseas borrowing89. 
2. in view of the risk and cost elements mentioned above, the 
ability of a participant to a joint venture to withdraw from, or 
diminish its contribution to, or pursue objects pursuant to 
individual theories within the joint venture's programme. Sole risk, 
non consent, dilution, withdrawal and the like are discussed later in 
this thesis. Thus, a participant is able to adjust its interest in a 
joint venture from time to time having due regard not only to risks 
and cost elements but also the perceived merits of the project and 
its own business position; 
3. the nature of the project itself. This includes a 
consideration of the oil and gas to be extracted, the characteristics 
of the field, the production process, the project size, its technical 
complexity, as well as the financial capability, technical competence 
and previous exploration experience of the participants and, the 
domestic and non-domestic use for the end product. An example of an 
instance where a number of such factors have been involved giving 
rise to the use of the joint venture, is to be found in the State of 
Western Australia, where most of the major iron ore projects involve 
participation by Japanese trading houses, as it is through the 
Japanese trading houses that all iron ore passes on its way to the 
Japanese steel mills - the Japanese trading house therefore having an 
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interest in the product, to the extent that it is used in further 
processing undertaken within the group of which it forms a part 
90ý 
4. the financing by each participant of its share of capital and 
operating costs involved in undertaking a project91. Each 
participant severally seeks to be, and is, when a joint venture is 
utilised, free to make its own financing arrangements in such a way 
as suits it best. This may affect the rates or conditions a 
participant can obtain from a financier, based on its own perceived 
financial strength. A participant of a joint venture weak in the 
financial perspective would not, therefore, affect or "dilute" a 
strong participant. Also, by each participant financing its share of 
capital and operating costs there will not be any mutual credit 
risk. Furthermore, one participant may have access to substantial 
internal funding which it wishes to utilise. It is most unusual for 
joint ventures at the exploration phase of a field development to be 
financed other than severally by the participants. There is greater 
scope for joint financing in joint ventures at the production phase 
of a field development, although even this is not at all common92; 
5. from the accounting point of view, the freedom of each 
participants to treat its interest in the joint venture in such a 
manner as suits it best93. This is because the accounting records 
of a joint venture are not a profit and loss statement and balance 
sheet. The accounting records do not contain more than details of 
outgoings, either on capital account, such as for construction costs, 
or on income account, such as for operating costs, and receipts in 
terms of money put up by the participants. There is no profit as 
such made by the joint venture, nor do the participants receive sales 
income jointly. Therefore, each participant can bring to account its 
own share or proportion of income and expenditure and, in so doing, 
can ultimately bring to account its profit or loss on the project in 
its own way; 
6. in so far as liability to third parties in respect of the joint 
venture activities are concerned it has been suggested that, in the 
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absence of express or implied authority to the contrary, such 
liability is limited in the sense that each participant is severally 
liable, not jointly and severally liable, for monies owing to a third 
party. A participant to a joint venture is said not to be 
responsible for the acts of the other participants to the joint 
venture other than for the acts of a participant or third party 
undertaken within the limits of that participant's or third party's 
authority, as delegated expressly to the participant or third party 
or as otherwise implied to the 
94 
participant or third party 
Likewise, a participant to a joint venture is said not to be able to 
pledge the credit or to bind the other participants to the joint 
venture other than in the case of the a participant or third party 
who is expressly authorised to pledge the credit of or to bind the 
other participant or participants 
95. 
Thus the participants seek to 
insulate the non-operators from liability96; 
7. the absence of a requirement for the participants to agree upon 
a common dividend policy or a common drawing policy since each 
participant will receive its income as a result of the joint venture 
by the sale by it of its individual entitlement to the "product" of 
the joint venture 
97; 
8. each participant's undivided interest as a tenant in common in 
the joint venture property and assets is readily chargeable under 
English and Australian Law98, either by way of a fixed or floating 
charge or by some other form of security, if a participant seeks to 
mortgage its interest in support of borrowings required to finance 
its share of capital or operating costs, and also to provide security 
to the other participants, in support of its covenants to meet its 
share of such costs99; 
9. the fact that the principle of equity accounting can be taken 
advantage of, in the Australian context, below normally acceptable 
limits, viz, the accounts of a subsidiary company holding an entire 
five per cent (5%) interest in a joint venture can be consolidated 
into the parent's group cccounts100; 
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10. how the product is to be disposed of. This includes such 
questions as: Is all of the product for sale?; is one of the 
participants a consumer of the product?; is the product solely or 
principally for the export or domestic market; and is further 
processing or treatment of the product required locally or overseas 
and, if so, by whom will it be done? Such questions must be 
considered against the background that each participant is to take 
and market its own share of the product of the joint venture 
severally. Consequently, if a participant requires its share of the 
product for its own use, it is free to so use it; 
11. the ability to overcome nationalistic prejudices and to allow 
for state participation 
101; 
12. the element of common or shared control of the project and the 
management of the project; 
13. the absence of the need for permanency 
102 
; 
14. the right of the participants to make their own governing 
rules, taking into account their own separate and particular 
requirements and the requirements of the project, both present and 
future, about such matters as default, minority interest and 
termination. A joint venture thus enables the participants the 
maximum opportunity to control and develop a structure which is 
consistent with the requirements of the project, both present and 
future; 
15. the past United States of America taxation practice which 
subjected American corporations to tax on their world wide income 
meant that it was essential for an American corporation that its 
expenditure on oil and gas exploration throughout the world be 
incurred through one of its own American incorporated corporations, 
so that the expenditure could be set off against profits attributed 
to its American head office. Historically the need to establish that 
the corporation had an "interest" in an oil and gas asset, as opposed 
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to an interest in an entity, coupled with other taxation factors led 
American corporations to favour the joint venture approach to oil and 
gas exploration and development 
103; 
16. save as provided in the terms of the agreement entered into by 
the participants, no participant owes to the other participants the 
degree of confidence or mutual trust owed by partners to one another, 
so that a participant of a joint venture could conceivably compete 
with the joint venture104 Therefore a breach of confidence and 
mutual trust owed by one participant to another participant would not 
be a ground for dissolution of a joint venture unless it was provided 
for in the terms of the agreement entered into by the 
participants 
105; 
17. save as provided in the terms of the agreement entered into by 
the participants, each participant is free to transfer or assign its 
rights in and to the joint venture without consent of the other 
participants to the joint venture 
106; 
18. a joint venture is not a firm and as such it cannot sue or be 
sued in its own right. Any action would have to be taken by or 
against the participants to the joint venture107. Where the 
management of the project for which the joint venture was 
formed is 
vested in a participant or a third party, this may provide a measure 
of protection against being joined in actions 
involving the other 
participants; 
19. a joint venture is not required to file 
information with a 
central records office disclosing the activities of 
the joint venture 
as such; 
108 
20. the principle means by which non-oil companies or 
financial institutions 
109 
with little or no knowledge of the 
110 
Industry can become involved in oil exploration and production ; 
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21. the concern to avoid the impact of the anti-trust laws in the 
United States of America and Australia by not participating in a 
partnership 
ill; 
22. the need for existing participants in the Industry to raise 
funds and, in so doing, disposing of part of their interest in and to 
the joint venture 
112; 
23. the desire of a participant to become involved in a project 
more quickly than would result from the full exploration 
113 
process 
24. clarity of purpose. Participation in a joint venture focuses 
the attention of the participants on the dominant business purpose 
for which the joint venture was established 
114; 
and 
25. the ability of a participant to give to the public a stake in 
the project without the consent of the other participants to the 
joint venture 
115 
In most instances it is not possible to point to authorities 
supporting the claimed non-taxation advantages of the participants of a 
joint venture. The basis for the vast majority of these advantages 
depends upon a joint venture being treated as other than a partnership 
and, even then, upon the principles of partnership law not being applied 
to a joint venture. Many of the issues raised by the non-taxation 
advantages will be considered later in this thesis. 
Judicial recognition has been given to a number of the non-taxation 
considerations by Wallace J. in Mount Isa Mines Limited v Seltrust Mining 
Corporation Pty. Limited in relation to a mining joint venture 
116 
"Joint venture agreements have become common place in the exploration 
and development of mineral resources in Australia during the last 
decade. This is because vast sums of money are involved and the 
corporate bodies concerned have not wished to lose their individual 
identity. Corporate responsibility and taxation considerations have 
also assisted in giving rise to this relatively new creature. " 
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It is submitted that what Wallace J. has said about mineral resources 
is also true of oil and gas resources. 
Just as there are numerous reasons why participants seeking to 
undertake a project as a co-operative endeavour seek to utilise the joint 
venture as the relationship to utilise in order for them to create the 
legal structure within which they can conduct operations, there are 
numerous reasons why participants do not elect to utilise the joint 
venture. 
The primary reasons why a participant may not seek to utilise a joint 
venture include questions of the complex and time-consuming problems of 
fiscal, reporting, accounting, legal and financial matters that attend a 
joint venture; of liability to third parties; the lack of a management 
team which is independent of the participant or third party vested with 
the management of the project for which a joint venture is formed; the 
need for joint control and decision making117, which may create a risk 
that problems, or even a stalemate, may develop in the decision-making 
process. Also there is the suggestion that the joint venture is less than 
adaptive in the event of inaccurate or false prognosis and as such can 
allow a build-up of conflict over time, due to subsequent shifts of 
bargaining power. This is a consequence of the fact that all of the 
interests of each participant to a joint venture are not uniform and as 
such the object of the joint venture cannot always be pursued with the 
same single-mindedness which an individual participant could adopt 
118 
This is often demonstrated in the early stages of putting together a joint 
venture where the interest of each participant may adversely influence the 
common objective of the joint venture. Having overcome the early 
conflicts each participant's position in the joint venture, its financial 
position and its association with other participants, represent further 
potential areas of conflict within the joint venture. These areas of 
conflict may be strengthend if unforseen difficulties push demands upon 
the participants to the joint venture beyond the bound of the negotiated 
agreement between the participants. The resolution of areas of conflict 
may result in loss of valuable time for the project and, in some cases, 
weaken the overall flexibility of the joint venture in dealing with 
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changing circumstances. Moreover, the effectiveness of the joint venture 
may be undermined by negotiated compromises between the participants that 
replace the certainty of a more autocratic management. 
12. THE JOINT VENTURE IN CONTEXT 
Before setting out the issue to be considered in this thesis it is 
necessary to try to place the joint venture in the sort of context that 
may be found in a field development. Primarily, because of the peculiar 
financial requirements and the length of time of a development, joint 
ventures may be established for each phase of a field development, such 
as, inter alia, a separate agreement to cover each of the following: - 
1. bidding; 
2. exploration; 
3. appraisal and development; 
4. exploitation; 
5. drilling; 
6. production; 
7. transportation, whether by pipeline, tanker or otherwise, and 
terminals; 
8. processing and refining; 
9, marketing; 
10. downstream processing; or 
11. utilisation 
119 
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Furthermore, the participants to the different phases of a field 
development may vary from phase to phase, as may the percentage interests 
of the participants in each phase. 
The agreements giving rise to the various joint ventures mentioned 
above are given descriptive names, for each phase of a field development. 
The descriptive names are very loose and far from universally applied. An 
example of this is to be found in a statement by Argyle 
120 
- 
"... in the mining industry it is customary to talk of the agreement 
amongst the participants as a joint venture agreement, in the 
petroleum industry the same agreement is usually referred to as a 
joint operating agreement (JOA). " 
Examples of the descriptive names are: - 
1. at the bidding phase -a joint bidding agreement; 
2. at the exploration and proving up phase, or the appraisal phase 
-a joint exploration agreement or joint appraisal agreement. It is 
not uncommon to find this phase combined with the development phase 
and as such a joint operating agreement or joint venture agreement is 
to be found; and 
3. at the development phase -a joint development agreement. 
It is not suggested that each of the types of agreement is to be 
found in each oil and gas field development. They certainly are not. 
However, in a lawyer's utopia, there would be prior written agreements 
between the participants of each phase of a field development for each 
separate phase of that field development. It is most unlikely that one 
agreement would cover all the phases of a field development, but one 
agreement could cover several phases121 . However, where a 
joint venture 
is formed it is usually restricted to a single project, be it a single 
phase or a number of phases of a field development or the whole of the 
122 
development2 
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13. ISSUES TO BE CONSIDERED IN THIS THESIS 
In Great Britain and Australia, there is neither general legislation 
specifically directed to the recognition and regulation of joint ventures 
nor is there a body of settled authority in this form of business 
relationship. 
A joint venture is a creature of contract; the terms and conditions 
for the conduct of the joint venture appear in a document normally 
entitled the Joint Operating Agreement. The principles of law governing 
the joint venture include the law relating to contract, property and 
equity, but the fundamental business issues will be set out specifically 
in the Joint Operating Agreement. 
This thesis will, in the main, concentrate on the joint venture in 
the Industry in the domestic commerce of Great Britain and Australia, on 
the assumption that the participants are nationals, but not parastatal 
enterprises, of the country in which they seek to undertake the 
Exploration Phase as a co-operative endeavour and to form a joint venture 
so to do. 
In concentrating upon the joint venture in the context of the 
Industry it is not forgotten that the joint venture is not limited to the 
Industry. The joint venture is to be found in many industries, not the 
least mining, manufacturing, public utilities, banking, transport and 
shipping, research, buying and selling and real estate. Furthermore, it 
is recognised that a large number of joint ventures transend national 
boundaries. Whilst not ignoring this fact completely, this thesis will 
not concentrate on the issues raised as a result of this transnational 
phenomenon. 
The legal structure of the agreement establishing the joint venture 
for each of the phases of a field development is basically the same. This 
thesis will, in examining the joint venture in the context of the 
Exploration Phase, consider a number of issues relating to the 
relationship between the participants to a typical Joint Operating 
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Agreement within the ambit of the legal regimes of Great Britain and 
Australia. Where considered relevant, the examination will take into 
account the approach of other legal regimes, such as Canada, South Africa 
and the United States of America. 
Against this background the main issues to be considered in this 
thesis will be: - 
1. the nature of the joint venture; 
2. the relationship between the Participants inter se; and 
3. the relationship between the Operator and the Participants. 
Save to the extent necessary for the consideration of a number of 
issues relating to the relationship between participants of a typical 
Joint Operating Agreement in the context of the legal regimes of Great 
Britain and Australia, this thesis will not describe in detail the 
underlying legal framework relating to the Industry or the impact on the 
joint venture of international and domestic laws and regulations nor the 
operation of international and domestic regulatory agencies. As this 
thesis will consider the joint venture in the context of the legal regimes 
of Great Britain and Austalia, it will not consider the impact of foreign 
laws on the joint venture. 
In the introduction to Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in 
Judicial Reasoning Walter Wheeler Cooke state 
123 
"... none of us can claim to have been the originator of any very 
large portion of any science, be it legal or physical. It is all 
that can be expected if each one of us succeeds in adding a few 
stones, or even one, to the evergrowing edifice which science 
is 
rearing. It follows that anything which one writes must largely 
be made up of a restatement of what has already been said by 
others in another form. Each one of us may congratulate himself 
if he has added something of value, even if that consists only in 
so rearranging the data which others have accumulated as to throw 
new light upon the subject -a light which will serve to 
illuminate the pathway of those who come after us and so enable 
them to make still further progress. " 
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It is with these words in mind that this thesis will be developed. 
14. PROFORMAS 
Examples of each of the typical Joint Operating Agreements utilised 
for each of the various phases of a field development will not be 
considered in this thesis. Rather, in the consideration of the issues 
mentioned above, two typical Joint Operating Agreements will provide the 
background against which the consideration of the issues will be made. It 
is the Joint Operating Agreement which defines and regulates the 
activities to be undertaken by the participants of the undertaking in 
unison of a project as a co-operative endeavour124 and which defines the 
interests of the participants 
125 
The proforma Joint Operating Agreement issued by Britoil Limited for 
the eighth licencing round126 will provide an example of a typical joint 
venture agreement utilised in the Great Britain jurisdiction. The 
"Guidelines for an Exploration Joint Operating Agreement"127 issued by 
the Australian Petroleum Exploration Association Limited will provide an 
example of a typical joint venture agreement utilised in the Australian 
jurisdiction. From the research conducted in preparing this thesis it is 
fair to say that although neither of the example proformas are in regular 
use by practicioners engaged in the areas of oil and gas law, in their 
entirety, the principle provisions contained therein are in regular use. 
This is particularly so in Great Britain. 
The Joint Operating Agreement in Great Britain, as in Australia, finds 
its roots in the Form 610 developed by the American Association of 
Petroleum Landmen for use in onshore arrangements in the United States of 
America128. With the advent of exploration for oil in Great Britain and 
Australia came attempts to adapt the American proforma for use in the 
Great Britain129 and Australian jurisdictions, although this did not 
lend to a standardised form in either case. 
Matters changed in Great Britain 
130 
in 1977 with the fifth licencing 
round and the participation of the British National Oil Corporation in all 
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Licences. One of the requirements for the issue of a Licence was that 
prospective licensees should conclude a Joint Operating Agreement with the 
British National Oil Corporation in a form acceptable to the Department of 
Energy 
131 
gy . 
The Department of Energy invited the oil industry to submit 
proposals for a standard form of Joint Operating Agreement 
132 
.A 
working group from the United Kingdom Offshore Operators Association 
prepared and submitted a draft. This draft was not adopted 
133 
Instead 
the British National Oil Corporation issued its own draft Joint Operating 
Agreement134 Each group of Licence applicants negotiated with the 
British National Oil Corporation on the basis of this draft, so as to 
arrive at the final form of Joint Operating Agreement to be submitted to 
the Department of Energy135 In the main, the draft form was accepted 
with minor variations so as to meet the individual needs of each group of 
Licence applicants. 
The proforma developed by the British National Oil Corporation 
provided and, continues to provide, the basis for Joint Operating 
Agreements entered into by groups of Licence applicants in licencing 
rounds subsequent to the fifth licencing round. The Britoil Limited 
proforma, which is considered in this thesis, is based upon the draft 
Joint Operating Agreement developed by the British National Oil 
Corporation in 1977. 
The development of a standard form of Joint Operating Agreement in 
Australia was not the same, as there has been no incident of state 
participation of the nature experienced in Great Britain to force 
standardisation upon the Industry. This is not to say that, despite it 
being acknowledged that joint venture agreements have been entered into in 
respect of a large number of the major Industry developments in Australia, 
the structure and basic terms of Joint Operating Agreements have not 
attained a reasonable degree of consistency and uniformity; they have. 
Attempts have been made in Australia by the Australian Mining and 
Petroleum Law Association and by the Australian Petroleum Exploratioin 
Association Limited to produce a standard Joint Operating Agreement. 
After discussions between the two groups, the Australian Petroleum 
Exploration Association Limited produced its proforma Joint Operating 
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Agreement 
136 
In this thesis, it is this proforma which forms the basic 
example for discussion from the Australian view point. 
The examination of the issues mentioned above, against the background 
of the two proforma examples, will give rise to a consideration of the 
general principles applicable to most, if not all, joint venture 
agreements of the types mentioned above. Naturally, the specific issues 
of the particular project being undertaken, for which the joint venture 
agreement is prepared, will vary widely and as such cannot form part of 
the issues to be considered here. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE PARTICIPANTS, OPERATING COMMITTEE AND OPERATOR: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
CONSIDERATION OF THEIR ROLES, RIGHTS AND DUTIES 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In considering the participants to a Joint Operating Agreement for 
the Exploration Phase, the roles that they adopt within the ambit of the 
Joint Operating Agreement and their rights and duties, it is proposed to 
limit the examination to what may be termed as those participants who fall 
within the direct ambit of the Joint Operating Agreement. To illustrate 
what is intended, the following diagram represents what may be called the 
direct interelationship of the participants to a Joint Operating Agreement 
for the Exploration Phase: - 
PARTICIPANT --------------------- 
PARTICIPANT --------------------- 
PARTICIPANT --------------------- 
PARTICIPANT --------------------- 
PARTICIPANT --------------------- 
OPERATOR --------------------- 
OPERATOR --------------------- 
OPERATOR --------------------- 
PARTICIPANT 
SOLE RISK PARTICIPANT 
OPERATING COMMITTEE 
OPERATOR 
THIRD PARTIES 
SOLE RISK PARTICIPANT 
OPERATING COMMITTEE 
THIRD PARTIES 
A participant may be represented more than once. This is because the 
participant accepts more than one role within the ambit of the Joint 
Operating Agreement. The most obvious example of a multi-role situation 
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is that of a participant who is: - 
1. a Participant; 
2. a member of the Operating Committee; 
3. the Operator; and 
4. a Participant to a Sole Risk Drilling. 
This example can be expanded further if necessary, but for the 
purpose of the illustration it will suffice. 
When considering the heading "third parties" one should bear in mind 
such third parties as: - 
1. relevant regulatory authorities and administrative authorities 
such as, in the United Kingdom, the Secretary of State for Energy 
and, in Australia, the Joint Authorities and the Designated 
Authorities; 
2. employees of the Participants and of the Operator; 
3. financial institutions; 
4. consumers, be they affiliates of the Participants or otherwise; 
S. contractors of the Participants and of the Operator; and 
6. sub-contractors and agents of the Participants, of the Operator 
and of the contractors. 
The list of third parties can also be expanded if necessary. However 
the list provided above will suffice to illustrate the point that the 
range of "third parties" is extensive. 
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The following chapters will consider, inter alia, the role, rights 
and duties of each of the following participants to a Joint Operating 
Agreement for the Exploration Phase and look at how the roles, rights and 
duties interrelate between: - 
1. the Participants; 
2. the Operating Committee; and 
3. the Operator. 
Each of the participants will be considered separately. In so doing 
the overlap in their roles, rights and duties will become obvious, as will 
the way in which their roles, rights and duties interrelate. It is not 
proposed to consider the roles, rights and duties of the various third 
parties in so far as they relate to a Joint Operating Agreement for the 
Exploration Phase, save to the extent that such roles, rights and duties 
have a direct and material impact upon the roles, rights and duties of the 
participants. 
The consideration will be set against the background of the proformas. 
The issue of whether a Joint Operating Agreement for the Exploration 
Phase establishes the relationship of joint venture, as between the 
Participants or that of partnership, and whether a joint venture is a 
partnership, will not be discussed when the consideration of the role, 
rights and duties of the participants is undertaken. It will be dealt 
with separately, later in this thesis. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE PARTICIPANTS: AN INTRODUCTION 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In this thesis it is proposed to consider the role, rights and duties 
of the Participants. In so doing it is proposed to examine only the major 
areas that are thought to require particular attention. The majority of 
the minor areas will be dealt with when considering the role, rights and 
duties of the Operator. It is not proposed to consider such matters from 
the point of view of the Participants in the chapters where the role, 
rights and duties of the Participants are considered. Such would achieve 
no more than viewing the same issues from a different perspective without 
giving rise to any issues which would warrant what could be seen as double 
treatment. 
The Participants are those persons, usually unrelated companies, who, 
for what ever reason, have made the decision to join together' to apply 
t 
for a petroleum title covering one or more blocks, and who have been 
successful in their application. In Great Britain, the number of 
Participants may be limited by the requirement that there be no more than 
ten licencees in respect of any one block3. 
The number of participants who enter into a joint venture to 
undertake the Exploration Phase will vary from project to project. As a 
general rule, the greater the inherent risks involved and the costs 
associated with the Exploration Phase, the larger the number of 
participants. However, the point can be reached where the risks and costs 
associated with an Exploration Phase are so great that only very large 
companies can economically afford to be participants 
in the joint venture 
formed to undertake that phase. 
In addition, there is also a statutory restriction as to the number 
of participants who can come together 
in a joint venture. Subject to 
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certain exceptions, section 716(1) of the Companies Act 1985 (UK) 
restricts to twenty the number of persons who may form a "company, 
association or partnership"... "for the purpose of carrying on any 
business that has for its object the acquisition of gain by the company, 
association or partnership, or by its individual members, unless it is 
registered as a company" under the said Act. Likewise, subject to certain 
exceptions, section 33(3) of the Companies (Western Australia) Code 1981 
(WA) restricts to twenty the number of persons who may constitute "an 
association or partnership ... that has for its object the acquisition of 
gain by the association or partnership or individual members of the 
association or partnership ... unless it is incorporated" under the said 
Code or formed pursuant to an Act or letters patent. 
Notwithstanding, it is argued later in this thesis that, in a joint 
venture, there is no "acquisition of gain" by an association or 
partnership and that a joint venture is not a partnership, there is a 
tendency in the Industry to endeavour to keep the number of participants 
who form a joint venture below twenty. This may be because it is arguable 
that a joint venture is an unincorporated association 
4. 
In Great Britain, the coming together of the Participants usually 
occurs following, or in anticipation of, the announcement of a new 
licencing round. The coming together is usually evidenced by a formal 
agreement referred to, depending upon its nature, as either an area of 
mutual interest agreement or a joint bidding agreements. The position 
in Australia is very similar to that in Great Britain. Where applications 
are invited for blocks, area of mutual interest agreements and or joint 
bidding agreements are commonplace6. In general terms, the participants 
seek to work together with the view of jointly applying for a petroleum 
title and in so doing share the cost of application and pool their 
respective knowledge, data and information in relation to the blocks on 
offer or to be offered. 
2. AREA OF MUTUAL INTEREST AGREEMENTS 
An area of mutual interest agreement relates to an area, the area of 
mutual interest, within which the participants agree that they will 
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conduct operations only jointly as a group. This precludes a participant 
from conducting operations in the area of mutual interest either as an 
individual or as a participant in a group other than the group formed 
pursuant to the area of mutual interest agreement. The restriction may be 
tempered by providing that a participant can conduct operations other than 
jointly, as mentioned above, provided that it first invites the other 
participant or participants of the area of mutual interest agreement to 
join in the operations proportionately, in the same shares as the 
participants had agreed to co-operate within the area of mutual interest. 
The operations would include the making of application for any petroleum 
title, and the farming-in to any existing petroleum title, within the area 
of mutual interest 
7. 
3. JOINT BIDDING AGREEMENTS 
A joint bidding agreement differs from an area of mutual interest 
agreement in that it relates only to the application for new petroleum 
titles within the area of mutual interest 
In Great Britain, because of the informal indication given by the 
Department of Energy in the seventh, eighth and ninth licencing rounds 
that an important criteria for selecting a group of participants for a 
Licence would be the degree of participation by United Kingdom entities in 
the competing bidding groups, the joint bidding agreement assumed an 
important role. Indirectly, the informal criteria assisted the growth of 
participation in joint ventures in the Industry in Great Britain. A 
non-United Kingdom entity seeking a Licence found it most desirable to 
join with a United Kingdom entity in making application to the Secretary 
of State for Energy for a Licence. A spin-off from this approach was the 
number of United Kingdom entities, a large number of whom had had no 
previous Industry experience or involvement, who were sought out and 
included as participants to bidding groups, in an endeavour to increase 
the British entity content of the group9. 
A joint bidding agreement usually seeks to: - 
1. commit the participants, during one or more licenc1ng rounds or 
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a stated period of time, to apply jointly and on an exclusive basis 
for petroleum titles within the area of mutual interest; 
2. require the participants to endeavour to agree the block or 
blocks within the area of mutual interest in relation to which 
application or applications will be made for a petroleum title or 
titles. It is normally the case that the agreement must be unanimous; 
3. prohibit a participant from making or joining in any other 
application for a petroleum title within the area of mutual interest 
during the term of the agreement; 
4. establish the consequences resulting from the participants 
failing to reach agreement upon specified matters within a specified 
period of time; 
5. nominate the person who will be the Operator for the purpose of 
the agreement and also when and if the application or applications 
for a petroleum title or titles is or are successful 
10; 
6. nominate the intended percentage interest of each participant 
for the purpose of the agreement and also the intended Interest of 
each participant if the application or applications for a petroleum 
title or titles is or are successful 
11; 
and 
7. require the participants to undertake to enter 
into a Joint 
Operating Agreement if the application or applications for a 
l 
petroleum title or titles is or are successful2 
4. OBJECTIVE OF THE PARTICIPANTS 
The objective of the Participants, having been successful 
in their 
application for a petroleum title, in entering into a Joint 
Operating 
Agreement extends to the scope of the agreement: the searching or 
boring 
for, or exploring for, petroleum within the area to which the petroleum 
title relates13. The agreement may also extend to the production of 
petroleum and other activities associated therewith 
14. 
However, the 
agreement will nearly always state that the objective of the 
Participants 
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is to exclude from within the scope of the agreement any joint financing, 
marketing or sale arrangements 
15 
The objective of the Participants will be carefully drafted - even if 
in general terms - as 
venture will operate. 
consent of all of the 
want to know at what 
pursuant to the Joint 
16 
activities 
it defines the parameters within which the joint 
To go beyond of those parameters will require the 
Participants. Furthermore, each Participant will 
point the activity undertaken or to be undertaken 
Operating Agreement, may conflict with its other 
5. THE INTERESTS OF THE PARTICIPANTS 
The Joint Operating Agreement will set out very clearly the undivided 
share of each Participant, as at the date of the commencement of the 
17 
agreement, in 
1. the petroleum title, all production from the petroleum title 
and the proceeds of the sale of production from the petroleum 
title 
18; 
2. all the property of whatsoever kind, be it real or pesonal, 
acquired by the Participants in the conduct, or for the purpose, of 
the joint undertaking of the Operations19; and 
3. all other estate, right, title, interest or obligation of the 
20 
Participants arising under or by virtue of the agreement . 
A Participant's undivided share - its Interest - is usually expressed 
as a percentage. The Participants' Interests relate to the proportionate 
undivided share as tenants in common of each of the respective 
Participants in the ownership of the assets, as well as the bearing of the 
liabilities of their activity, that is, in the entirety of the activity. 
It is not correct to refer to these assets and liabilities as the assets 
and liabilities of the joint venture; they are the assets and liabilities 
of the Participants. This distinction is most important and 
is often 
overlooked. In this sense, the interest of a participant to a 
joint 
rl( 
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venture in such assets and liabilities and hence the Interest of a 
Participant can be distinguished from that of a partner in partnership 
property. The High Court of Australia in Canny Gabriel Castle Jackson 
Advertising Pty. Limited v Volume Sales (Finance) Pty. Limited21 
described the interest of a partner in partnership property as follows: - 
"The partner's share in the partnership is not a title to specific 
property but a right to his proportion of the surplus after the 
realization of assets and the payment of debts and liabilities. 
However, it has always been accepted that a partner has an interest 
in every asset of the partnership and this interest has been 
universally described as a "beneficial interest" notwithstanding its 
peculiar character ... 
Nevertheless we think that the interest of the partner in an asset of 
the partnership is sui generis ... 
It is, as we have said, recognized 
as a beneficial interest. " 
In Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Everett22 Barwick C. J., 
Stephen, Mason and Wilson JJ. said: - 
"Although a partner has no title to specific property owned by the 
partnership, he has a beneficial interest in the partnership assets, 
indeed in each and every asset of the partnership: Canny Gabriel 
Castle Jackson Advertising Pty. Limited v Volume Sales (Finance) Pty. 
Limited (1974) 131 CLR 321 at 327-328; 8 ALR 407 at 412; Livingston 
v Comr. of Stamp Duties (Qld) (1960) 107 CLR 411 at 453. His share 
in the partnership consists of a right to a proportion of the surplus 
after the realization of the assets and the payment of the debts and 
liabilities of the partnership: Bakewell v DFC of T (SA) (1937) 58 
CLR 743 and 770; Bolton v FC of T (1964) 9 AITR 385 at 389. 
Historically the interest of a partner in a partnership has been 
considered to be an equitable interest because it 
is a right or 
interest enforceable in equity and not at law: Bolton, supra. 
" 
A participant to a joint venture and hence a Participant, unlike a 
partner, has a separate and identifiable interest in each asset acquired 
by the participants in the conduct, or for the purpose of the 
joint 
23 
venture 
It is important to appreciate that the undivided share of each 
Participant is an undivided share as a tenant in common with the other 
Participants. It is possible for a situation to arise where the 
Participants do not have the same interest in each and every asset and 
or 
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liability. This is to be contrasted with the position of the Participants 
in relation to the Licence: they are joint tenants24. The fact that the 
Joint Operating Agreement does set out the respective Interests of the 
Participants is important, as the Licence itself does not set out the 
respective interests of the Participants. The Licence merely establishes 
a joint entitlement on the part of the Participants as a group. The 
Participants are collectively granted the right to search or bore for, or 
explore for, or extract petroleum from, the licenced area. The Licence 
also provides that where the Licence is held by more than one person, the 
obligations to be observed and performed under the Licence shall be 
performed and observed by the Participants 25 y jointly and severally . 
Hence the Joint Operating Agreement seeks to sever the joint tenancy 
created by the Licence in so far as the Participants inter se are 
concerned and in so far as all third parties, other than the Secretary of 
State for Energy, are concerned26. The position of the Participants in 
relation to the Permit is the same: they are joint tenants. The same 
considerations as discussed in relation to the Licence apply to the Permit. 
Another way in which the Interest of a Participant can be 
distinguished from that of a partner in partnership property is that, 
unlike a partner27, the Participant has certain rights or choses in 
action represented by the Joint Operating Agreement and related 
28 
agreements 
The setting out of the Interests of the Participants also takes into 
account the situation where the Participants are not the same as the 
holders of the relevant petroleum title. In Great Britain this situation 
often arose where the holder of an interest in a Licence sought to pass 
its economic interest through to an associated party, usually a company 
incorporated in America. The passing through of the economic interest was 
done by an illustrative agreement (sometimes also called a pass through 
agreement) under which the legal interest was held by a United Kingdom 
resident company whilst the American resident company held the beneficial 
interest in any production resulting under the Licence. The need for this 
device arose as a result of regulation 4 of the Petroleum (Production) 
Regulations 1966 which required applicants for a Licence to be resident 
citizens of the United Kingdom and colonies or companies incorporated in 
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the United Kingdom. This requirement was abolished in 1976 in order that 
the United Kingdom might comply with its obligations not to discriminate 
against EEC nationals and companies29. Coupled with the requirement for 
applicants for a Licence was also the desire of American companies to be 
able to retain full freedom to write off expenditure for United States tax 
30 
purposes 
Where an illustrative agreement has been utilised it is the 
associated party who will be the Participant - the holder of an Interest. 
The holder of the interest in the Licence who has passed its economic 
interest through to the associated party will also be a Participant but 
with no economic rights or duties under the Joint Operating Agreement 
whilst the illustrative agreement remains operative 
31. 
It will not be 
the holder of an Interest whilst the illustrative agreement remains 
operative. 
In this thesis it will be presumed that the Participants are the same 
as the holders of the relevant petroleum title. 
The Interest of each Participant is subject to adjustment and 
variation from time to time32. The matters giving rise to these 
alterations are set out in the Joint Operating Agreement and will include 
such matters as withdrawal, default and assignment 
33 
Some Joint Operating Agreements will provided for a limit below which 
a Participant's Interest cannot be reduced without the consent of all of 
the Participants 
34 
In general terms, the nature of the Interest of a Participant may be 
said to be both proprietary and contractual. The Interest is proprietary, 
in so far as it relates to the undivided share as tenant in common in the 
assets and contractual, in so far as it comprises choses in action 
relating to management of the Operations and in so far as the right of one 
Participant as against another Participant is concerned. The dual 
character of the Interest of a Participant requires the application of the 
relevant principles of the law of property and the law of contract, to be 
considered in any analysis of a Joint Operating Agreement and the 
joint 
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venture formed thereby and of the Interest of a Participant35. The 
consequences of this dual character will be demonstrated later in this 
thesis, particularly when the assignment of a part or the whole of the 
Interest of a Participant is considered. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE PETROLEUM TITLE 
1. INTRODUCTION 
One of the assets in which each Participant has, as a general rule, 
an undivided share as a tennant in common, is the petroleum title. It is 
around the petroleum title that the Joint Operating Agreement revolves. 
It is the main reason that the Participants enter into the Joint Operating 
Agreement; to exploit the area to which the petroleum title relates for 
their individual benefit 
The petroleum title, in the case of the Britoil proforma, is the 
Licence issued by the Secretary of State for Energy2 to the Participants 
and, any other Licence issued to the Participants in substitution or 
partial substitution for the original Licence3. 
The petroleum title, in the case of the Apea proforma, is the Permit 
issued by the Joint Authority4 to the Participants and any variation, 
amendment, extension or renewal thereof5 and all petroleum exploration, 
development, production, transporation and retention tenements granted in 
substitution thereof or as an adjuct thereto 
2. PROPERTY IN PETROLEUM IN SITU 
In order to examine the nature of and the rights of the Participants 
under a petroleum title, it is first necessary to determine in whom the 
property in petroleum in situ is vested. After all, if a petroleum title 
grants to the Participants the exclusive, or virtually exclusive, right to 
search, bore for and get petroleum within the area to which the petroleum 
title relates, it is desirable to know in whom the property in the 
7 
petroleum in situ is vested 
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In so far as any rights in petroleum in situ in the offshore area is 
concerned, the position is governed by Article 2 of the 1958 Geneva 
Convention on the Continental Shelf and section 1 of the Continental Shelf 
Act 1965. 
By virtue of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf the 
8 
Crown has: - 
"... sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring [the continental 
shelf proximate to its coast] and exploiting [its] natural 
resources. "9 
The sovereign rights are: - 
"... exclusive in the sense that if the coastal State does not 
explore the continental shelf or exploit its natural resources no one 
may undertake these activities ... without the express consent of the 
coastal State. "10 
This does not mean that the coastal State owns the continental shelf 
proximate to its coast. The regime relating to the continental shelf 
cannot be assimilated with territory''. The coastal State merely has an 
exclusive right to explore and exploit the natural resources of the 
continental shelf proximate to its coast. The coastal State cannot 
exercise full governmental powers over the continental shelf proximate to 
its coast, it can only exercise such powers as the 1958 Geneva Convention 
on the Continental Shelf permits and as are necessary for the enjoyment of 
the exclusive right. Thus, though the coastal State does not have 
ownership of the continental shelf proximate to its coast, it does have 
1 
rights which are considered to be proprietary in nature2. Hence, the 
coastal State can pass to the the holder of a petroleum title relating to 
an area on the continental shelf proximate to its coast, at least, the 
right to explore for and exploit the natural resources of the continental 
13 
shelf proximate to its coast that is proprietary in nature . 
The natural resources of the continental shelf proximate to a State's 
coast referred to "... consist of the mineral and other non-living 
14 resources of the sea-bed and subsoil 
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The term "continental shelf" refers: - 
"(a) to the sea-bed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to 
the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 
200 metres or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the 
superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural 
resources of the said areas; 
(b) to the sea-bed and subsoil of similar submarine areas adjacent to 
the coasts of islands. "15 
In this thesis it is not proposed to consider further the 1958 Geneva 
Convention on the Continental Shelf16 or, the numerous issues that are 
raised thereby in relation to the application thereof or the physical 
extent of the continental shelf proximate to the United Kingdom and 
Australia respectively. These, and similar issues, are dealt with 
adequately elsewhere17. 
To make the provisions of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the 
Continental Shelf operative in domestic, as opposed to international, law 
and thereby binding upon and in so doing affecting the rights and freedoms 
of the subjects of the United Kingdom or Australia, as the case may 
be, it 
was necessary for the enactment of specific legislation transforming the 
1 
provisions of the treaty into municipal law8. This objective was 
addressed: - 
1. in the case of Great Britain, by the Continental Shelf Act 
1964 
(UK) which sought to vest in the Crown: - 
"Any rights exercisable by the United Kingdom outside 
territorial waters with respect to the sea-bed and subsoil and 
their natural resources ... "19 
Section 1(3) of the Continental Shelf Act 1964 (UK) when read 
in conjunction with section 1(8) of the Continental 
Shelf Act 1964 
(UK) and section 1(2) of the Petroleum (Production) 
Act 1934 (UK) 
makes it clear that the "natural resources" referred 
to in section 
1(1) of the Continental Shelf Act 1964 
(UK) include oil and natural 
gas20. Furthermore, the definition of the term 
"natural resources" 
in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental 
Shelf 
21 
would 
appear to include oil and natural gas. 
In the absence of a 
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definition of the term "natural resources" in the law of the United 
Kingdom that is inconsistent with what has been submitted, it is 
further submitted that the courts of England and Scotland would give 
to that term under the Continental Shelf Act 1964 (UK) a meaning 
consistent to that set out in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the 
Continental Shelf22; 
2. in the case of Australia, by the Seas and Submerged Lands Act 
1973 (C'th) which, inter alia, declared: - 
"that the sovereign rights of Australia as a coastal State in 
respect of the continental shelf of Australia, for the purpose 
of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources, are 
vested in and exerciseable by the Crown in right of the 
Commonwealth"23. 
The Australian States challenged the validity of the Seas and 
Submerged Lands Act 1973 (C'th). The High Court of Australia in New 
South Wales v Commonwealth24 confirmed, inter alia, the 
jurisdiction of the Commonwealth Parliament over petroleum resources 
in the offshore area when all members of the High Court of Australia 
supported the declaration of Commonwealth "sovereign rights" over the 
natural resources in the offshore area. The High Court of Australia 
held that the Submerged Lands Act 1973 (C'th) was, inter alia, an 
effective implementation of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the 
Continental Shelf. 
Although the Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973 (C'th) does not 
state what is meant by the term "natural resources", the definition 
of the term in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf 
would appear to include oil and natural gas. Furthermore, as with 
the courts of England and Scotland, courts of Australia would, in the 
absence of a definition of the term "natural resources" in the law of 
Australia that is inconsistent with what has been submitted, give to 
that term, under the Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973 (C'th), a 
meaning consistent to that set out in the 1958 Geneva Convention on 
25 
the Continental Shelf 
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In June 1979, agreement was reached at a Premiers' Conference 
to establish a joint Commonwealth/State regime for, inter alia, the 
petroleum resources of the offshore area, with Commonwealth 
responsibility for policy issues and State responsibility for 
administrative arrangements. The relevant legislation is the 
Commonwealth legislation; day-to-day administration is vested in the 
hands of the Designated Authority and the more significant powers are 
vested in the Joint Authority. The agreement does not impinge upon 
the fact that the Commonwealth has jurisdiction over petroleum 
resources in the offshore area. 
The question may be asked as to what is the nature and extent of the 
rights excercisable by the United Kingdom referred to in section 1(1) of 
the Continental Shelf Act 1964 (UK) and, by Australia, referred to in 
Section 11 of the Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973 (C'th). 
Neither the Continental Shelf Act 1964 (UK) nor the Seas and 
Submerged Lands Act 1973 (C'th) of itself provides the answer26 and, as 
such, recourse must be had to conventional and customary international 
law. This leads back to Article 2(1) of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the 
Continental Shelf where the rights are described as ". .. sovereign rights 
for the purpose of exploring ... and exploiting"27 the natural resources 
of the continental shelf proximate to the coast of the State. As is 
evident from the Continental Shelf Act 1964 (UK) 
28 
and the Seas and 
Submerged Lands Act 1973 (C'th), these rights are not assimilated to State 
territory29, in that it does not mean that the coastal State "owns" the 
continental shelf proximate to its coast or the natural resources 
thereof. What, then, are these rights? Are they of a proprietary 
nature? Do they confer, inter alia, ownership of petroleum in situ in the 
offshore area in the Crown? 
It is not proposed in this thesis to consider the conflicting 
arguments advanced in answer of the questions raised. They have been 
adequately addressed elsewhere30. To the extent that there has been a 
judicial pronouncement on the underlying issue one is left with the obiter 
dictum of Slade J. in Earl of Lonsdale v Attorney General31 and the 
3 
dicta in New South Wales v Commonwealth2 
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Slade J. said: - 
"These obiter conclusions as to the interpretation of these two Acts 
[Petroleum (Production) Act 1934 (UK) and Continental Shelf Act 1964 
(UK)] may be thought to invoke certain anomalies in that, if correct, 
they mean that the Crown can claim a statutory title to oil and 
natural gas situated beneath the continental shelf, ,,. -34 
The effect of this dictum, in the context of the decision, was to 
hold the view that section 1(1) of the Continental Shelf Act 1964 (UK) 
expropriated to the Crown any rights in petroleum in situ in the offshore 
area which might previously have been vested in private hands35. It is 
submitted that to have advanced such a view Slade J. must have considered 
that the rights were of a proprietary nature. 
In New South Wales v Commonwealth36 Barwick C. J. said: - 
"Sovereign rights at least imply exclusive and paramount rights to 
exploit together with all the power necessary to secure the principal 
rights. "37, and 
Stephen J. said: - 
°'... their subject matter [Division 2 of the Seas and Submerged Lands 
Act 1973 (C'th)] is not proprietorship inconsistent with State 
interests, nor is it even sovereignity, but sovereign rights for 
specific purposes, the exploration and exploitation of natural 
resources. °'38 
Hence, the High Court of Australia saw the position as being one of 
39 
sovereign rights rather than proprietary rights 
There is strong support for the view that the rights are of a 
40 
proprietary nature to be found in the writing of the commentators . 
The argument runs that petroleum in situ in the offshore area can no 
longer be regarded as res nullius, for a determinate person, the Crown, 
has, in the case of Great Britain, by virtue of section 1(1) of the 
Continental Shelf Act 1964 (UK), and, in the case of Australia, by virtue 
of Section 11 of the Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973 (C'th), the right 
to reduce that petroleum into possession and the right to exclude any 
other person from so doing. These rights are said to equate with 
proprietary rights. It is conceded that the Crown may not thereby have 
gained full ownership of petroleum in situ in the offshore area but, 
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nevertheless it is argued that the Crown does thereby gain a limited or 
qualified form of ownership thereof 
41. 
It has been suggested that the 
nearest analogy available in the United Kingdom and Australia would be the 
profit a' prendre of English and Australian law and the lease of mineral 
42 
rights in Scottish law. 
From the point of view of this thesis, the lack of certainty as to 
the nature of the Crown's right to petroleum in situ in the offshore area 
is not of major importance. It is sufficient that the Crown has the right 
to reduce such petroleum into possession and the right to exclude other 
persons from so doing and thereby has the right to delegate to other 
persons the right to explore for and to exploit petroleum in situ in the 
offshore area through, in the current situation, a licence regime. 
3. THE PETROLEUM TITLES AND THE RIGHTS THEY CONFER 
3.1 Great Britain 
There are, at present, two types of petroleum licence43 that can be 
granted by the Secretary of State for Energy in relation to petroleum 
exploration in the offshore area. The petroleum licences are: - 
44 
(i) an exploration licence which incorporates the model clauses 
set out in Schedule 5 to the Petroleum (Production) (Seaward Areas) 
Regulations 198845, unless modified or excluded by the Secretary of 
State for Energy46. This licence permits the licencee "to search 
for petroleum in the strata of the islands and in the sea bed and 
subsoil"47, which includes the right to prospect, carry out 
geological surveys and drill to a depth not exceeding three hundred 
and fifty metres for the purpose of obtaining geological 
information 
48 
but, does not include any right to get petroleum . 
An exploration licence permits the licencee to locate likely 
petroleum-bearing areas only. It does not permit the licencee to 
discover and delimit reservoirs by the drilling of exploration and 
appraisal wells. To do this the licencee requires a Licence. 
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An exploration licence is granted at large allowing exploration 
over the whole area, with the exception of blocks held under a 
Licence 
49. 
Possession of an exploration licence does not give the licencee 
any preferential right to a Licence if the licencee is successful in 
discovering petroleum under the exploration licence 
50 
Due, in the main, to the lack of exclusivity of an exploration 
licence, there has been a distinct lack of interest in seeking such a 
licence; 
(ii) a Licence 
51 
which incorporates the model clauses set 
out in Schedule 4 to the Petroleum (Production) (Seaward Areas) 
Regulations 198852 unless modified or excluded by the Secretary of 
State for Energy53. This exclusive licence permits the licencee " 
... to search and bore for, and get, petroleum in the sea-bed and 
subsoil ... " within the area to which the Licence relates 
54 
The overall licencing regime has been amended, modified or 
varied time to time. It is not proposed in this thesis to consider 
the earlier licencing regime in any detail or the transition from one 
licencing regime to another. It will suffice in this thesis merely 
to point out that, depending upon the time at which the application 
was made for the grant of a Licence, a different set of model clauses 
may apply to the Licence. 
3.2 Australia 
There are at present a number of types of petroleum licences that can 
be granted by the relevant Joint Authority in relation to petroleum 
exploration in the offshore area. There is nothing equivalent to the 
model clauses used in Great Britain. The terms upon which a petroleum 
licence is issued will be contained in the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 
1967 (C'th) on the petroleum licence. The petroleum licences are: - 
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(i) a Permit. This Permit permits the permittee "to explore for 
petroleum, and to carry on such operations and execute such works as 
are necessary for that 55 y purpose, in the permit area" 
A Permit allows the permittee to locate likely 
petroleum-bearing areas only. This includes the right to drill wells 
for exploratory purposes. It does not allow the permittee to 
discover and delimit reservoirs by the drilling of exploration and 
appraisal of wells. 
Commercial production is prohibited56 and property in any 
petroleum within the area to which the Permit relates does not pass 
to a permitee until production7. However, there is a right given 
5 
to a permitee to obtain a production licence upon discovery of 
petroleum within the area to which the Permit relates 
58 
The exploratory rights acquired under a Permit are virtually 
exclusive, although the holder of an access authority may undertake 
limited operations within the area to which the Permit relates59; 
(ii) a special prospecting authority. This authority allows the 
authorised person to carry on the "exploration operation" specified 
in the authority60. It has been suggested that this authority may 
be used to permit prospective bidders for an advertised Permit or 
production licence to evaluate the potential of the area to which the 
authority relates before submissions of tenders61. It does not 
authorise the drilling of a well62; 
(iii) an access authority. This authority permits a permittee or the 
holder of a production licence to conduct such "exploration 
operations" on an area adjacent to the area of the relevant Permit or 
production licence, as the case may be, as are specified in the 
authority63. It has been suggested that this authority may be used 
to permit the completion of a grid pattern of seismic lines, 
extending beyond the boundaries of the area to which a Permit 
relates, or to permit the holder of a production licence to survey a 
- 95 - 
pipeline route over another person's Permit64. It does not 
65 
authorise the drilling of a well 
(iv) the written consent of the relevant Designated Authority to 
petroleum exploration operations conducted in the course of 
66 
scientific investigations. This provision has been used to 
authorise preliminary exploration such as aeromagnetics and seismic 
studies 
67. 
4. THE APPLICATION FOR AND GRANTING OF PETROLEUM TITLES 
The purpose of the licencing regimes that have been established in 
Great Britain and Australia is to temporarily transfer, to private 
individuals, on a long-term contractual basis, the Crown's right, over a 
defined period and area, to explore for and exploit petroleum in 
situ68. On the one hand, under the licencing regimes, the holder of a 
petroleum title attains title to petroleum when it is reduced into 
possession, usually at the well-head. On the other hand, the holder of a 
petroleum title pays to the Crown certain fees together with a royalty on 
production and accepts a wide range of obligations as to the way in which 
operations are conducted under the petroleum title69. 
4.1 Great Britain 
The Secretary of State for Energy is empowered by the Petroleum 
(Production) Act 1934 (UK) to grant "licences to search and bore for and 
get petroleum". The provision of the Petroleum (Production) Act 1934 
70 
(UK) empowering the Secretary of State for Energy to grant licences has 
been extended to areas of the United Kingdom continental shelf, designated 
under the Continental Shelf Act 1964 (UK) 
71 
by the Continental Shelf Act 
1964 (UK), so that it applies in relation to petroleum in situ in the 
72 
designated areas as it would apply to petroleum in situ in Great Britain. 
The Secretary of State for Energy is required to make regulations73 
in respect of licences to be granted under the Petroleum (Production) Act 
1934 (UK), which regulations may vary with the different types of 
licences, dealing with such matters, inter alia, as the manner in which 
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applications may be made74, whom may make application for a licence75 
and the model clauses which shall, unless the Secretary of State for 
Energy thinks fit to modify or vary them in a particular case, be 
incorporated in a licence76. These regulations have been made and are 
evidenced, in the current licencing regime, by the Petroleum (Production) 
(Landward Areas) Regulations 1984 and the Petroleum (Production) (Seaward 
Areas) Regulations 1988. This thesis is only concerned with the Petroleum 
(Production) (Seaward Areas) Regulations 1988. 
The Petroleum (Production) (Seaward Areas) Regulations 1988 provide 
that any person may apply for a Licence77 by making application either 
in pursuance of an invitation from the Secretary of State for Energy or on 
its own initiative. 
The Secretary of State for Energy will, subject to an exception, 
always invite applications for Licences78. The exception79 is 
designed to fascilitate the financing of field development by granting a 
separate Licence, extending only to the area covered by the field, and to 
permit Licences revoked on the default of one participant to a joint 
venture to be re-granted, for example, to the non-defaulting participants. 
The procedure for the application for and the granting of a Licence, 
where applications are invited by the Secretary of State for Energy, is 
not at all complex. It is not proposed in this thesis to discuss the 
procedure in detail, as much of the process is little more than mechanical 
in nature. It is usually the case that by the time the participants to a 
joint venture have entered into a Joint Operating Agreement in relation to 
the Exploration Phase, a Licence will have been granted by the Secretary 
of State for Energy. Therefore, it is proposed to outline very briefly 
the procedure and in general terms only, where it has a bearing on the 
Exploration Phase. The procedure involves the holding of licencing 
rounds; a licencing round is commenced by the Secretary of State for 
Energy causing to be published in the London, Edinburgh and Belfast 
Gazettes, a notice inviting applications Licences80 for a number of 
designated blocks. 
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To date, eleven licencing rounds have been conducted81 
The Gazette notice will specify the method or methods that will be 
employed in allocating the blocks. The method or methods are not laid 
down by legislation or regulation. They are chosen at will by the 
Secretary of State for Energy. To date, three methods of allocation have 
been employed. These are: - 
(i) discretionary allocation. This is the method that has been 
employed in all but a few cases for the award of Licences. The term 
"discretionary" refers to the method of allocation in which no single 
criterion is indicated as being a criterion which would be 
determinative of the choice to be made by the Secretary of State for 
Energy where the choice is between competing applications. What has 
occurred, when this method has been employed, is for the Secretary of 
State for Energy to indicate informally82, from time to time, a 
number of criteria which will be taken into account in reaching such 
a decision83. These criteria, being non-statutory in character, do 
not have any legal force84, but they do play a major part in 
evaluating competing applications. 
As has been indicated earlier in this thesis, the criteria have 
led to the formation of joint ventures between groups of companies in 
such a manner as to satisfy these informal criteria, in so far as the 
companies can or are prepared to do. However, the approach to 
satisfying the criteria is somewhat haphazard, as the process of 
applying them so as to arrive at the allocation of a Licence for a 
specific block to one of a number of competing applications, is 
carried out entirely in private by the Department of Energy through 
private negotiations with the applicants. Due to the privacy of the 
Department of Energy's considerations and negotiations and the fact 
that reasons are not given for the granting or refusal of an 
application, it is difficult for potential applicants to assess the 
weight that will be given to each criterion; hence, the emphasis in 
compiling a joint venture grouping to satisfy the criteria. 
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It is considered correct to speak in terms of the "weight" to 
be given to each of the criteria as what little is known about the 
process of applying the criteria is that a number of quantitive 
tests, in which the applicant must show a certain minimum standard, 
are applied by the Department of Energy before an application will be 
seriously considered. In 1974 the Department of Energy explained85 
that a measured weight factor was applied to each criterion. The 
degree to which an applicant met each criterion aided the selection 
of who would, if anyone would, be the successful applicant in respect 
of each particular block for which applications had been sought. 
However, the practical working of this rating and weighting system 
was not, and has yet to be, explained. 
It is not just the criteria that aid in determining the 
successful applicant, if there is to be one. The work programmes 
proposed by the applicants also play a major role in the process of 
determination. 
In all licencing rounds, stress has been placed on the 
continuing need for expenditious, thorough and efficient 
exploration. It is this need that has given rise to negotiations 
between the Department of Energy and applicants on the work 
programmes the applicants will undertake if granted a Licence. The 
work programmes cover the amount of surveying the applicant will 
undertake and the number of wells the applicant will drill under the 
terms of the Licence. Where a Licence is granted, the work programme 
negotiated by the applicant with the Department of Energy will be 
incorporated into the terms of the Licence and the holder of the 
Licence will be under a contractual obligation to carry out the work 
programme during the initial term of the Licence; 
(ii) discretionary allocation with fixed cash premium. This method 
was implemented in the seventh licencing round. Applications for 
Licences were invited for blocks which the applicants themselves 
could nominate from within defined areas. For the privilege of this 
freedom of choosing the blocks which would be licenced and of being 
allocated a Licence on this basis, the successful applicants were 
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required to pay a fixed non-recurrent premium of five million pounds 
per block on allotment, in addition to the usual fees, royalties and 
rentals which relate to licenced blocks 
86 
Notwithstanding the premium that was to be paid, the allocation 
process followed the discretionary allocation method discussed above, 
other than that work programmes were not required. 
The legislative power to seek the payment of a fixed cash 
premium on the grant of a Licence falls within the provision that a 
licence "shall be granted for such consideration (whether by way of 
royalty or otherwise) as the Secretary of State [for Energy] with the 
consent of the Treasury may determine ... "7. This provision is 
$ 
extended to areas of the United Kingdom continental shelf designated 
under the Continental Shelf Act 1964 (UK) 
88 
by the Continental 
Shelf Act 1964 (UK)89, so that it applies in relation to petroleum 
in situ in the designated areas as it would apply to petroleum in 
situ in Great Britain; 
(iii) variable cash tender. This method was implemented in the 
fourth, eighth and ninth licencing rounds. Applicants were invited 
to bid for blocks, in as much as they would agree to pay a cash 
premium, which was not fixed but nominated by them, in the event that 
they were granted a Licence in respect of the block or any one or 
more of the blocks bid for. 
Where this method of allocation was used, work programmes were 
not required and the criteria did not apply. However, the Secretary 
of State for Energy retained his discretion in the allocation 
process, by reserving the right to reject the highest, or any, bid 
for a block. 
The legislative power to seek bids for the grant of a licence 
is likewise to be found in the Petroleum (Production) Act 1934 
90 
(UK) This provision is similarly extended to areas of the 
9 
United Kingdom continental shelfl 
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Once the Secretary of State for Energy has issued the invitation to 
apply for a Licence for one or more of the blocks designated in the 
Gazette notice, an applicant is required to lodge its application within 
the period specified in the notice92. The period specified is usually 
93 in the region of two months 
The application, which must be in writing, is required to be in or 
substantially in the form specified94 and required to be delivered to 
the Department of Energy, accompanied by the appropriate application 
fee95 and such supporting evidence as is required by, and is appropriate 
to, an application in the form specified96. Should any of the 
information supplied by the applicant change, during the period after the 
making of the application for Licence but before the Secretary of State 
for Energy either grants or refuses the application, the applicant must 
forthwith give written notice to the Secretary of State for Energy setting 
out particulars of the change 
97 
. 
After the closing date for applications, all applications received 
are considered by the Department of Energy which arranges for a 
presentation by the applicants under consideration and negotiates with 
them an appropriate work programme. At the conclusion of the process the 
Secretary of State for Energy then decides and announces the awards to be 
98 
made 
4.2 Australia 
The relevant Joint Authority is empowered by the Petroleum (Submerged 
Lands) Act 1967 (C'th) to grant Permits 
99. 
Save where the method to be employed in allocating a block or blocks 
is to be the cash bidding method, the Designated Authority must always, 
subject to a number of exceptions, invite applications for Permits 
100 
The invitation may be initiated by the Designated Authority on its own 
undertaking or at the request of the relevant Commonwealth Minister 
101 
A person cannot make an application for and be granted a Permit on its own 
initiative, except where the Designated Authority has invited applications 
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for the granting by the Joint Authority of a Permit in respect of a block 
or blocks102 or, in respect of a block or blocks that have been 
surrendered, cancelled or determined 
103 
and no application is made 
104 
or, after considering the applications, a Permit is not granted for any of 
those applications in respect of the designated block or all or some of 
the designated blocks105 In such circumstances, the Designated 
Authority may cause a notice to be published, in the Commonwealth of 
Australia Gazette advising that a Permit has not been granted in respect 
of the designated block or all or some of the designated blocks and 
thereafter, at any time, may receive an application for the grant by the 
Joint Authority of a Permit in respect thereof, without further notice or 
invitation 
106 
Where the method to be employed in allocating a block or blocks is to 
be the cash bidding method, it is the Joint Authority that must invite 
applications for the Permits 
107 
The procedure for applying for the granting of a Permit where 
applications are invited by the Designated Authority or Joint Authority, 
as the case may be, is not complex. It is not proposed in this thesis to 
discuss the procedure in detail, since, as in Great Britain, much of the 
process is nothing more than mechanical in nature. It is usually the case 
that by the time the participants to a joint venture have entered into a 
Joint Operating Agreement in relation to the Exploration Phase, a Permit 
will have been granted by the Joint Authority. Therefore it is proposed 
to outline, very briefly, the procedure and in general terms only, where 
it has a bearing on the Exploration Phase. 
The procedure is commenced by the Designated Authority108 or Joint 
Authority109 causing to be published, in the Commonwealth of Australia 
Gazette, a notice inviting applications for the grant by the Joint 
Authority of a Permit or Permits for a number of designated blocks. 
The Commonwealth of Australia Gazette notice will specify where the 
method to be employed in allocating a block or blocks is to be the cash 
110 
bidding method In such circumstances, the Commonwealth of Australia 
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Gazette notice will, in addition to specifying the period as mentioned 
below, specify whether the Permit or Permits to be granted will be able to 
be renewed 
ill; 
will contain a summary of the conditions subject to which 
the Permit is or Permits are to be granted112 and specify the matters 
that the Joint Authority will take into account in determining whether or 
not to reject an application 
113 
An example of the use of the cash bidding method commenced on 
November 29,1985, when five blocks in the Commonwealth adjacent area of 
Ashmore and Cartier Islands were gazetted for application, employing the 
cash bidding method. The Commonwealth of Australia Gazette notice 
_ specified that 
114 
(i) an applicant was required to lodge notice of its application on 
or before February 28,1986; 
(ii) any Permit or Permits to be granted would be for one six-year 
period and would not be able to be renewed; and 
(iii) in determining whether to reject an application the matters 
that the Joint Authority would take into account include: - 
(a) whether the applicant had sufficient technical and 
financial resources to effectively carry out exploration 
operations in the area to which any Permit would relate; and 
(b) whether the bids received from applicants were inadequate 
because of insufficient competition, for example, where there 
has been collusive bidding. 
The Commonwealth of Australia Gazette notice will specify a period 
within which an applicant is required to lodge the notice of its 
application 
115 
The application, which must be in writing, is required to be in 
116 117 
accordance with an approved form , made 
in an approved manner , 
in 
respect of not more than a specified number of blocks118 or, in the case 
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where the block or blocks to be allocated are the subject of the cash 
bidding method, be in respect of that block or all such blocks119, 
accompanied by particulars of the proposals of the applicant for work and 
expenditure in respect of the blocks to which the application 
relates120, the technical qualifications 
121, 
the technical advice 
122 
and the financial resources available to the applicant 
123 
. and 
accompanied by the appropriate application fee124 and may set out such 
other matters as the applicant wishes to be considered125. Where the 
method to be employed in allocating a block or blocks is to be the cash 
bidding method, the application is required to specify the amount the 
applicant is prepared to pay, in a single payment, in respect of the grant 
of a Permit126. The amount is to be in addition to the prescribed 
fee127. However, in such circumstances, the application is not required 
to be accompanied by particulars of the proposals of the applicant for 
work and expenditure in respect of the block or blocks. Where the 
application is in respect of a block or blocks that have been surrendered, 
cancelled or determined, the application is required to specify the amount 
the applicant is prepared to pay, but not necessarily in a single payment, 
in respect of the grant of a Permit 
128. 
The amount is to be in addition 
to the prescribed fee129. Furthermore, the application must be 
130 
accompanied by a deposit of the amount specified 
The Designated Authority may, at any time, require the applicant to 
furnish, within a stated period of time, further information in writing in 
connection with the application 
131 
After the closing date for applications, the Joint Authority has the 
discretion to reject all or any of the applications for the grant of a 
13 
Permit 
2. 
There are no grounds laid down in the Petroleum (Submerged 
Lands) Act 1967 (C'th) upon which the Joint Authority may exercise its 
discretion to reject an application. However, it has been suggested that 
the Joint Authority will exercise its discretion to reject an application 
if it is not satisfied with the information accompanying the application 
in regard to the proposal for work and expenditure, technical 
qualifications or advice on the financial resources available to the 
applicant 
133 
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If the Joint Authority reject all but one of the applications for the 
grant of a Permit, the Joint Authority may advise the applicant, in 
writing, that it is prepared to grant to the applicant a Permit in respect 
of a designated block or blocks134 Thus the Joint Authority would 
appear to be at liberty to select the successful candidate. Where two or 
more applications remain unrejected, as may be the case where the method 
employed in allocating a block or blocks in the cash bidding method or 
where the applications are in respect of a block or blocks that have been 
surrendered, cancelled or determined, the Joint Authority may advise the 
applicant whom has specified the higher amount 
135, in writing, that it 
is prepared to grant to the applicant a Permit in respect of a designated 
block or blocks 
136 
In either event, where the Joint Authority advises the applicant that 
it is prepared to grant to the applicant a Permit in respect of a 
designated block or blocks, the Joint Authority must also set out, in the 
written advice to the applicant, a summary of the conditions subject to 
which the Permit is to be granted137 and a statement to the effect that 
the application will lapse if the applicant does not make a request to the 
Joint Authority in respect of the grant of the Permit138 and does not 
lodge with the Designated Authority the security that the applicant is 
required to lodge as security for compliance with the conditions and the 
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 (C'th) and any regulations made 
thereunder139 (advice of such requirement to be set out in the written 
advice) 
140 
and or pay the amount141 or the balance of the of the 
amount142 to be paid in respect of the grant of the Permit to the 
applicant, as the case may be. 
5. ACCEPTANCE OF AN OFFER OF A PETROLEUM TITLE 
5.1 Great Britain 
Where an applicant is offered a Licence by the Secretary of State for 
Energy, such Licence may be offered on the condition that within a 
specified period of time from the date of the offer, the applicant, inter 
alia: - 
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(i) confirms acceptance of a work programme proposed by the 
Secretary of State for Energy following discussion with the 
applicant; and 
(ii) remits to the Secretary of State for Energy the initial 
fee 
143 
5.2 Australia 
Where an applicant is advised by the Joint Authority that it is 
prepared to grant to the applicant a Permit in respect of a designated 
block or blocks, the applicant may, within a stated period of time 
144, 
by written notice to the Designated Authority, request the Joint Authority 
to grant to it the Permit145 and lodge with the Designated Authority the 
security that the applicant is required to lodge146 and or pay the 
amount147 or the balance of the amount148 to be paid in respect of the 
grant of the Permit to the applicant, as the case may be. 
Once the applicant has made its request to the Joint Authority and 
has otherwise complied with the procedure mentioned above, the Joint 
Authority is required to grant it the Permit 
149 
If the applicant does not make a request to the Joint Authority or 
otherwise fails to comply with the procedure mentioned above, its 
application lapses 
150 
6. LEGAL CHARACTERISTICS OF PETROLEUM TITLES 
6.1 Great Britain 
A Licence is contractual in form. It is executed as a deed by the 
Secretary of State for Energy and the Participants. Its terms contain 
many elements that are of a commercial nature. The model clauses, although 
regulatory, in that they are in effect determined by Parliament, are 
nothing more than model clauses until, by the terms of the Licence 
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contract, they are incorporated into the Licence and become Licence 
obligations 
151 
Prior to this the model clauses have no legal 
force152. The substance of a Licence is also contractual: valuable 
rights to the exploitation of property are given in return for 
153 
payment 
A Licence is also regulatory in nature. The issue of a Licence is 
regulated, the model clauses to be incorporated into a Licence are 
determined by Parliament, and the Secretary of State for Energy has the 
power to direct certain of the activities that may be taken under the 
Licence by the Participants 
154 
. But, once granted, the Licence stands 
on its own as a contract between the Crown and the Participants. 
It may, therefore, be said that a Licence is of a dual character: it 
is both contractual and regulatory 
155 
It is of interest to note that in Inland Revenue Commissioners v 
Mobil North Sea Ltd. 
156 
Harman J. was of the view that a Licence was 
not within the meaning of the term "contract" as used in s. 111(7) of the 
Finance Act 1981. 
6.2 Australia 
Although there has been no judicial consideration of the question by 
the courts of Australia 
157, 
it is submitted that a Permit inl'statutory 
rather than contractual in nature158. One commentator, Carr159, has 
based his view to this effect upon the absence of satisfaction of the 
traditional tests for determining whether a contract comes into existence, 
arguing that: - 
(i) there is no offer made which is accepted, but rather the 
exercise of a statutory discretion in favour of an applicant; 
(ii) there may be consideration for the obligations accepted by the 
applicant and the Joint Authority; and 
- 107 - 
(iii) it is doubtful whether the applicant and the Joint Authority 
intend to create legal relations and make a contract as the rights of 
the applicant and the Joint Authority are protected by statute, which 
means that they have no need to have recourse to the law of 
contract. The question, therefore, of contractual remedies does not 
160 
arise 
161 
The majority of commentators have based their view upon that 
expressed by Crommelin. Crommelin's view is that the legal 
characteristics of a Permit is determined by interpreting the relevant 
provision of the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1987 (C'th) 
162 
and not 
by considering the form of the Permit 
163 
A consideration of the 
relevant provisions shows that they provide an extensive statutory 
framework of rights and obligations, coupled with the power to award such 
rights and obligations in the form of a Permit. Therefore, Crommelin 
argues164 the ordinary meaning of the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 
1987 (C'th) would seem to be that the rights and obligations are statutory 
rather than contractual in nature. 
7. THE NATURE OF INTERESTS UNDER THE PETROLEUM TITLE 
The nature and extent of the right that the Crown possesses in 
petroleum in situ has been discussed above. It was submitted that the 
Crown possesses rights of a proprietory nature in petroleum in situ and 
that the nearest analogy would appear to be the mining lease in Scotland 
and the profit ä pendre in England and Australia. 
7.1 Great Britain 
What then of the nature of the interest that the Participants obtain 
under a Licence? The Participants do not, by the Licence or otherwise, 
gain property in the petroleum in situ. Property in the petroleum is 
obtained by the Participants when the petroleum is reduced into possession 
pursuant to the terms of the Licence165 usually, at the well-head. 
The operative words of a Licence, insofar as the Participants are 
conerned, are that the holder of the Licence has the: - 
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". .. EXCLUSIVE 
LICENCE AND LIBERTY during the continuance of this 
licence and subject to the provisions hereof to search and bore for 
petroleum, and get petroleum... ', 
166 
This would appear to confer upon the Participants an exclusive 
licence (to engage in activities in the area to which the Licence relates 
which would otherwise infringe the Crown's exclusive privilege of 
exploration and exploitation) coupled with a grant (of all petroleum which 
167 
the Participants may get under the Licence) . 
Hence the Licence is said to equate, in so far as the Participants 
are concerned, with a licence coupled with a grant and as such, closely 
resembles the mining lease in Scotland and the profit ä prendre in 
England168. This confers the right to take the produce of another's 
land. However, the Licence goes further than the mining lease in Scotland 
and the profit ä prendre in England, in that it is also a right to exhaust 
another's property, rather than merely use it. 
It follows that the exclusive right to search and bore for, and get, 
petroleum which is confered by a Licence, would be a real right in 
Scotland or a proprietary right in England. Consequently, the 
Participants may, for example, act directly to restrain any unlicenced 
drilling or other exploratory activity in the area to which the Licence 
relates or, any unlicenced or unlawful activity outside that area which 
has the effect of diminishing in value the Participants' interest 
169 
7.2 Australia 
The starting point for considering the nature of the interest that 
the Participants obtain under the Permit, is the same in Australia as it 
is in Great Britain: the Participants do not, by the Permit or otherwise, 
obtain property in petroleum in situ. Property in petroleum is obtained 
1 
by the Participants, upon recovery of any petroleum70 
The operative words of the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1976 
(C'th), in so far as the Participants are concerned, are that: - 
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"A Permit, while it remains in force, authorizes the permitee, 
subject to this Act and the regulations and in accordance with the 
conditions to which the permit is subject, to explore for petroleum, 
and to carry on such operations and execute such works as are 
necessary for that purpose ... ', 
171 
As has been pointed out above, a Permit confers on the Participants a 
virtually exclusive right to conduct exploratory operations within the 
area to which it relates. In addition, a Permit confers on the 
Participants a non-exclusive right of access to the area to which it 
relates and a right to apply for and obtain a production licence in 
respect of a discovery of petroleum within the area to which the permit 
relates172. Whilst the right to obtain a production licence is 
significant, statutuory and extremely valuable rights it should also be 
recognised that a Permit does not confer on the Participants a right to 
recover petroleum173. What then, is the nature of the interest 
conferred on Participants by the Permit? 
There has been no judicial consideration by the courts of Australia 
of the question which raises the issue of whether a Permit is proprietory 
and, if it is, what form of property it is174. Although it is said that 
the question raises such an issue, 
commentators 
175 
is that a Permit, 
the view of a number of 
being statutory in nature, bears 
little or no relationship to the forms of proprietory interests recognised 
by common law and, as such, rather than seeking to characterize the 
interest that the Participants obtain under the Permit in common law 
terms, any consideration of the question should involve matters of 
statutory interpretation. Nevertheless, courts of Australia have tended, 
in similar circumstances, to turn to the common law forms of proprietory 
176 interest and classify the interest before them accordingly . 
Furthermore, a number of the commentators have tended to proceed to look 
at decisions of courts of Australia in cases involving mineral titles, on 
the basis that such decisions may give some indication of how the courts 
1 
of Australia would answer the question77. 
It is thought, by the majority of commentators and, it is submitted, 
correctly so, that the nature of the interest that the Participants obtain 
under the Permit is proprietary78 
1 
. However, the 
issue of what form of 
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property the interest is, is not clearly answered by those commentators. 
It is difficult to indentify a common law interest that corresponds with 
the interest that Participants obtain under the Permit179. It does not 
correspond with a mere or bare licence 
180, 
easement 
181, 
lease 
182 
. or 
profit a prendre183 
In view of the difficulty in, identifying the common law interest that 
corresponds with the interest that the Participants obtain under the 
Permit, there have been calls184 for the courts of Australia to adopt a 
more flexible approach and recognise a new category of proprietory 
interest outside the forms of proprietory interest recognised by the 
common law, for instance, an irrevocable licence, proprietory in 
nature 
185. 
If such were to be the case, the interest that the 
Participants obtain under the Permit would be seen as a licence revocable 
only in accordance with the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 
186 
(C'th) 
8. THE LAW GOVERNING THE PETROLEUM TITLE 
8.1 Great Britain 
In practice, the question of what law, Scottish or English, govern a 
particular Licence, is of limited importance, in that the rules of 
contract which are relevant to the Licence in both legal regimes are in 
most respects the same. What differences there are, are not likely to 
create major difficulties within the Licence framework 
187. 
Where difficulties do arise and it is necessary to determine the law 
governing the Licence, recourse to the model clauses will not alone 
provide the answer. The model clauses do not contain an express choice of 
governing law. Turning then to the rules of conflicts of law relating to 
the governing law of contracts, the position is the same in both English 
and Scottish law: where the participants have made no express choice of 
governing law, the contract will be governed by the law impliedly chosen, 
or, failing an implied choice, by the system of law with which the 
contract has the closest connection 
188. 
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8.2 Australia 
The question of what law governs a particular Permit is not an 
issue. Each Permit is issued under the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 
1967 (C'th) and as such it is the interpretation of that Act, by courts of 
Australia exercising federal jurisdiction, which governs the Permit. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE PARTICIPANTS AND ABANDONMENT 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The decision to abandon the whole or part of the Operations is vested 
in the Participants 
l. 
Once they have made a decision to abandon the 
whole or part of the Operations, the Operator is obliged to recover and 
try to dispose of such of the property of the Participants as the 
Operating Committee directs can economically and reasonably be recovered, 
or as may be required under the petroleum title or any Act, regulation or 
2 
by-law 
Joint Operating Agreements usually, in a very general way, seek to 
address the main issue that arises, as between the Participants, from a 
decision to abandon the whole or part of the Operations: the sharing of 
the cost of abandonment between the Participants and the provision of 
security by the Participants in relation to their respective individual 
potential liability3. However, Joint Operating Agreements usually 
address the issue in the context of development or production; that is, 
after the Exploration Phase4. To a large extent this is because it has 
been estimated that considerable cost may be involved as a result of the 
Participants deciding to abandon the whole or part of the Operations where 
that decision involves the decommissioning of an offshore production 
structures. By way of contrast, at the Exploration Phase, the cost has 
not been estimated to be as considerable. Nevertheless, it is considered 
necessary to look at what obligations are imposed at the Exploration Phase 
upon the Participants of the petroleum title or by any Act, regulation or 
by-law. This is so, notwithstanding that Joint Operating Agreements 
rarely specifically address the sharing of the cost of abandonment between 
the Participants, where abandonment arises at the Exploration Phase. The 
abandonment of the whole or part of the Operations at the Exploration 
Phase would nevertheless fall within the scope of the Joint Operating 
Agreement and as such would be an activity for which the Participants are 
liable to meet the cost according to their respective Interest share. 
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In looking at the obligations it is not proposed to consider the 
international law aspects of abandonment of the whole or part of the 
Operations. These have been dealt with adequately elsewhere. 
6 
2. ABANDONMENT IN GREAT BRITAIN 
To abandon a well7, the Participants require the consent in writing 
of the Secretary of State for Energy. 
8 
It would appear that the Secretary of State for Energy could withhold 
consent or impose conditions upon the granting of consent. An example of 
what may be required by the Secretary of State for Energy when imposing 
conditions upon the granting of consent to abandon a well, is as follows: - 
"In giving consent to the abandonment of the well, it is a 
requirement that at the conclusion of the work a certificate that the 
seabed is free of all obstructions be submitted. The Secretary of 
State will be prepared to accept a signed certificate from the 
operator or his authorised sub-contractor stating: 
(a) that all strings of casing have been cut at a depth to be 
quoted (10ft or more) below the seabed and that all structures 
above this point other than possibly the temporary guide base 
(the details of which, if left on the seabed, shall be stated) 
have been recovered with the casing; 
(b) that the seabed within at least 70 metres of the 
abandoned well has been surveyed either visually or by another 
technique appropriate to the visibility conditions and that any 
debris located, which originated from the drilling operations 
and which could possibly cause damage to fishermen's nets, has 
been removed. Alternative methods of demonstrating that the 
seabed is free of all obstruction can be submitted for 
consideration in advance of abandonment; 
(c) the location within the U. K. where any removed wellheads, 
sub-sea completions and/or recovered debris will be available 
for inspection for a period of not less than 21 days following 
the date of the submission of the signed certificate, or 
failing their availability for inspection the location where 
any of the aforementioned matters have been utilised or 
otherwise disposed of, and the manner of such utilisation or 
disposal. "9 
Where consent is granted subject to conditions the Participants are 
obliged to comply with those conditions'. Furthermore, where a well is 
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plugged, such must be done in accordance with a specification approved by 
the Secretary of State for Energy and must be carried out in an efficient 
and workmanlike manner 
11 
Where the conditions imposed by the Secretary of State for Energy 
relate to the plugging or sealing of a well, the Secretary of State for 
Energy may from time to time cause the well and the records relating to 
the well to be examined, as specified by the Secretary of State for 
Energy, at the expense of the Participants. The examination can be 
carried out in such manner, upon such occasions, at such intervals and by 
l 
such persons as the Secretary of State for Energy may specify2. 
Any well that has not, with the consent of the Secretary of State for 
Energy, been abandoned at the expiration or determination of the 
Participants' rights in respect of an area or part thereof in which that 
well is drilled must, at the discretion of the Secretary of State for 
Energy, either: - 
1. be left in good order and fit for further working together with 
all casings and any well-head fixtures which, if removed, would cause 
damage to the well13, all of which becomes the property of the 
Secretary of State for Energy 
14; 
or 
2. be plugged and sealed in accordance with directions specifying 
the manner in which the well is to be plugged and sealed and the time 
within which such work is to be done15, if the Secretary of State 
for Energy so directs by notice in writing not less than one month 
before the holder of the Participants' rights in respect of the area 
or part thereof in which the well is situate expire or determine 
16 
It is suggested that where a well has not, with the consent of the 
Secretary of State for Energy, been abandoned at the expiration or 
determination of the Participants' rights in respect of the area or part 
thereof in which the well is drilled, the responsibility in relation to 
the well and the subsequent abandonment thereof would be that of the 
Secretary of State for Energy. 
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Were the Participants to fail to comply with any condition imposed by 
the Secretary of State for Energy relating to the plugging, sealing or 
abandonment of a well, the Secretary of State for Energy is empowered, 
after giving to the Participants reasonable notice in writing of his 
intention, to execute any works and to provide and install any equipment 
which, in the opinion of the Secretary of State for Energy, may be 
necessary to secure the performance of the obligation or obligation 
imposed under the conditions and to recover the cost and expense of so 
doing from the Participants17. Furthermore, the Secretary of State 
would be in a position to revoke the Licence due to the failure of the 
Participants to comply with the terms and conditions of the Licence18. 
The effectiveness of the threat of revocation could well turn on the value 
attributable by the Participants to the Licence at that point in time. 
In so far as the Secretary of State for Energy is permitted to impose 
conditions on the grant of consent to abandon a well, the conditions 
imposed could be to the effect that the Participants make good, to the 
satisfaction of the Secretary of State for Energy, any damage to the sea 
bed or subsoil in the area to which the Licence relates including the 
clearing of the sea bed of debris. 
The position relating to the abandonment of the structure from which 
the well is drilled on the United Kingdom Continental Shelf is a little 
more complex. Where it is the desire of the Participants to abandon a 
structure, there are a number of possible methods by which a requirement 
may be imposed that the structure be in whole or in part removed, and 
enforced, on a case by case basis. 
In so far as the Secretary of State for Energy is permitted to impose 
conditions on the grant of consent to abandon a well, the conditions 
imposed could, it has been argued, be to the effect that the structure 
from which the well is drilled must itself be in whole or in part removed, 
failing which the removal could be carried out by the Secretary of State 
for Energy at the cost and expense of the Participants in the same manner 
as discussed above19. Failure to comply with such a condition would 
also give to the Secretary of State for Energy the same remedies, as 
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discussed above, of recovering the costs and expense of undertaking the 
obligation and or revocating the Licence. 
The question must be asked as to whether this line of argument is 
valid. The consent in writing of the Secretary of State for Energy is 
required before commencing or, after abandonment, re-commencing to drill a 
20 21 
well and before abandoning a well. Furthermore, it would appear 
that the Secretary of State for Energy could withhold consent or impose 
conditions upon the granting of consent with which the Participants must 
comply22. But could the Secretary of State for Energy impose a 
condition to the effect that the structure, from which the well is 
drilled, must be in whole or in part removed once the well has been 
drilled and or abandoned? 
A problem with accepting a positive answer to the question may be 
that the power of the Secretary of State for Energy to withhold consent 
and or impose conditions upon the granting of consent is not unlimited. 
Any such action by the Secretary of State for Energy may have to be within 
the ambit of the purpose for which the power was conferred23. To begin 
with, the model clauses make reference to the abandonment of wells, not of 
the structures from which they are drilled. If the view is adopted that 
the discretion given to the Secretary of State for Energy is one to which 
administrative law applies, then the Secretary of State for Energy must 
exercise his discretion for the purpose for which the power was given to 
him under the legislation. Therefore, the Secretary of State for Energy, 
in giving consent, could not impose conditions other than conditions 
relating directly to the abandonment of wells, which would not necessarily 
include the imposition of conditions addressing the abandonment of the 
structures from which the wells are drilled24. If, however, the view is 
adopted that the model clauses are merely terms of a contract between the 
Participants and the Secretary of State for Energy, then none of the 
restrictions referred to above would apply25. The issue involves 
answering the question of whether a Licence is contractual or regulatory 
in nature 
26. 
The question has been discussed above. 
Another possible method by which a requirement that the structure 
from which the well is drilled and which the Participants desire to 
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abandon be in whole or in part removed, is to be found in the Petroleum 
(Production) Act 1934 (UK), where the Secretary of State for Energy is 
empowered to grant licences upon such terms and conditions as he thinks 
fit27 The provision of the Petroleum (Production) Act 1934 (UK), 
empowering the Secretary of State for Energy to impose conditions on the 
grant of a licence, is extended to areas of the United Kingdom Continental 
Shelf designated under the Continental Shelf Act 1964 (UK) 
28 
by the 
Continental Shelf Act 1964 (UK) 
29 
so that it applies as in relation to 
petroleum in situ in Great Britain. It would thereby be possible for the 
Secretary of State for Energy to impose conditions in the Licence 
sufficient to regulate the abandonment of the structures from which the 
well is drilled, on the ground that control of exploration for and 
exploitation of petroleum in situ includes the control of the termination 
3 
of the Exploration Phase0 
A further possible method is to be found in the Coast Protection Act 
1949 (UK). The relevant provisions of the Coast Protection Act 1949 (UK) 
are extended to areas of the United Kingdom Continental Shelf designated 
under the Continental Shelf Act 196431 by the Continental Shelf Act 1964 
32 
(UK) so that they apply in relation to the designated areas as they 
would to Great Britain. 
Before a structure, including a structure from which a well is 
drilled, can be placed on or removed from the United Kingdom Continental 
Shelf and before the construction, alteration or improvement of such a 
structure can be effected, the consent, conditional or otherwise33, of 
the Secretary of State for Transport is required34 so as to prevent any 
obstruction or danger to navigation35. In the main, the consent of the 
Secretary of State for Transport will be sought by and granted to the 
Operator rather than the Participants. To date, the standard form of 
consent granted by the Secretary of State for Transport contains the 
condition: - 
that in the event of the structure being abandoned or disused, 
the Secretary of State shall be notified and the site cleared to the 
satisfaction of the Secretary of State within such period as he 
directs so that no obstruction or danger to navigation is caused or 
likely to result. "36 
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Were the Operators to fail to comply with a condition imposed by the 
consent given, the Secretary of State for Transport could serve notice 
requiring the structure to be removed or alterations made7. 
3 
The Petroleum Act 1987 (UK) has great bearing upon the abandonment of 
structures. The Petroleum Act 1987 (UK) imposes another tier to the 
structure of consents and obligations mentioned above and to the 
obligations, if any, of the Participants pursuant to the Joint Operating 
Agreement 
38. 
The most important consequence of the Petroleum Act 1987 (UK) is that 
it allows the Secretary of State for Energy to deal with the abandonment 
of structures on a case-by-case basis39, including the structure from 
40 
which a well is drilled. The timing of and the direction to implement 
the abandonment provisions in respect of a particular structure is at the 
41 
discretion of the Secretary of State for Energy . 
The Petroleum Act 1987 (UK) permits the Secretary of State for 
Energy, at his discretion, to require, by written notice any one or more 
of a number of persons to submit to him a programme setting out the 
measures proposed to be taken in connection with the abandonment of a 
structure42. The persons to whom the notice is directed are required, 
within the time specified43, to submit an abandonment programme dealing 
with such matters as the estimated cost of the measures proposed44, the 
timing of the measures proposed45 and provisions for continuing 
maintenance in the event that the structure is to be left in position or 
is not to be wholly removed. The notice may also require the persons 
46 
to whom it is directed to carry out such consultations as may be specified 
in the notice before submitting an abandonment programme47. 
The persons to whom the Secretary of State for Energy may direct such 
a notice are: - 
1. the person whom (at the time of the giving of the notice) has 
registered the structure under the Mineral Workings (Offshore 
Installation) Act 1971 (UK) 
48 
or, if there is no such person, the 
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person (at the time of the giving of the notice) having the 
49 
management of the structure. This would, in the first case, 
usually include the owners of the structure and, in the second case, 
the Operator50; 
2. any person whop'(at the time of the giving of the notice) is a 
concession owner in relation to the structure, for the purpose of the 
Mineral Workings (Offshore Installations) Act 1971 (UK)51, or whom- 
was a concession owner for those purposes, when an activity within 
section 12(2) of the Mineral Workings (Offshore Installation) Act 
1971 (UK) was last carried on from, by means of or on the 
structure52. This would, in most cases, include the 
Participants 
53; 
3. any person (at the time of the giving of the notice) not within 
either of 1. or 2. above whoa is aparticipant of a Joint Operating 
Agreement or similar agreement relating to rights by virtue of which 
54 
a person is within 2. above. This would include the 
Participants, if any, whoir are not holders of the Licence; 
4. any person (at the time of the giving of the notice) not within 
1., 2. or 3. above who( owns an interest in the structure otherwise 
than as security for a loan55; or 
5. any company (at the time of the giving of the notice) not 
within 1., 2., 3. or 4. above but is associated with a company (at 
the time of the giving of the notice) that is within 1., 2., 3. or 4. 
above56. What amounts to one company being associated with another 
turns upon the control of the company 
57. 
What amounts to control 
is specified in some detail58 but in the main it relates to control 
through share capital59, the entitlement to exercise votes in 
general meetings of the company60, the entitlement to distribution 
income61, the entitlement to the distribution of assets on a 
winding up62 or the ability to direct, directly or indirectly, the 
affairs of the company in accordance with its wishes63. One 
interesting aspect is the unusual level of shareholding that 
determines control, viz., "one half or more". It matters not 
64 
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whether the respective companies were incorporated in the United 
6 
Kingdom or elsewhere5 
The Secretary of State for Energy has given notice requiring the 
submission of an abandonment programme in respect of all "installations in 
66 
place in January 1988" 
In this thesis it is proposed to consider the position of the 
Participants and the Operator and not that of any other person to whom the 
Secretary of State for Energy may direct a notice requiring the submission 
of an abandonment programme in respect of a structure. 
The Secretary of State for Energy may give notice to any one or more 
of the Participants and or to the Operator requiring the submission of an 
abandonment programme in respect of a structure, notwithstanding that an 
abandonment programme has already been submitted and, either rejected or, 
approval thereof has been withdrawn67. Furthermore, any notice given to 
any one or more of the Participants and or the Operator, may be withdrawn 
prior to the submission of an abandonment programme or a further notice, 
either in substitution for or in addition to the notice, may be given to 
any one or more of the Participants and or the Operator, by the Secretary 
68 
of State for Energy . 
On receipt of an abandonment programme the Secretary of State for 
Energy may reject it or approve it69, and where it is approved, with or 
without modification and or whether subject or not to conditions or 
not70. Where there is modification to the abandonment programme or 
conditions to be imposed, such abandonment programme cannot be approved by 
the Secretary of State for Energy without the Participant, Participants 
and or the Operator who submitted the abandonment programme having the 
opportunity to make written representations in respect of the modification 
or conditions71. Even where an abandonment programme has been approved, 
either the Secretary of State for Energy or such of the Participant, 
Participants and or the Operator who submitted the abandonment programme 
may, by written notice 
72, 
propose to alter the abandonment programme or 
any condition attached to the approval thereof. Where the proposal is 
73 
made by the Secretary of State for Energy the Participant, Participants 
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and or the Operator who submitted the abandonment programme, must be given 
the opportunity to make written representations in respect of the 
7 
proposal4. Once the Secretary of State for Energy has determined that 
the alteration should be made, notice of the determination must be given 
to such of the Participant, Participants and or the Operator whom had the 
obligation under the prior approval or have the obligation under the 
varied abandonment programme to carry out the abandonment programme75. 
If the Participant, Participants and or the Operator to whoka notice 
requiring the submission of an abandonment programme in respect of a 
structure, fails to submit an abandonment programme or if an abandonment 
programme is submitted but rejected by the Secretary of State for Energy, 
the Secretary of State for Energy may prepare, at the expense of such of 
the Participant, Participants and or Operator to whom the notice was 
given76, an abandonment programme77. The abandonment programme 
prepared by the Secretary of State for Energy, once notified to such of 
the Participant, Participants and or the Operator to who notice was given, 
has effect as if submitted by the Participant, Participants and or the 
Operator and approved by the Secretary of State for Energy78. 
In order for the Secretary of State for Energy to prepare an 
abandonment programme in respect of a structure, the Petroleum Act 1987 
(UK) empowers the Secretary of State for Energy, by notice in writing 
directed to such of the Participant, Participants and or the Operator whom 
was given notice to require it or them to supply such records and drawings 
and such other information as may be specified within the time 
specified79. Failure to comply with such a notice without reasonable 
excuse amounts to an offence 
80. 
Once an abandonment programme in respect of a structure has received 
approval, it becomes the duty of the Participant or each of the 
Participants and or the Operator who submitted it, to secure that it is 
carried out and that any condition to which the approval is subject is 
complied with81. It is submitted that the combined effect of sections 
1,2 and 8 of the Petroleum Act 1987 (UK) is to make the Participant, 
Participants and or the Operator who submit the abandonment programme 
jointly and severally liable to secure that it is carried out and that any 
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condition to which the approval is subject, is complied with82. 
Any one or more of the Participants and or the Operator who submitted 
the abandonment programme may request the Secretary of State for Energy to 
83 
withdraw the approval. If less than all of the Participant, 
Participants and or the Operator who submitted the abandonment programme 
seeks the withdrawal of approval the Secretary of State for Energy must 
0,1 *'- 
give such of the Participant, Participants and or the Operator whoiº, not 
A- 
seeking the withdrawal of approval the opportunity to make written 
representations as to whether approval should be withdrawn. The 
84 
Secretary of State for Energy must notify the Participant or all of the 
Participants and or the Operator who submitted the abandonment programme 
of the determination of the request to withdraw approval5. 
8 
The Secretary of State for Energy or any of the Participant, 
Participants and or the Operator who submitted the abandonment programme 
may propose in writing86 that any person under a duty to secure the 
carrying out of an abandonment programme87 shall cease to have that 
duty, or that another person who does not have that duty should have it 
either in addition to those that do or, in substitution for one or more of 
those that do88. Where the proposal is that some other person comes 
under such a duty, such person must fall within the class of persons 
referred to above to whom notice could be given, at the time when the 
proposal is made or when the first notice requiring the submission of an 
abandonment programme was given89. 
Where such a proposal is made, the Secretary of State for Energy must 
give to any person who may come under such a duty or cease to have such a 
duty as a result of the proposal, 
representations concerning it 
90 
the opportunity to make written 
Upon making a determination in respect 
of the proposal, the Secretary of State for Energy must give notice of the 
determination to every person whom before, and every person whom as a 
91 
result of, the determination was or is under such a duty . 
If an approved abandonment programme in relation to a structure is 
not carried out or a condition is not complied with, the Secretary of 
State for Energy may give written notice to the Participant or any of the 
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Participants and or the Operator who submitted the abandonment programme 
requiring them to take the remedial action specified in the notice within 
the time specified92. Failure to comply with such a notice amounts to 
an offence, unless it is proved that due diligence was exercised to avoid 
failure to comply93. Failure to comply with such a notice may also 
result in the Secretary of State for Energy carrying out the remedial 
action required by the notice at the expense of the Participant, the 
Participants and or the Operator to whom the notice was given 
94 
The Secretary of State for Energy may, after giving notice to submit 
an abandonment programme to a Participant, the Participants and or the 
Operator and, before approving the abandonment programme submitted, 
require, by written notice, the Participant, the Participants and or the 
Operator to whom notice to submit an abandonment programme was given, to 
provide information as to any documentation in relation to their financial 
affairs95. The Secretary of State for Energy may, at any time by 
written notice require that Participant, the Participants and or the 
Operator to provide, as specified in the notice and within the time 
specified in the notice, information and supply copies of documents, in 
order to satisfy himself that a Participant, the Participants and or the 
Operator having a duty to secure that an abandonment programme is carried 
out will be capable of discharging that duty96. Failure to comply with 
either of the notices without reasonable excuse97 or providing 
information known to be false in a material particular or recklessly 
providing information which is false in a material particular 
98 
is an 
offence 
99 
If the Secretary of State for Energy is not satisfied that a 
Participant, the Participants and or the Operator will be capable of 
discharging the duty to secure that an abandonment programme is carried 
out, he may by written notice, after consulting the Treasury, require the 
Participant, the Participants and or the Operator to take such action as 
is specified in the notice within the time specified in the notice 
100 
Any Participant, the Participants and or the Operator upon whom such a 
notice is to be served must be given by the Secretary of State for Energy 
the opportunity to make written representations as to whether the notice 
A 
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should be given101 Failure to comply with such a notice is an offence 
unless it is proved that such Participant, the Participants and or the 
l0 
Operator exercised due diligence to avoid the failure2 
The Petroleum Act 1987 (UK) also empowers the Secretary of State for 
Energy to make regulations relating to the abandonment of 
structures 
103 
Such regulations may relate to matters such as standards 
and safety requirements applicable to dismantling, removal and 
disposal104, standards and safety requirements where anything is left in 
the water 
105, 
prevention of pollution 
106 
and inspection 
107 
The Petroleum Act 1987 (UK) also deals with fees, offences, penalties 
108 
and proceedings in relation thereto 
An interesting aspect of the Petroleum Act 1987 (UK) is the 
limitation placed on the ability of a Participant, the Participants and or 
the Operator to question the validity of certain actions of the Secretary 
of State for Energy. It would appear that if a Participant, the 
Participants and or the Operator wishes or wish to question the validity 
of an action it or they must be aggrieved by the proceedings taken and the 
action taken must relate to questioning the validity of the action on the 
ground that it was not within the power of the Secretary of State for 
Energy or that the relevant procedural requirements had not been complied 
withl09. What may be questioned is listed110 and any application for 
review must be made within forty-two days of the taking of the 
actionlll Otherwise than as stated, the validity of the action of the 
Secretary of State for Energy is not reviewable112. Where reviewable, 
if a court is satisfied that the act was not within the power of the 
Secretary of State for Energy or that the applicant has been substantially 
prejudiced by the failure to observe the procedural requirements, it may 
1 
quash the act13 
A number of interesting issues arise from the Petroleum Act 1987 
(UK). Possibly, the issue that will concern the Participants the most is 
that they cannot rely for all time upon the approval of the Secretary of 
State for Energy for an abandonment programme in respect of a structure. 
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The Secretary of State for Energy can, in effect and notwithstanding the 
right of the Participants in most cases to make representations, alter, 
add to or delete from an approved abandonment programme, or approve the 
addition or deletion of persons upon whom the duty falls to carry out the 
abandonment programme. Not only does this create a degree of uncertainty 
as to the final form that the abandonment programme may take or as to the 
persons who may ultimately have the duty of carrying out the abandonment 
programme, but it also could create problems when a Participant seeks to 
assign all or part of its Interest. In the event that an abandonment 
programme had been approved and the assignor was a person upon whom the 
duty fell to carry out the abandonment programme there is no statutory 
release or right of release from the duty, even upon satisfying given 
criteria as to the suitability of the assignee to undertake the duty in 
lieu of the assignor. The way out appears to be for the assignor to seek 
to have the duty lifted under section 6(1)(b) of the Petroleum Act 1987 
(UK). Even so, the lifting of the duty is entirely within the discretion 
of the Secretary of State for Energy, although in such cases there is some 
1 
right of judicial review of the determination made14 
Another issue that will concern the Participants is how to determine 
the point at which the obligation in respect of abandonment of the 
structure arises. Such appears to be almost entirely at the discretion of 
the Secretary of State for Energy. Furthermore, the question of for how 
long the duty remains is not addressed. Theoretically, where the 
abandonment programme requires a structure to be left in position or not 
wholly removed, the maintenance obligation could continue in 
perpetuity 
115 
In a case requiring other than complete removal, what 
maybe the position where the structure vests in the Secretary of State for 
Energy116? Do the persons - which could include a Participant, the 
Participants and or the Operator - who have the duty to carry out the 
abandonment programme, continue to have a duty to maintain the structure 
or part or parts thereof not removed? It would appear that such could be 
the case. Furthermore, would such persons be liable to a third party who 
suffered damage on the partially removed structure ? 
117. 
In principle, 
there should be no liability arising from a breach of statutory duty or 
negligence if the structure has been partially removed in accordance with 
an approved abandonment programme. 
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Having considered the statutory regime as it applies to the 
abandonment of a structure, which includes the structure from which a well 
is drilled, it is appropriate to mention a number of other statutes that 
have a bearing upon the undertaking, by the Operator of the removal in 
whole or in part of the abandoned structure. 
The disposal of the wholly or partially removed structure may require 
a permit under the Food and Environmental Protection Act 1975 (UK). 
However, whether this Act would apply to the dumping of the wholly or 
partially removed structure on the United Kingdom Continental Shelf is 
unclear. 
In carrying out the removal of the abandoned structure, in whole or 
in part, the Prevention of Oil Pollution Act 1971 (UK) 
118 
would apply 
were there to be a discharge of oil during the undertaking of the 
119 
process 
Also applicable to the removal of the abandoned structure, in whole 
or in part, is the Mineral Workings (Offshore Installations) Act 1971 
(UK). This Act enables regulations to be made for the purpose of 
certification as to the fitness of structures120. The prime object is 
to ensure the safety of structures when being assembled or 
dismantled121. Regulations made pursuant to the Act, the Offshore 
Installations (Construction and Survey) Regulations 1974, require each 
structure to have a valid certificate of fitness after a certain date 
122 
and, before a structure that has a current certificate of fitness can be 
dismantled it is necessary that the procedure established by the 
regulations be followed 
123. 
As an aside, it has been suggested 
124 
that the power to make regulations about matters arising out of the 
termination of a certificate of fitness125 would enable regulations to 
be made which control the manner in which abandonment of a structure is 
exercised. With all due respect, it is submitted that such would not 
support an obligation to remove a structure that no longer has a 
certificate of fitness. At best, it would support the regulation of the 
126 
of removal26 
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Finally, in this regard, note should be made of the model clause 
incorporated into a Licence which requires that any operation authorised 
by the Licence must not be carried out in such a way as to interfere 
unjustifiably 
127 
with navigation or fishing in the waters of the area to 
which the Licence relates or with the conservation of the living resources 
of the sea128. This may give rise to the need to remove a structure or 
sea bed debris as such might cause such unjustifiable interference 
129. 
The question of on whom the cost of abandonment rests, including the 
cost of removing a structure, in whole or in part, has been discussed 
above. However, a number of additional comments are considered apposite. 
In so far as the requirement to abandon arises under the Licence, 
each Participant is jointly and severally liable for any obligations 
arising pursuant to the Licence or any of the model clauses incorporated 
therein130 and hence for the cost thereof. The Participants, by the 
Joint Operating Agreement, seek to sever this joint tenancy in so far as 
the relationship between the Participants themselves is concerned and 
substitute therefor the relationship of tenants in common in specified 
shares; thereby substituting several liability for joint and several 
liability. To this end, at the post Exploration Phase, the Joint 
Operating Agreement seeks to have the Participants enter into an 
abandonment agreement before the time for the submission of the Annexe 
'B', which agreement will provide for the equitable sharing of the 
liabilities of abandonment between the Participants and the provision of 
security by the Participants in relation to their potential 
liability 
131 
Not all Joint Operating Agreements make such provision. 
Furthermore, and more important', ) it is extremely rare for the Joint 
Operating Agreement to address such issues at the Exploration Phase. In 
the main, this has been the result of uncertainty as to the extent of 
removal which will be required on abandonment of the structure. This 
position is not remedied by the Petroleum Act 1987 (UK). However, the 
Petroleum Act 1987 (UK) has given imputus to the need for the Participants 
to reach an abandonment agreement 
132. 
It is important to appreciate 
that even if an abandonment agreement were to be entered into by the 
Participants for the Exploration Phase, such an agreement could not alter 
- 146 - 
the liability of the Participants, or one or more of them, to third 
parties. It would only alter the liability of the Participants inter se. 
In so far as the obligation in respect of the abandonment of a 
structure arises under the Coast Protection Act 1949 (UK), it would appear 
that in most cases it will be solely the Operator who will be liable for 
implementing an abandonment programme required thereby. This would be so 
regardless of whether or not a contribution could be obtained by the 
Operator from the other Participants. This situation would arise since 
the necessary consent by the Secretary of State for Transport would be 
given to the Operator and not to the other Participants133 It is the 
person to whom the consent is given who assumes the liability for 
compliance with conditions imposed on the granting of consent and for 
compliance with the provisions of the Coast Protection Act 1949 (UK). 
Were the Operator to change, subsequent to the grant of consent or 
the authorisation, the new Operator would not assume the obligation unless 
the relevant permit were transferred to it, with the necessary 
134 
approvals 
Whether the Operator has a right to a contribution by the other 
Participants in such circumstances, is one that is required to be 
addressed in the Joint Operating Agreement. Such a right does not arise 
by statute. 
Whilst it will often be the case that the Joint Operating Agreement 
addresses the Operator's right of contribution by the other Participants, 
it is rare for a Joint Operating Agreement to address a Participants' 
right of contribution by the other Participants, where the liability falls 
on one of the Participants other than the Operator. Such could occur 
where the Participants' liability vis ä vis a third party is joint and 
several and the third party, the relevant authority, takes action against 
one of the Participants other than the Operator. Such could occur under 
the Petroleum Act 1987 (UK), where only one Participant could be called 
upon to submit an abandonment programme and that Participant is left with 
the sole duty to comply with the abandonment programme. It is doubtful 
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whether there would, in such circumstances, be any common law right of 
contribution. 
Were the Joint Operating Agreement to be silent on the right of a 
Participant, other than the Operator, to seek a contribution where 
liability is not expressed by statute to be joint and several, it could be 
argued that a right of contribution arises under the Licence. The 
Licence, being a contract into which all the Participants have entered 
into, binds them jointly and severally. The problem is that the Joint 
Operating Agreement seeks to sever that joint and several liability 
between the Participants inter se and replace it with several liability. 
An issue that arises under the Joint Operating Agreement in relation 
to the question of cost of abandonment, is how to address the situation 
where a Participant defaults in meeting its obligation to contribute to 
the cost of abandonment. The usual remedy for failure to contribute the 
requisite share of a cost is ultimately the forfeiture of the 
Participant's Interest. The problem with this remedy, other than the 
legal problems discussed later in this thesis, is the value of what is to 
be forfeited. If the value of what is to be forfeited will be less than 
the contribution required to be made towards the abandonment cost, there 
is no security for the other Participants in the forfeiture remedy once 
the point has been reached where the potential liability towards the cost 
of abandonment exceeds the value of what could be forfeited. Admittedly, 
at law, there would be the right of the other Participants to proceed 
against the defaulting Participant's other assets to recover the 
contribution in regard to which default has been made. However, if the 
defaulting Participant does not have available assets which could give 
rise to the funds that may be required, then another form of security will 
need to be sought135 To this end, alternative security against default 
is required. This is particularly so in so far as the Operator is 
concerned, as it will need, in most cases, the protection against the 
consequence of the default by a Participant in meeting its obligation to 
contribute to the cost of abandonment. 
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To date, a number of different types of security have been 
propose 
136 
In very general terms the type that appears to have 
received the most support is a scheme based on guarantees given by third 
parties. Each Participant is obliged to provide to the other 
Participants, including the Operator, an irrevocable guarantee in a form, 
and from a third party (be it a parent, bank or financial institution), 
acceptable to the other Participants to the effect that the Participant 
will contribute its share of the cost of complying with the requirements 
concerning abandonment, failing which the guarantor will itself become 
liable to the other Participants for such share 
137 
It is suggested that the success of establishing security 
arrangements of the type mentioned above would be best achieved if the 
negotiation and settlement of the arrangements could be made before the 
commencement of the work programme. Preferably, the arrangements should 
form part of the Joint Operating Agreement. It would be more difficult to 
reach such an arrangement once the likely cost of abandonment exceeds the 
perceived value of consequences of the exploration being undertaken. 
It has, however, been suggested138 that if the majority of 
Participants who have had imposed upon them the duty of carrying out an 
abandonment programme under the Petroleum Act 1987 (UK), wished to 
establish a security arrangement of the type mentioned above, but were 
prevented from doing so by the dissent of a minority of the Participants, 
the majority could bring the matter to the attention of the Secretary of 
State for Energy. The dissenters may then be asked why they refuse to 
join in the security arrangements proposed by the majority and if the 
Secretary of State for Energy were not satisfied with the minority's 
explanation, the Secretary of State for Energy may serve notice, pursuant 
to section 1 of the Petroleum Act 1987 (UK) on companies associated with 
the dissenting Participants. By means of a combination of exposing 
associated companies to such a notice and being required to explain their 
reasons for dissent, it is believed that the Secretary of State for Energy 
could provide a powerful incentive to the Participants to establish 
security arrangements, whilst also preventing the majority Participants 
from forcing unreasonable security arrangements on the minority 
Participants. 
- 149 - 
3. ABANDONMENT IN AUSTRALIA 
The abandonment of wells and structures from which they are drilled 
and the clearing of the sea bed of debris by the Participants can be 
controlled and conditions relating thereto can be imposed by the 
Designated Authority. 
The Designated Authority may at any time by notice in writing direct 
the Participants 
139 
to: - 
1. remove or cause to be removed from the area to which the Permit 
relates all property brought into the area by any person engaged or 
concerned in the operations authorised by the Permit or to make 
arrangements that are satisfactory to the Designated Authority with 
respect to that property140 This would include property brought 
into the area by the Operator and or the contractors of the 
Operator; 
2. plug or close off, to the satisfaction of the Designated 
Authority, all wells made in the area to which the Permit relates, by 
any person engaged or concerned in the operations authorised by the 
Permit141 Once again, this would include activities undertaken by 
the Operator and or the contractors of the Operator; 
3. make provision, to the satisfaction of the Designated 
Authority, for the conservation and protection of the natural 
resources in the area to which the Permit relates142; and 
4. make good, to the satisfaction of the Designated Authority, any 
damage to the sea-bed or subsoil in the area to which the Permit 
relates caused by any person engaged or concerned in the operations 
authorised by the Permit143 Once again, this would include 
activities undertaken by the Operator and or the contractors of the 
Operator. 
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The position is the same where the Permit has been wholly or partly 
determined, wholly or partly cancelled or has expired, save that the 
direction or directions may be given by the Designated Authority to the 
Participants or those persons who were the Participants, as the case may 
be, in relation to the Permit144 This would enable the Designated 
Authority to give directions in relation to a well or structure 
notwithstanding the expiration or determination of the Participants' 
rights in respect of the area or part thereof in which the well is drilled 
or the structure from which the well was drilled, is situated. 
Were the Participants to fail to comply with the direction or 
directions of the Designated Authority on or before the date of expiration 
of the Permit145 or, where the Permit has been wholly or partly 
determined, wholly or partly cancelled or has expired, within the time 
specified in the notice given by the Designated Authority146 they would 
be liable to a fine147. Furthermore, were the Participants to fail to 
comply with the direction or directions of the Designated Authority within 
the time mentioned above or to fail to carry out an arrangement148 to 
remove or cause to be removed from the area to which the Permit relates 
property brought into the area by any person engaged or concerned in the 
operations authorised by the Permit149 the Designated Authority may do 
all or any of the things required by the direction, directions or 
arrangement to be done150 In addition, if the Participants fail to 
remove or cause to be removed such property, the Designated Authority may, 
by notice published in the Commonwealth of Australia Gazette, direct that 
the owner or owners of the property remove it from the area to which the 
Permit relates or dispose of the property to the satisfaction of the 
Designated Authority, within the time specified in the notice151 The 
Designated Authority must serve a copy of the notice on each person whom 
the Designated Authority believes to be the owner of the property or any 
part thereof152. The owner or owners may, or course, include any one or 
more of the Participants and the Operator. 
Furthermore, were the owner or owners of the property to fail to 
comply with the direction of the Designated Authority, the Designated 
Authority may: - 
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1. remove, in such manner as the Designated Authority thinks fit, 
all or any of the property 
153; 
2. dispose of, in such manner as the Designated Authority thinks 
fit, all or any of the property 
154; 
and 
3. if a copy of the notice has been served on a person whom the 
Designated Authority believed to be the owner of the property or any 
part thereof, sell, by public auction or otherwise, as the Designated 
Authority thinks fit, all or any of that property in relation to 
which a notice has been served155 The Designated Authority may 
deduct from the proceeds of sale costs and expenses incurred in 
relation to the ro ert 
156 
ppy costs and expenses incurred in 
relation to the doing of any things required by a direction given by 
the Designated Authority to be done by the person157 and any fees 
or amounts due under the Petroleum Submerged Lands) Act 1967 (C'th) 
by the person 
158 
All costs and expenses incurred by the Designated Authority in 
relation to the removal, disposal or sale of property, are a debt due by 
the owner of the property to the Commonwealth of Australia159, whilst 
all costs and expenses incurred by the Designated Authority in relation to 
the doing of any thing required by a direction to be done by the 
Participants (other than as the owner of property) are a debt due by the 
160 
Participants to the Commonwealth of Australia 
In effect, neither the Participants nor the owner of the property may 
bring an action against the Designated Authority in respect of the 
removal, disposal or sale of property 
161 
In addition to the power vested in the Designated Authority to deal 
with the abandonment of wells, structures and debris, there is the 
additional sanction vested in the Joint Authority to cancel the Permit as 
to all or some of the blocks in respect of which the Permit relates 
1623 
were the Participants not to comply with a direction given by the 
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Designated Authority163, or not to pay any amount payable, such as costs 
and expenses incurred by the Designated Authority in relation to the 
removal, disposal or sale of property or in relation to the doing of any 
thing required by a direction to be done by the Participants, within three 
164 
months after the day on which the amount became payable 
Before the Joint Authority can cancel the Permit as to all or some of 
the blocks in respect of which the Permit relates, the Joint Authority 
must have given at least one month's written notice to the Participants of 
its intention to cancel the Permit165 The notice must have specified a 
date on or before which the Participants may, by written notice served on 
the Designated Authority, submit any matters that the Participants wish to 
be considered166 Further, the Joint Authority must have taken into 
account any action taken by the Participants to remove the ground upon 
which the Joint Authority intends to cancel the Permit or to prevent the 
recurrence of similar grounds167 and any matters submitted on or before 
the specified date by the Participants 
168 
The effectiveness of the threat of cancellation could well turn on 
the value attributable by the Participants to the Permit at that point. 
The Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 (C'th) also provides for 
regulations to be made for securing, regulating, controlling or 
restricting the removal of structures, equipment and other property 
brought into an area for or in connection with exploration for petroleum 
that are not used or intended to be used in connection with exploration 
for petroleum in the area169 To date no such regulations have been 
made. 
The abandonment of wells and structures and the clearing of the sea 
bed of debris could also be dealt with in two other manners. Firstly, a 
Permit can be granted subject to such conditions as the Joint Authority 
thinks fit170. There would be nothing to stop the Joint Authority 
imposing conditions which addressed the abandonment issues. Secondly, the 
relevant Minister can give directions with respect to the prevention of 
pollution, or other damage to the environment171 , by a structre from 
which the well is drilled 
172. 
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If the abandonment of a well or a structure or the clearing of the 
sea bed of debris involves the dumping of waste or any other matter from a 
structure173 or the dumping of a structure174 the owner of the 
structure and or the person in charge of the structure will need to be 
issued with a permit pursuant to the Environmental Protection (Sea 
Dumping) Act 1981 (C'th)175. In such circumstances, if a permit is not 
obtained, the owner of the structure and or the person in charge of the 
structure will be guilty of an offence 
176 
A permit may be applied for by anyone'77 and may be granted subject 
to such condition and, at any time while the permit is in force, 
conditions may be imposed178. 
Where waste or any other matter is dumped from a structure or a 
structure is dumped179 and the relevant Minister considers the dumping 
likely to: - 
1. cause obstruction, or constitute a danger, to vessels 
180; 
2. result in harm to human or marine life181; or 
3. result in interference with the exercise of the sovereign 
rights of Australia as a coastal State to explore and exploit the 
natural resources of the continental shelf of Australia182, 
the relevant Minister may cause such steps to be taken as he thinks proper 
to repair or remedy any condition, or to mitigate any damage, arising from 
the dumping183. Where the relevant Minister has incurred expense or 
other liability undertaking such repair or remedy 
184, 
and a person has 
been convicted of an offence as a result of the dumping of waste or any 
other matter from a structure or the dumping of a structure without having 
a permit to do so 
185, 
the person convicted is liable to pay to the 
Commonwealth an amount equal to the total amount of those expenses and 
liabilities 
186 
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The Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 (C'th) does not specify the 
standards for the abandonment of a well or the removal of a structure or 
the cleaning of the sea bed of debris187. It would appear that the 
standards are to be those set by the Designated Authority: it is to the 
satisfaction of the Designated Authority that, in most cases, matters have 
to be dealt with. 
Finally in this regard, note should be made of the Petroleum 
(Submerged Lands) Act 1967 (C'th) which requires that any operations 
authorised by the Permit must be carried on in a manner that does not 
188 189 
interfere with navigation, fishing, the conservation of the 
resources of the sea and sea bed 
190 
or any operations of another person 
being lawfully carried on by way of exploration for, recovery of or 
conveyance of a mineral (which for such purposes includes petroleum), or 
by way of construction or operation of a pipeline 
191, 
to a greater 
extent than is necessary for the reasonable exercise of the rights and 
performance of the duties of the Participants 
192. 
This may give rise to 
the need to remove a structure or sea bed debris as it might cause such 
interference. 
The question of on whom the liability for the cost of abandonment 
rests, is rather interesting. It is to the holders of the Permit - the 
Participants - that the Designated Authority may issue its directions. It 
would appear that the directions must be issued to all, and not just one 
or more of the Participants. However, in the case of the failure by the 
Participants to remove, or cause to be removed from the area to which the 
Permit relates property brought into the area by any person engaged or 
concerned in the operations authorised by the Permit, the Designated 
Authority may issue directions to the owner or owners of that property, 
which could include the Operator and the contractors of the Operator, to 
remove it or dispose of it to the satisfaction of the Designated Authority. 
In such circumstances, it is submitted that under the Permit, each 
Participant is jointly and severally liable for any obligations arising 
pursuant to the Permit and hence for the costs thereof. As is the case in 
Great Britain, the provisions of the Joint Operating Agreement which seek 
to substitute several liability for joint and several liability do not 
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alter the liability of the Participant or any one or more of them to third 
parties. Therefore, were the Participants to enter into an abandonment 
agreement for the Exploration Phase such an agreement would only alter the 
liability of the Participants inter se. 
The difficulties with arrangements under the Joint Operating 
Agreement in so far as abandonment is concerned and default by a 
Participant in meeting its obligations to contribute to the cost of 
abandonment, have been discussed above in relation to Great Britain. The 
discussion applies equally in relation to Australia. 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE PARTICIPANTS: OTHER RIGHTS AND DUTIES 
1. RESERVATION OF RIGHTS BY THE PARTICIPANTS 
The Participants will reserve unto themselves individually the rights 
that they have under the petroleum title, save to the extent that such 
rights are fettered by the terms of the Joint Operating Agreement1. 
2. RIGHT OF INSPECTION 
Each Participant will have the right to inspect the books, records 
and inventories of whatsoever kind or nature maintained by or on behalf of 
the Operator and relating to the Operations. Such right will not extend 
to books, records and inventories maintained by or on behalf of the 
Operator as the owner of an Interest. To exercise the right of inspection 
a Participant will be required to give to the Operator a minimum period of 
notice prior to the date upon which it desires to make the inspection and 
identify the person or persons who will undertake the inspection. The 
inspection will be required to be undertaken at a reasonable time and 
during usual business hours. The right of inspection will be in addition 
to the right to audit the accounts and records of the Joint Account2. 
3. INSURANCE 
Each Participant may, in addition to the insurance required to be 
effected by the petroleum title, any Act, regulation or by-law or 
otherwise, at its own expense and for its own account obtain such other 
insurance pertaining to the Operations or materials acquired under the 
Joint Operating Agreement as it deems advisable3. However, the Joint 
Operating Agreement will usually provide that such additional insurance 
must not interfere, directly or indirectly, with the Operator's 
negotiations for, or placement of, such insurance as the Operator is 
required to obtain and effect under the Joint Operating Agreement4. 
The Joint Operating Agreement will require each Participant to obtain 
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and maintain such insurance or other evidence of financial responsibility 
as may be decided from time to time by the Operating Committee in respect 
of its share of any liability to third parties which may arise in 
connection with the Operations. This insurance is in addition to any 
other insurance of the nature mentioned above. Each Participant will be 
required to provide to the Operating Committee such evidence, as may be 
reasonably required, of the effecting of the insurance or other evidence 
of financial responsibility, and the maintenance thereof, as and when 
requested to do so by the Operating Committee. 
s 
4. OPOL 
The Joint Operating Agreement will require the Participants to 
execute a "non-operators undertaking"6 and to furnish such other forms 
and information as are necessary to establish financial responsibility in 
accordance with? the rules of the Offshore Pollution Liability 
$ 
Association Limited ("OPOL"). 
5. LITIGATION 
A Participant will be required to notify the other Participants of 
any claim relating to or which may affect the Operations. In so far as a 
claim does relate to or affect the Operations, the Participant will be 
required to defend or settle the claim in accordance with the directions 
of the Operating Committee. The costs, expenses and damages payable as a 
result of such defence or settlement will be met from the Joint Account 
If any other Participant wishes to participate in such defence or 
settlement it will be permitted to do so, but at its sole cost and 
10 
expense 
6. WORK AND EXPENDITURE OBLIGATIONS 
In Great Britain as has been mentioned above in this thesisll 
after the closing date for applications for Licences, all applications 
received are considered by the Department of Energy, which arranges for a 
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". 1 
presentation by the applicants under consideration and negotiates with 
them an appropriate work programme. Thereafter, where an applicant is 
offered a Licence by the Secretary of State for Energy, such Licence will 
usually be offered on the condition that within a specified period of time 
of the date of the offer the applicant, inter alia, confirms acceptance of 
a work programme proposed by the Secretary of State for Energy. The work 
programme will, in most cases, be that negotiated between the Department 
of Energy and the applicant12. 
The work programme will be set out in Schedule 4 to the Licence13 
The Licence requires the holders of the Licence to carry out the 
scheme of prospecting, including any geological survey by any physical or 
chemical means and the programme of test drilling as may be set out in the 
Licence during the initial term of six years 
14 
Where a Licence has been issued as the result of the discretionary 
allocation with fixed cash premium method (as implemented in the seventh 
licencing round) or the variable cash tender method (as implemented in the 
fourth, eighth and ninth licencing round) the practice is not to set out a 
15 
particular work programme in the Licence 
In the event that the holders of the Licence do not carry out the 
work programme set out in the Licence the Secretary of State for Energy 
16 
may revoke it 
In Australia, an applicant must set out, in its application for a 
block or blocks, particulars of its proposals for work and expenditure in 
respect of the block or blocks to which the application relates17. This 
requirement does not apply where the cash bidding method of allocating a 
18 
block or blocks is employed 
When the Joint Authority advises an applicant that it is prepared to 
grant to the applicant a Permit in respect of the block or blocks to which 
the application relates, the Joint Authority must set out in the written 
advice, inter alia, a summary of the conditions subject to which the 
Permit will be granted19, Other than where the Permit is to be granted 
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as a result of the cash bidding method of allocating blocks20, a Permit 
may be granted subject to such conditions as the Joint Authority thinks 
fit and are set out in the Permit21. The conditions may include 
conditions with respect to work to be carried out in or in relation to the 
area to which the Permit relates during, the term of the Permit and or 
amounts to be expended by the applicant in the carrying out of such 
work22. Once the applicant makes its request to the Joint Authority to 
grant it the Permit23 and has lodged with the Designated Authority the 
security that the applicant is required to lodge24 and, paid the balance 
of the amount25 to be paid in respect of the grant of the Permit, the 
Joint Authority will grant the Permit to the applicant26. 
If the applicant's proposals for work and expenditure are accepted by 
the Joint Authority they will form the basis of the work and expenditure 
conditions set out in the Permit27. As such, great care must be taken 
by the applicant in preparing the proposals for work and expenditure 
28 
After all, the Participants may find themselves in the position whereby, 
to comply with the conditions set out in the Permit, they have to carry 
out minimum work and or minimum expenditure in relation to the area to 
which the Permit relates29. In the case of both, compliance with either 
the minimum work condition or the minimum expenditure condition will not 
30 
suffice to satisfy the Participants' obligations. To avoid breaching 
the conditions set out in the Permit it is therefore usual for the 
proposals to be drafted in general terms in so far as work is concerned 
and conservatively in so far as expenditure is concerned31. In 
addition, where for example, work has been done or expenditure made in a 
year in excess of that required for the year, a prudent Operator would 
ascertain whether the excess can be credited against the next year's 
minimum work programme or minimum expenditure requirement32. 
In the event that the holders of the Permit do not comply with the 
conditions set out in the Permit, the Joint Authority may cancel the 
Permit33 and forfeit the security given 
34 
Due to the consequences that can flow from failure, to carry out the 
work programme set out in the Licence in the case of Great Britain and, to 
comply with the work and or expenditure conditions set out in the Permit, 
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in the case of Australia, it is usual for the Joint Operating Agreement to 
stipulate that the work and or expenditure conditions stipulated in the 
petroleum title which are obligatory, be incorporated into the Joint 
Operating Agreement and made obligatory on all Participants35. To this 
end, the Joint Operating Agreement will usually provide that there can be 
no Non-Consent Operations or Sole Risk Operations in respect of the 
obligatory work and or expenditure conditions stipulated in the petroleum 
36 
title 
7. PROGRAMMES AND BUDGETS 
The proposed programmes and budgets are to be considered, revised and 
approved by the Operating Committee as soon as is practicable37 and in 
most cases prior to a stated date or within a period of time38. 
8. AMENDMENT OF PROGRAMMES, BUDGETS AND AUTHORISATIONS FOR EXPENDITURE 
The Joint Operating Agreement usually provides that a Participant 
may, at any time by notice to the other Participants, propose that an 
approved programme and budget and or authorisation for expenditure be 
amended. To the extent that the amendment is approved by the 
39 
Operating Committee, the approved programme and budget and or 
40 
authorisation for expenditure will be deemed amended accordingly 
However, such amendment will not operate to invalidate any authorised 
committments or expenditure made by the Operator prior to the 
amendment4l 
9. NON-CONSENT 
The general rule established by the Joint Operating Agreement is that 
all Operations under the petroleum title are to be carried out by the 
Operator, subject to the overriding control of the Operating Committee, as 
Operator for and on behalf of all the Participants. As will be discussed 
later42, there is usually at least one exception to this rule: Sole Risk 
Operations. 
- 173 - 
A Sole Risk Operation is an activity under the petroleum title 
carried out in accordance with the terms of the Joint Operating Agreement, 
usually by the Operator, as Operator for and on behalf of fewer than all 
the Participants, this being an activity which has been proposed by the 
Operator and has not received the requisite affirmative vote to proceed as 
43 
part of the Operations 
The converse of a Sole Risk Operation is a Non-Consent Operation. 
The Joint Operating Agreement will usually permit a Participant to elect 
not to participate in an activity under the petroleum title in accordance 
with the terms of the Joint Operating Agreement, this being an activty 
which has been proposed by the Operator and received the requisite 
affirmative vote (but less than a unanimous affirmative vote) to proceed 
as part of the Operations 
44 
The main difference between a Sole Risk Operation and a Non-Consent 
Operation is one of emphasis. In a Sole Risk Operation it is, in effect, 
one Participant desiring to carry out an activity in which the other 
Participants do not desire to participate45, whilst in a Non-Consent 
Operation it is, in effect, one Partiicpant not desiring to participate 
46 
with the other Participants in carrying out an activity 
The same legal principles apply alike to Sole Risk Operations and 
Non-Consent Operations. Sole Risk Operations are considered in some 
detail later in this thesis47. The comments made in that consideration 
apply equally to Non-Consent Operations48. What is more, the 
consequences of Sole Risk Operations and Non-Consent Operations are often 
the same49. As such, the discussion of Non-Consent Operations which 
follows is limited but should be considered in conjunction with the 
discussion of Sole Risk Operations. 
It is not unusual for the Joint Operating Agreement to provide for 
Sole Risk Operations and Non-Consent Operations50. Nevertheless, some 
Joint Operating Agreements do not permit non-consent to arise at the 
Exploration Phase. They may permit it to arise, in given circumstances, 
at the Development Phase, where a Participant may have the right to elect, 
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in given circumstances, not to proceed with the development51 
The rationale for prohibiting a Participant from electing not to 
participate in an activity at the Exploration Phase is that, in high risk 
areas, it would act as a deterrant to participation as the risk factor and 
52 
cost factor increased 
Other Joint Operating Agreements do permit non-consent to arise at 
53 
the Exploration Phase 
The rationale for permitting a Participant to elect not to 
participate in an activity at the Exploration Phase is that a Participant 
should not be compelled to so participate without its consent 
54 
The non-consent provision usually provides that a Participant which 
voted against an operating programme and budget adopted by the Operating 
Committee55 or a Participant which voted in favour of an operating 
programme and budget adopted by the Operating Committee56 may, within a 
stated period of time of the vote which adopts the operating programme and 
budget, give notice to the other Participants that it will not contribute 
to the proposed operating programme and budget57. It is usually the 
case that such notice can only be given in respect of a proposal to drill 
an exploratory well58 which is not part of the minimum work 
programme 
59 
for the current year 
60 
On receipt of the notice given by the Non-Consent Participant, the 
Participants receiving the notice are usually given the right, within a 
stated period of time of receipt, to give like notice to all other 
Participants. If such Participants do not give notice within the time 
specified they will be deemed to have confirmed their intention to 
6 
participate in the proposed operating programme and budgetl 
If Participants holding, in aggregate, a stated percentage or more of 
the Interests have given notice that they will not participate, the 
proposed operating programme and budget will usually not proceed. A 
Participant which voted for the proposal may however, give notice, to 
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secure the right to conduct Sole Risk Drilling62, of its intention to 
63 
carry out a Sole Risk Drilling 
However, if the percentage is less than the stated percentage, then 
the proposed operating programme and budget will proceed at the sole risk 
and expense of, and all costs of the Non-Consent Operation shall be borne 
by, the Participating Participants64 in the same proportion as their 
respective Interests bear to each other and all matters directly relating 
to the conduct of the operating programme and budget will be decided by 
the Participating Participants 
65. 
Even so, the Non-Consent Participants 
will be required to be kept fully informed of all Non-Consent Operations 
and all data from the operations will be required to be made available to 
them as soon as practicable and at no cost other than that which is 
reasonable for copying and delivery 
66 
The Participating Participants are usually required to indemnify and 
hold harmless the Non-Consent Participants from and against all liability, 
costs, claims, expenses or loss directly incurred as a result of the 
6 
Non-Consent Operations7. 
The Non-Consent Operation will be carried out in accordance with the 
terms of the Joint Operating Agreement, by the Operator, for and on behalf 
of the Participating Participants, as part of the Operations68. 
In the event that the Non-Consent Operation result in a particular 
discovery of petroleum assessed by the Operating Committee to be capable 
of exploitation, the Participating Participants will be entitled to 
recover from each Non-Consent Participant a sum equal to a stated multiple 
of the total costs of the Non-Consent Operation, as would have been 
payable by each Non-Consent Participant had it and all other Participants 
participated 
69, 
The recovery of the sum is usually effected by the 
Non-Consent Participant funding each Participating Participant's share of 
all operating programmes and budgets with respect to evaluation, 
development or exploitation of the discovery until the sum payable has 
been expended70. On satisfactory reimbursement, any property acquired 
by or on behalf of the Participating Participants for the purpose of the 
Non-Consent Operations will vest in all of the Participants as tenants in 
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common, in proportion to their respective Interests71. 
Each Non-Consent Participant will have the right, at its own expense, 
to have an audit carried out by its own or independent auditors to verify 
the amount of the sum payable by it72 and each Participant will have a 
like right of audit to verify that the reimbursement obligations have been 
satisfied73. 
10. RENEWAL OF THE PETROLEUM TITLE 
In Great Britain, a Licence is granted in the first instance for a 
term of six years, may be contained for a further term of twelve years and 
may thereafter continue for a further maximum period of eighteen 
years74. Progression from the initial term to the third term, depends 
upon the due performance by the Participants of the work obligations and 
with the other terms and conditions of the Licence75. Furthermore, 
progression from the initial term to the second term is subject to 
surrender provisions76. The initial and second terms can be seen as the 
exploration and appraisal terms, whereas the third term can be seen as the 
development term77. This thesis will, therefore, only consider the 
initial and second terms. 
At any time, not later than three months before the expiration of the 
initial term, the Participants may give notice in writing to the Secretary 
of State for Energy that they desire the Licence to be continued as to 
part of the area to which the Licence relates and to determine as to the 
residue of the area to which the Licence relates; the area to be 
7s 
surrendered. 
The notice is required to describe the area to be surrendered79 and 
to specify a date, not later than the expiry of the initial term, upon 
which the area to be 
specified the rights 
area surrendered but 
imposed upon or incu 
that date 
81. 
surrendered is to be surrendered 
80. 
On the date 
granted by the Licence will cease in respect of the 
without prejudice to any obligations or liabilities 
rred by the Participants under the Licence prior to 
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In Australia, a Permit is granted in the first instance for a term of 
six years82 and may be continued for further terms of five years83. 
Progression from the initial term to the second term, and from the second 
term to the third term and so forth, depends upon the due performance by 
the Participants of the conditions set out in the Permit84, compliance 
with the provision of the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 (C'th)85, 
and otherwise at the discretion of the Joint Authority86. Furthermore, 
progression is, in each case, subject to surrender provisions87. 
At any time, not later than three months before the expiration of the 
initial or then current term88, the Participants may make application to 
the Designated Authority for renewal by the Joint Authority of the Permit 
in respect of the blocks specified in the application89. 
The notice is required to be in accordance with an approved form90, 
. 
9 in an approved manner1 and be accompanied by the prescribed fee 
92 
Application for renewal of a Permit cannot be made where the method 
employed in allocating a block or blocks to which the Permit relates is 
the cash bidding method if, the notice inviting application for the grant 
of the Permit stated that it was not able to be renewed 
93 
or a renewal 
94 
of the Permit has previously been granted by the Joint Authority 
The application is also required to specify the blocks to which the 
renewed Permit is to relate, being one half of the blocks to which the 
9 
Permit related 
5. 
The balance of the blocks to which the Permit related 
are surrendered. 
Where the Participants make an application for the renewal of a 
Permit, the Joint Authority: - 
1. must, if the Participants have complied with the conditions set 
out in the Permit and the provisions of the Petroleum (Submerged 
Lands) Act 1967 (C'th)96; or 
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2. may, if the Participants have not so complied and the Joint 
Authority is satisfied that, although the Participants have not so 
complied, special circumstances exist to justify the granting of the 
renewal of the Permit97, 
inform the Participants by notice in writing that it is prepared to grant 
to them the renewal of the Permit98 and that the Participants are 
required to lodge a security for compliance with the conditions to which 
the Permit, if the renewal is granted, will from time to time be subject 
and with the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 (C'th)9. 
9 
On the other hand, if the Participants have not so complied and if 
the Joint Authority is not satisfied that special circumstances exist to 
justify the granting of the renewal of the Permit, the Joint Authority 
must, by notice in writing served on the Participants, refuse to grant the 
renewal of the Permit 
100 
Before it can refuse to grant the renewal of the Permit the Joint 
Authority must have given to the Participants not less than one month's 
written notice of its intention to refuse to grant the renewal of the 
Permit101 The notice must have given particulars of the reasons for 
the intention102 and have specified a date on or before which the 
Participants or any other person on whom the notice was served may 
103 
, 
by notice in writing served on the Designated Authority, submit any matter 
that they wish to be considered104 Furthermore, the Joint Authority 
must have thereafter considered any matter submitted to it for 
consideration 
105 
The notice advising the Participants that the Joint Authority is 
prepared to grant to them a renewal of the Permit must contain a summary 
of the conditions to which the Permit, on the grant of renewal, is to be 
subject106 and a statement to the effect that the application will lapse 
if the Participants do not make a request to the Joint Authority to grant 
to them the renewal of the Permit and lodge with the Designated Authority 
10 
the security referred to7 
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The Participants have one month after service of the notice advising 
them that the Joint Authority is prepared to grant to them a renewal of 
the Permit to serve upon the Designated Authority a written notice 
requesting the Joint Authority to grant to them the renewal of the 
Permit108 and to lodge with the Designated Authority the security 
referred to 
109 
Once the Participants have complied with these requirements the Joint 
Authority is required to grant to them the renewal of the Permit 
110 
Were the Participants to fail to comply with these requirements, the 
ill 
will lapse at the end of the one-month period 
The rationale for relinquishment provisions, of the type utilised in 
Great Britain and Australia, is that it ensures additional pressure will 
be placed upon the Participants to explore thoroughly the area to which 
the petroleum title relates, in order to make a decision as to which areas 
to relinquish. Furthermore they ensure that areas which do not produce a 
discovery or where the Participants have decided not to conduct further 
exploration will, within a reasonable time, revert to the government 
112 
The renewal of the petroleum title is approached in a different 
manner by each of the proformas. 
Under the Britoil proforma, when it comes to the making of a decision 
upon whether to continue the Licence 
113 
upon the expiration of the 
initial term of six years, it is a case of determining which Participants 
desire to continue the Licence and which are in agreement upon the 
delineation of the surrender area to be described in the notice of 
renewal114 If a majority115 of those Participants wish to renew the 
Licence, then the renewal of the Licence shall be sought 
116 
In quantifying at the Participants entitled to vote, the vote by any 
Participants against continuation is ignored. The matter is decided by 
those Participants that desire to continue 
117 
The renewal clause is stated to be without prejudice to each 
Participant's right to give notice to the other Participants that it 
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wishes to withdraw from the Licence and the Joint Operating Agreement 
during the initial term of the Licence 
118. 
It is also stated to be 
1 
subject to the rights of the Participants relating to sole risk19 
Under the APEA proforma, the Operator is required, within a stated 
period of time prior to the expiration of the current term of the Permit, 
to submit to the Operating Committee the issue of whether, if the Permit 
1 is capable of renewal, to apply for renewal20 
Any Participant not voting in favour of applying for renewal of the 
Permit is required to withdraw121 from the Permit with effect from the 
expiration of the current term of the Permit122. 
Thereafter, within a stated period of time prior to the last day upon 
which an application for renewal of the Permit is required to be 
submitted, each Participant that elects to join in applying for the 
renewal of the Permit123 must notify the other Participants of its 
124 
election. The Operator is required to advise each Participant of the 
last date on which it can make such an election within a stated period of 
l 
time prior to such election date25 
If no Participant elects to apply for the renewal of the Permit the 
Operator is required to conclude the Operations with respect to the Permit 
and no application for renewal of the Permit can be made 
126 
If at least one Participant elects to apply for the renewal of the 
Permit, those Participants that do not so elect are deemed to have given 
notice of withdrawal from the Permit with effect from the date of 
expiration of the current term of the Permit and must, if so required by 
the Participants that do so elect, execute such documents and do such acts 
and things as are necessary to obtain the Permit127. 
If only one Participant elects to apply for the renewal of the 
Permit, that Participant is to have sole charge and control over the 
method and conditions of application for renewal of the Permit 
128. 
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If there is more than one Participant that elects to apply for the 
renewal of the Permit it must decide on the minimum work programme129 
and the minimum expenditure commitment130 to be submitted in the 
application for renewal and, if appropriate, the block or blocks 
131 
3. n 
respect of which renewal will be sought132. The Operator is required to 
submit the application for renewal on the basis of the agreed work and 
expenditure commitments 
133 
Each Participant so electing to join in applying for the renewal of 
the Permit will have the right to be represented individually in any 
discussions or meetings that take place with the Joint Authority in 
relation to the application for or on the conditions upon which renewal of 
the Permit will be granted134 The Operator will not be empowered to 
advance to the Joint Authority any proposals with respect to such matters, 
nor to agree any minimum work commitment 
135 
or minimum expenditure 
commitment136 unless the same has been previously agreed by the 
Participants who elected to join in the application 
137 
In the event that the Joint Authority is prepared to grant a renewal 
of the Permit upon conditions which differ materially from those submitted 
in the application, each Participant who elected to join in the 
application will have the right, within a stated period of time from the 
date of receipt of notice from the Operator of such conditions, to give 
notice to all other Participants which elected to join in the application, 
of withdrawal from the Permit138. The Operator is required to give 
notice of such conditions promptly after the receipt of the information 
13 
from the Joint Authority9 
Where a Participant gives notice of withdrawal, it 
have given notice of withdrawal with effect from the da 
the current term of the Permit and must, if so required 
Participants that do not give like notice, execute such 
such acts and things as are necessary to obtain renewal 
will be deemed to 
to of expiration of 
by the 
documents and do 
of the Permit 
140 
If at least one of the Participants which elected to join in applying 
for the renewal of the Permit does not give notice of withdrawal, the 
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Operator is required to request the grant of renewal of the Permit on 
behalf of that Participant or those Participants 
141 
11. WITHDRAWAL 
A Joint Operating Agreement will usually prohibit a Participant from 
withdrawing from the petroleum title or the Joint Operating Agreement 
unless such withdrawal is undertaken in the manner established by the 
Joint Operating Agreement 
142 
A Participant may give notice to the other Participants that it 
wishes to withdraw from the petroleum title or the Joint Operating 
Agreement143 The time at which the notice may be given will usually be 
stipulated in the Joint Operating Agreement as, depending upon the time at 
which it is given, certain consequences will flow from the giving of the 
notice. Issues of timing and the consequences flowing from the giving of 
notice will differ from Joint Operating Agreement to Joint Operating 
Agreement. It is usual to provide: - 
1. if a Participant gives notice earlier than a stipulated period 
prior to, in some cases, the expiration of the initial term of the 
petroleum title144, and in other cases the expiration of the 
14 
current year5 
146 
, the Participant has the right to withdraw 
from the petroleum title and the Joint Operating Agreement; and 
2. if the petroleum title is extended for a further term, if a 
Participant gives notice at any time during the further term that 
Participant has the right to withdraw from the petroleum title and 
the Joint Operating Agreement 
147 
The Joint Operating Agreement will usually require all work and or 
expenditure obligations to have been completed, be it for the initial term 
or the current year, before a Participant can give notice of its desire to 
withdraw148. This is because it would be unacceptable for a Participant 
to pass on an increased financial burden to the other Participants by 
withdrawing earlier. 
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In addition, the Joint Operating Agreement will give to the other 
Participants the right to give notice, within a stipulated period of the 
receipt of the notice, that they also wish to withdraw from the petroleum 
title and the Joint Operating Agreement149 If all other Participants 
give notice that they also wish to withdraw, the Participants will be 
deemed to have agreed to abandon the Operations and the petroleum title 
will be required to be surrendered at the earliest possible date150 
Each participant will be required to take promptly any and all actions, 
and execute any and all documents necessary to effect such surrender 
151 
If fewer than all of Participants give notice that they also wish to 
withdraw from the petroleum title and the Joint Operating Agreement, the 
withdrawing Participants (the Participant that gave the initial notice and 
the Participants who subsequently gave notice) are required to withdraw 
from the petroleum title and the Joint Operating Agreement on the earliest 
possible date and to assign their respective Interests to the 
non-withdrawing Participants 
152. 
The Joint Operating Agreement will 
usually provide that the withdrawing Participants are not to receive 
compensation for the assignment of their respective Interests 
153 
The actual withdrawal of a withdrawing Participant from the petroleum 
title and the Joint Operating Agreement will be subject to a number of 
conditions. In so far as the Joint Operating Agreement is concerned these 
conditions will usually include: - 
1. a requirement that the withdrawing Participant assigns all its 
Interest to the non-withdrawing Participants154 The assignment of 
all or part of the Interest of a Participant is considered in some 
detail later in this thesis155 The comments made in that 
consideration apply equally to the assignment of an Interest by a 
withdrawing Participant156 and as such will not be addressed here; 
2. a stipulation that the Interest of the withdrawing Participant 
be either acquired by the non-withdrawing Participants in proportion 
to the total proportion of the Interests or in such other proportions 
as they may themselves agree upon157; 
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3. a requirement that the withdrawing Participant join with the 
non-withdrawing Participants in such actions as may be necessary or 
desirable to obtain any consents or approvals, including, in the case 
of Great Britain, that of the Secretary or State for Energy and, in 
the case of Australia, that of the Joint Authority to the 
158 
assignment ; 
4. a requirement that the withdrawing Participant and the 
non-withdrawing Participant execute and deliver any and all documents 
necessary to effect the assignment 
159; 
5. a provision that the costs, stamp duty, transfer taxes and 
other expenses of the assignment are the obligation of the 
withdrawing Participant 
160; 
6. an obligation, notwithstanding the giving of the notice, of the 
withdrawing Participant to join with the non-withdrawing Participants 
in such actions as may be required by them for the maintenance of the 
petroleum title161 This requirement will be so drafted to provide 
that, by participating in the actions, the withdrawing Participant 
will not incur any financial obligations beyond those incurred 
immediately prior to the giving of the notice and those provided for 
by the provisions of the Joint Operating Agreement relating to 
withdrawal 
162; 
7. a provision that the costs, fines, penalties and other expenses 
incurred by the non-withdrawing Participants in connection with the 
withdrawal of the Participant are the obligation of the withdrawing 
Participant 
163; 
8. a stipulation that the withdrawing Participant is not permitted 
to withdraw from the petroleum title and the Joint Operating 
Agreement if its Interest is subject to any liens, changes or 
164 
encumbrances unless the non-withdrawing Participants are willing 
to accept the assignment subject to such liens, charges or 
encumbrances 
165; 
and 
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9. a stipulation that unless the non-withdrawing Participants 
agree to accept the withdrawing Participants' liabilities and 
obligations, the withdrawing Participant will remain liable and 
obliged for its percentage share of all expenditure accruing to the 
Joint Account under any programme or budget approved by the Operating 
Committee and authorised by an authorisation for expenditure prior to 
the date on which the notice of withdrawal was given, even if the 
operations concerned are implemented after that date166 This 
stipulation will be so drafted to provide that the withdrawing 
Participant will not be liable for any amounts which it would not 
have been obliged to pay had it not withdrawn167. The one 
exception may be with respect to costs of abandonment. The Joint 
Operating Agreement will provide that the withdrawing Participant 
remains liable and obligated for its share of all costs and 
obligations relating to abandonment168. This will apply to all 
Operations and Sole Risk Drilling in which the withdrawing 
Participant has participated. The difficulty with this exception is 
to establish the amount of the contribution to be made by the 
withdrawing Participant to the costs of abandonment. Usually the 
costs of abandonment169 are to be calculated on an equal share 
basis as at the time of withdrawal170. In the absence of agreement 
between the non-withdrawing Participants and the withdrawing 
Participant, the Joint Operating Agreement may provide for the costs 
of abandonment to be determined by an independent third party, such 
as a surveyor171, to be appointed by the Participants172. The 
independent third party will usually act as an expert and not as an 
arbitrator, his decision being final and not subject to review or 
appeal173. The Joint Operating Agreement will then provide that 
the withdrawing Participant either pays the amount determined as 
payable by it to the Operator who will credit the amount received to 
each non-withdrawing Participant in the Joint Account174 or provide 
the non-withdrawing Participants with such security for such amount 
as is acceptable to all of the non-withdrawing Participants175. An 
alternative to determining the amount to be paid by the withdrawing 
Participant as mentioned above is for the withdrawing Participant to 
remain liable and obligated for its share of all costs and 
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obligations relating to abandonment, if abandonment occurs within a 
stipulated period after the effective date of withdrawal176. In 
such cases, the withdrawing Participant will be required to provide 
the non-withdrawing Participants with such security therefore as is 
acceptable to all of the non-withdrawing Participants177. In 
either event, in the case of Great Britain, the withdrawing 
Participant, if under a duty to secure the carrying out of an 
abandonment programme, will seek to be released from that 
obligation 
178. 
Where a Participant seeks to withdraw from the petroleum title and 
the Joint Operating Agreement, such withdrawal and the assignment 
1 
necessitated thereby will not be effective until a stipulated date79 
The stipulated date may be either the effective date of the 
assignment180 or the end of the current year181. The withdrawing 
Participant will cease to have any rights in respect of the petroleum 
title on and after the stipulated date2. If all the Participants give 
18 
notice of their desire to withdraw, the effective date of withdrawal will 
183 
be the date on which the surrender takes effect 
During the period commencing with the giving of notice by the 
Participant of its desire to withdraw from the petroleum title and the 
Joint Operating Agreement and terminating of such withdrawal and 
assignment becoming effective, the withdrawing Participant will hold its 
Interest upon trust for the non-withdrawing Participants184. Each 
non-withdrawing Participant will be required to indemnify the withdrawing 
Participant against any and all costs, expenses, claims and liabilities 
arising from the commencement of the period, until the effective date of 
the assignment 
185. 
The withdrawing Participant will be required, during 
that period, to execute such documents and do such acts and things as are 
necessary to comply with the obligations of the holder of the petroleum 
title and, as directed by the Operator, otherwise and on behalf of the 
non-withdrawing Participants 
186 
Two interesting questions that arise when considering the right of a 
Participant to withdraw from the petroleum title and the Joint Operating 
Agreement are: - 
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1. what is to happen if a discovery is made by a well, to which 
the withdrawing Participant has contributed, after the giving of 
notice of a desire to withdraw?; and 
2. does the withdrawing Participant retain its entitlement to vote 
at meetings of the Operating Committee in respect of operations for 
which it remains liable and obligated? 
In the first case, the Joint Operating Agreement may provide the 
answer by stating that the withdrawing Participant shall have the right 
within a stated period of time to elect that it be deemed not to have 
withdrawn from the trapping unit resulting from the discovery7. On 
18 
the other hand, the Joint Operating Agreement may be silent on the 
issue'88. In the latter instance, it is submitted, the withdrawing 
Participant has no right to participate in the discovery. 
In the second instance, the Joint Operating Agreement may provide for 
the withdrawing Participant to retain its entitlement to vote at meetings 
of the Operating Committee in such circumstances, but apart from this, the 
withdrawing Participant is not entitled to vote at meetings of the 
Operating Committee189. In most cases the Joint Operating Agreement 
will be silent on the issue. In the latter case, it is submitted the 
withdrawing Participant will retain its entitlement to vote at meetings of 
the Operating Committee until such time as the assignment of its Interest 
becomes effective. 
12. SURRENDER OF THE PETROLEUM TITLE 
In the case of Great Britain, the Participants may at any time during 
the initial term, by giving to the Secretary of State for Energy not less 
than six months' written notice, surrender or determine the Licence 
190 
The Licence will expire on an anniversary date of the date of commencement 
of the initial term191 The Participants may cancel the notice by 
giving to the Secretary of State for Energy not less than one months 
written notice to that effect before the expiration of the first 
192 
notice 
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In the case of Australia, the Participants may at any time, by 
application in writing served on the Designated Authority, apply to 
surrender all of the blocks in respect of which the Permit is in 
force 
193. 
The Designated Authority cannot give his consent to the 
surrender unless the Participants have: - 
1. paid all fees and amounts payable by them under the Petroleum 
(Submerged Lands) Act 1967 (C'th) or have made arrangements, that are 
satisfactory to the Designated Authority, for the payment of those 
fees and amounts 
194; 
2. complied with the conditions set out in the Permit and with the 
provisions of the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 (C'th)195; 
3. to the satisfaction of the Designated Authority, removed or 
caused to be removed from the area to which the surrender relates all 
property brought into that area by any person engaged or concerned in 
the operations authorised by the Permit, or have made arrangements 
that are satisfactory to the Designated Authority with respect to 
that property 
196; 
4. to the satisfaction of the Designated Authority, plugged or 
closed-off all wells made, in the area to which the surrender 
relates, by any person engaged or concerned in the operations 
authorised by the Permit197; 
5. subject to the provisions of the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) 
Act 1967 (C'th), made provision, to the satisfaction of the 
Designated Authority, for the conservation and protection of the 
natural resources in the area to which the surrender relates198; and 
6. to the satisfaction of the Designated Authority, made good any 
damage to the sea-bed or subsoil, in the area to which the surrender 
relates, caused by any person engaged or concerned in the operations 
authorised by the Permit 
199 
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In most cases, items 1., 4. and 6. will relate to the activities 
undertaken by the Operator for and on behalf of the Participants. 
If the Participants have complied with the requirements listed above, 
the Designated Authority cannot unreasonably refuse consent to the 
200 
surrender. Hence, there is a discretionary power vested in the 
Designated Authority as to whether he will consent to the surrender. 
If the Participants have not complied with the requirements listed 
above, the Designated Authority can give his consent if he is satisfied 
that special circumstances exist that justify the giving of consent to the 
surrender 
201 
Where the Designated Authority does give his consent to the 
application to surrender, the Participants may, by notice in writing 
served on the Designated Authority, surrender the Permit202. 
Of recent date it has been the practice to grant Permits subject to 
the condition that the Participants complete the minimum work programme 
for the first three years of the initial term or renewed term before they 
can successfully apply for consent to the surrender of the blocks in 
respect of which the Permit is in force203. This policy would appear to 
relate to Permits and renewed Permits alike. 
The consent of all Participants is required to determine the 
petroleum title. The Participants are required to make application 
204 
jointly to surrender the petroleum title and each Participant must take 
promptly any and all actions, and execute any and all documents, necessary 
to effect such surrender 
205 
13. SURRENDER OF PART OF THE AREA TO WHICH THE PETROLEUM TITLE RELATES 
In the case of Great Britain and Australia, the requirements relating 
to the surrender of the petroleum title apply alike to the surrender of 
part of the area to which the petroleum title relates 
206 
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The consent of all Participants is required to surrender any part of 
the area to which the petroleum title relates207. 
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CHAPTER VII 
THE PARTICIPANTS AND SOLE RISK DRILLING 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The general rule established by the Joint Operating Agreement is that 
all Operations under the petroleum title are to be carried out by the 
Operator, subject to the overriding control of the Operating Committee, as 
Operator for and on behalf of all the Participants, albeit that their 
interests may vary. The one exception to this rule is what is known as a 
Sole Risk Operation. This is an activity under the petroleum title 
carried out in accordance with the terms of the Joint Operating Agreement, 
usually by the Operator, as Operator for and on behalf of less than all 
the Participants 
l. 
Sole Risk Operations reflect a recognition of the need to enable a 
Participant to take independent action where an activity has been proposed 
by the Participant and the Operating Committee has voted against or failed 
to vote in favour of the activity. The reasoning for the Operating 
Committee's action or inaction may reflect a difference in technical 
opinion or a recognition of budgeting restraint2. Sole Risk Operations 
can therefore provide an effective way to overcome an impasse between the 
Participant who holds very strong views in favour of undertaking the 
activity and the Operating Committee3, overcome the situation where one 
or more of the Participants through the Operating Committee have an 
effective veto over the activity which, for it or their own reasons, it or 
they choose not to support4; allow a Participant to follow its own view 
or interests5 or allow flexibility in the work that can be carried on in 
the area to which the petroleum title relates6. 
The provisions of the Joint Operating Agreement which provide for 
Sole Risk Operations are usually drafted with a view to persuading 
Participants to join in the Sole Risk Operations by making it expensive 
for a Participant that does not join in, if the Sole Risk Operation 
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proves successful and the Participant wishes to subsequently participate 
in the Sole Risk Operation7. On the other hand, the provisions are 
usually drafted so as to encourage a Participant to take the risk of 
carrying out an activity8. The balance would appear, in most cases, to 
be successful; there having been very few occasions when Sole Risk 
Operations have been undertaken at the Exploration Phase. 
9 
2. THE SCOPE OF A SOLE RISK OPERATION 
At the Exploration Phase, the type of activity which may be conducted 
as a Sole Risk Operation under the Joint Operating Agreement is strictly 
limited in a number of respects. In part, this is to prevent a 
Participant from specifying a Sole Risk Operation whereby it could, if it 
so elected, develop a project sequentially as a Sole Risk Operation and in 
so doing effectively prevent the other Participants from ever coming into 
the project. 
At the Exploration Phase it is usual for the only Sole Risk Operation 
permitted, to be drilling undertaken for and on behalf of fewer than all 
of the Participants'0. This is known as "Sole Risk Drilling". 
The situations within which Sole Risk Drilling may be undertaken are 
strictly limited. Sole Risk Drilling is limited to: - 
1. the drilling of an exploratory well or the deepening 
11 
plugging back12, side-tracking13 or testing14 of a 
suspended15 well or of a well which is in the course of being 
drilled but which the Operating Committee has decided to abandon 
16 
neither such wells being inside the interpreted closure of any 
geological structure or stratigraphic trap on which a well has been 
drilled, in which petroleum of potentially significance has been 
found to be present 
17 
This is known as a "without trapping unit 
drilling"; 
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2. the drilling of an exploratory well or the deepening or 
side-tracking of a suspended well inside the interpreted closure of 
any geographical structure or stratigraphic trap on which a well has 
been drilled in which petroleum of potentially commercial 
significance has been found to be present and which well is drilled, 
deepened or side-tracked to a different stratigraphic level to that 
in which such petroleum was found to be present. The approval of the 
Operating Committee is required before such drilling, deepening or 
side-tracking is carried out18. This is known as a "within 
trapping unit drilling"; or 
3. the deepening or side-tracking of a well which is in the course 
of being drilled and which does not form part of a development 
programme. Unless the Operating Committee otherwise agrees, any test 
programme by the Participants must have been carried out, the 
Participants informed of the results and a decision of the Operating 
Committee taken to abandon the well before any such deepening or 
side-tracking is carried out19. This is known as "a non 
development programme drilling". 
There is a further overriding limitation in that a Sole Risk Drilling 
cannot be carried out if it is substantially similar to 
20 
. conflicts 
21 
with or would, in the opinion of the Operating Committee, interfere 
with22 all or any part of a programme that has been approved by the 
Operating Committee and which is current at the commencement of the Sole 
Risk Drilling23, any Sole Risk Drilling which has previously been 
proposed, or the planned fulfilment of the minimum work obligations24. 
3. THE PROPOSING OF A SOLE RISK DRILLING 
A Sole Risk Drilling comes about because it is proposed by one or 
more of the Participants. Before a proposal for a Sole Risk Drilling of 
the type permitted under the Joint Operating Agreement can be made, 
certain criteria may have to be satisfied. 
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4. THE SOLE RISK DRILLING CRITERIA 
Before Sole Risk Drilling may be proposed, in the case of both a 
without and a within trapping unit drilling, it is necessary that: - 
1. the drilling shall have been proposed to the Operating 
Committee at the time of the-consideration of the current exploration 
programme but was not included in the programme25; or 
2. the drilling, having been included in the current exploration 
programme, the Operating Committee voted against or failed to vote in 
favour of an authorisation for expenditure relating to the drilling 
within a stated period of time of the submission of the authorisation 
for expenditure to the Participants. A decision by the Operting 
Committee to change the timing of such drilling within the year to 
which the current exploration programme relates, does not amount to a 
vote against the authorisation for expenditure26; or 
3. the drilling was proposed to the Operating Committee in 
reasonably sufficient detail by way of amendment to the current 
exploration programme and the Operating Committee voted against or 
failed to vote in favour of the drilling within a stated period of 
time of the submission of the amendment to the Participants 
27 
. 
5. PROPOSAL AND ACCEPTANCE OF A SOLE RISK DRILLING 
In the case of a without trapping unit drilling and a within trapping 
unit drilling a Sole Risk Drilling is proposed by the Participant wishing 
to make the proposal, giving notice to the other Participants setting out 
the proposed location of the drilling28 and all other relevant 
information29. The relevant information is required to include the 
scope and nature of the Sole Risk Drilling, the geological prognosis and 
objectives of the Sole Risk Drilling, detailed authority for 
expenditure30 and the date on which it is proposed that the Sole Risk 
Drilling should commence, such date being within a stated period of time 
of the notice31. In some cases, the notice must be given within a 
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stated period of the Operating Committee having voted against or failed to 
vote in favour of the proposed drilling or an authorisation for 
3 
expenditure relating to a drilling2. 
Either: - 
1. each recipient of a notice is required to respond within a 
stated period of time by giving notice to all other Participants of 
whether it elects to participate and, if a Participant fails to 
respond within the time period, it is deemed to have elected not to 
33 
participate , or 
2. each recipient of a notice desiring to participant is required 
to respond within a stated period of time by giving notice to all 
other Participants that it elects to participate 
34 
In the case of a non development programme, drilling a Sole Risk 
Drilling is proposed by the Participant wishing to make the proposal, 
giving as much notice as is possible to the other Participants, stating 
whether it wishes to use joint property35 for the Sole Risk Drilling 
and, if so, what items thereof. The notice should also set out such 
relevant information as is necessary in order to allow the other 
Participants to consider the proposal and elect whether or not to 
36 
participate 
Each recipient of a notice is required to respond within a stated 
period of time by giving notice, to all other Participants, of whether it 
elects to participate. If a Participant fails to respond within the time 
period it is deemed to have elected not to participate37. 
If the percentage of Interests of the Participants electing to 
participate together with the percentage of Interests of the Participants 
proposing the Sole Risk Drilling is: - 
1. either: - 
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(i) equal to the combined percentage of Interests of all of 
the Participants; or38 
(ii) not less than the percentage pass mark for resolutions of 
the Operating Committee 
39; 
the Sole Risk Drilling shall be carried out, in accordance with the 
notice, by the Operator as a part of the Operations as if determined 
by the Operating Committee and, if appropriate, the current relevant 
programme shall be deemed amended accordingly and the Operator shall 
promptly notify the Participants of the consequential amendments to 
the current relevant budget40; or 
2. (i) less than the percentage referred to in (a)(i) above; or 
(ii) less than the percentage pass mark referred to in (a)(ii) 
above; 
such Participant, together with any other Participants which have 
elected to participate may, subject to the provisos mentioned in 
relation to a within trapping unit drilling or a non development 
programme drilling in the case of Sole Risk Drilling thereunder, 
within a stated period of time following the expiration of the 
notice, require the Operator to undertake the Sole Risk 
Drilling41. In such event, if the same arose as the result of the 
Operating Committee voting against or failing to vote in favour of an 
authorisation for expenditure under a current exploration programme, 
such programme shall be deemed amended accordingly and the Operator 
shall promptly notify the Participants of the consequential 
amendments to the current exploration budget. In the case of a 
notice given in relation to a Sole Risk Drilling under a without 
trapping unit drilling or a within trapping unit drilling, the Sole 
Risk Drilling may not be commenced later than a stated period of time 
following such notice and in the case of a notice given in relation 
to a non development programme drilling, the Sole Risk Drilling may 
be commenced as soon as it is possible to do so without interference 
to the Operations on that well42. In the event that the Sole Risk 
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Drilling is not commenced within the stated period, the right to 
commence usually lapses. The lapse of the right to commence the Sole 
Risk Drilling does not prevent a Participant again proposing a Sole 
Risk Drilling with respect to the same matter as that covered by the 
right to commence a Sole Risk Drilling that has lapsed43 
6. DELIMITATION OF INTEREST OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN A SOLE RISK DRILLING 
A Sole Risk Drilling is required to be carried out at the sole risk, 
cost and expense of the Participant which proposes the Sole Risk Drilling 
and any Participant which has elected to join the Sole Risk Drilling. 
These Participants, the Sole Risk Participants, if more than one, are to 
bear the risk, cost and expense of the Sole Risk Drilling in proportion to 
that which each such Participant's Interest bears to the sum of the 
Interests of the Sole Risk Participant's44. The ratio may be varied by 
the Sole Risk Participants by agreement 
45 
7. GENERAL RULES OF CONDUCT FOR A SOLE RISK DRILLING 
Sole Risk Participants are required to exercise all necessary 
precautions to ensure that the Sole Risk Drilling does not jeopardise, 
hinder or unreasonably interfere with the Operations 
46 
Further, the Sole Risk Participants are required to: - 
1. indemnify and hold harmless all Non Sole Risk Participants 
against all actions, claims, demands and proceedings whatsoever 
brought by any third party, including an employee of a Sole Risk 
Participant, arising out of or in connection with the Sole Risk 
Drilling 
47; 
2. in so far as it may be within their control, keep the petroleum 
title free from all liens, charges and encumbrances which might arise 
by reason of the conduct of the Sole Risk Drilling48; and 
3. indemnify all Non Sole Risk Participants against all damages, 
costs, losses and expenses whatsoever directly or indirectly caused 
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to or incurred by them as a result of anything done or omitted to be 
done in the course of carrying out such Sole Risk Drilling, excepting 
only damage inflicted to the subsurface including any resevoir49 
The fact that the Non Sole Risk Participants approve of the Sole Risk 
Drilling, whether or not such approval is required, is deemed not to 
constitute a waiver of the above mentioned obligations placed upon the 
Sole Risk Participants 
50 
The value of the indemnity given by the Sole Risk Participants is 
only worth what the Sole Risk Participants are worth. 
8. USE OF PROPERTY, DATA AND INFORMATION BELONGING TO ALL THE 
PARTICIPANTS 
A Sole Risk Participant carrying out a non development programme 
drilling as a Sole Risk Drilling is entitled to use joint property for 
such unless the Operating Committee otherwise decides, within the period 
for response to the notice, stating that the Sole Risk Participant wishes 
51 
to use the joint property for the Sole Risk Drilling . 
In all other cases of Sole Risk Drilling if the Sole Risk Participant 
wishes to use the joint property, it is required to give notice to all Non 
Sole Risk Participants stating the purpose for which the joint property is 
to be used. Within a stated period of time of the giving of the notice, 
the Operating Committee is required to decide whether the Sole Risk 
Participant is to be authorised to use the joint property and, if so, on 
what terms and conditions. The Operating Committee may not unreasonably 
withhold authorisation to use the joint property and any charges for the 
use of the joint property is to be on a reasonable and equitable basis 
52 
In so far as data and information which is owned by the Participants 
is concerned, a Sole Risk Participant is entitled to use such data and 
information for a Sole Risk Drilling. On the other hand, any data or 
information obtained in respect of the Sole Risk Drilling is to be made 
available to all Participants53, although the property in the data and 
information remains with the Sole Risk Participant until one or more of 
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the Non Sole Risk Participants discharges, in full, its liability to the 
Sole Risk Participants under the provisions of the Joint Operating 
Agreement which allow a Non Sole Risk Participant to elect to participate 
by the payment of the sums mentioned below54, when the data and 
information becomes the joint property of the Participants discharging 
such liability and the Sole Risk Participant55. The requirement that 
the Sole Risk Participant make available to all Participants any data or 
information obtained in respect of the Sole Risk Drilling is to enable the 
Non Sole Risk Participants to make an informed decision as to whether to 
elect to participate in the subsequent appraisal or development programme. 
9. THE ROLE OF THE OPERATOR 
The general rule is that the Sole Risk Drilling is to be carried out 
by the Operator on behalf of the Sole Risk Participant56. In Great 
Britain this rule is conditional upon the obtaining of any necessary 
consent of the Secretary of State for Energy57. The rule may be subject 
to the proviso that if the Operator is not participating in the a Sole 
Risk Drilling, and in Great Britain the Secretary of State for Energy will 
approve the appointment of a Sole Risk Participant as operator for the 
Sole Risk Drilling, the Operator may decline to carry out the Sole Risk 
Drilling and the Sole Risk Participant is to act as operator to carry out 
Sole Risk Drilling58. 
10. GENERAL RULES APPLICABLE TO A SOLE RISK DRILLING 
The following general rules apply to all Sole Risk Drilling: - 
1. the Sole Risk Drilling is to be carried on under the overall 
supervision, direction, and control of a committee consisting of the 
Sole Risk Participants. This committee takes the place of the 
59 
Operation Committee; 
2. the committee is required to require each Sole Risk Participant 
to take out and maintain, in respect of the Sole Risk Drilling, such 
levels of insurance as shall have been determined by the Operating 
Committee in respect of Operations60. On the issue of insurance, 
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the provisions relating to insurance, in so far as they apply to the 
Sole Risk Drilling, shall apply in such a manner so that Non Sole 
Risk Participants are treated and regarded as third parties61; 
3. the computation of costs and expenses of the Sole Risk Drilling 
incurred by the Sole Risk Participants is to be made in accordance 
with the principles established in the Accounting Procedure62; 
4. the Operator, or the operator appointed to carry out the Sole 
Risk Drilling, is required to maintain separate books, records and 
accounts (including bank accounts) for the Sole Risk Drilling. These 
are to be subject to the same right of examination and audit by the 
Sole Risk Participants, and, so long as they are entitled to elect to 
participate in the Sole Risk Drilling, the Non-Sole Risk 
Participants, as those relating to the Operations63; 
5. the costs and expenses of the Sole Risk Drilling are not to be 
reflected in the statements and billings rendered by the Operator for 
the Operations64; 
6. if the Operator is carrying out a Sole Risk Drilling on behalf 
of a Sole Risk Participant, the Operator is entitled to make cash 
calls on the Sole Risk Participant in connection with the Sole Risk 
Drilling and is not to use Joint Account funds and nor is it required 
to use its own funds for the purpose of paying the costs and expenses 
of the Sole Risk Drilling65. Furthermore, the Operator is not 
obliged to commence or, having commenced, to continue the Sole Risk 
Drilling unless and until the relevant advances have been received 
from the Sole Risk Participant66; 
7. the Operator, or the operator appointed to carry out the Sole 
Risk Drilling, is required to keep the Operating Committee informed 
on the progress of the Sole Risk Drilling 
67 
; 
8. if a Sole Risk Drilling results in the discovery of petroleum 
the matter must be referred to the Operating Committee for 
appropriate action 
68; 
and 
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9. the terms of the Joint Operating Agreement shall apply to the 
Sole Risk Drilling mutatis mutandis69. This causes some 
difficulty, particularly with regard to withdrawal, assignment and 
default. It is not proposed to discuss these difficulties in this 
thesis. 
11. THE RIGHT OF A NON SOLE RISK PARTICIPANT TO ELECT TO SUBSEQUENTLY 
PARTICIPATE 
If a Sole Risk Drilling is carried out which results in a particular 
discovery70, any Participant which was a Non Sole Risk Participant in 
all or part of such Sole Risk Drilling will be required to elect, within a 
stated period of time, whether it wishes to participate in appraisal 
drilling or a development programme relating to that discovery. There are 
two basic approaches to the election: - 
1. the Non Sole Risk Participant must give notice within the 
stated period of time to all the Participants of its desire to so 
71 
participate ; or 
2. the Non Sole Risk Participant must give notice within the 
stated period of time to all the Participants of its desire not to so 
participate, failing which, it is deemed to have elected to so 
72 
participate . 
A Participant which elects to participate in respect of any such Sole 
Risk Drilling in which it was a Non Sole Risk Participant and in respect 
of which it has not previously contributed to the cost and expense 
thereof, shall pay to the Sole Risk Participants, and if more than one, 
in 
proportion to their respective Interests in the petroleum title or in such 
other proportions as they may have agreed, an amount equal to the amount 
it would have contributed to the Joint Account had such Sole Risk Drilling 
been carried out as a part of the Operations73. 
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In addition, such a Participant is required to pay, in the case of 
Great Britain, when the Secretary of State for Energy has authorised 
(whether by consenting or by approving or serving a programme) 
74 
the 
commencement of the development of a discovery in respect of which Sole 
Risk Drilling has been carried out75 or, in the case of Australia, 
within a stated period of time of the grant of a production tenement in 
respect of the discovery76, to each Sole Risk Participant which is also 
participating in the development, a "premium" amount calculated in 
accordance with a rather complex formula77 in respect of each Sole Risk 
Drilling in which it did not participate. The formula need not be 
discussed in this thesis. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
DEFAULT BY THE PARTICIPANTS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The principal object of the default provisions in a Joint Operating 
Agreement is: - 
1. to provide a method by which the joint venture can continue to 
operate in the event of default in the performance by a Participant 
of its duties; 
1 
and 
2. to provide a disincentive against default in the performance by 
2 
a Participant of its duties. 
There are a number of types of duty under a Joint Operating 
Agreement, such as3: - 
1. the duty of each Participant to pay cash calls issued by the 
Operator; 
2. the duty of the Operator; 
3. the duty of each Participant to appoint a representative to the 
Operating Committee; 
4. the duty of each Participant to be just and faithful and not do 
anything that could place the property of the Participants in 
jeopardy; 
5. the duty of each Participant to keep information of the joint 
venture confidential; 
6. in most cases, the duty of each Participant to negotiate in 
good faith a development and production agreement in the event of a 
commercial discovery of petroleum; 
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7. the duty of each Participant to observe the provisions of the 
Joint Operating Agreement when dealing with withdrawal and 
assignment; and 
8. in most cases, the duty of each Participant to maintain a 
minimum Interest. 
In so far as default in the observance of these types of duty is 
concerned, the Joint Operating Agreement usually addresses only the first 
two types of duty, that is: - 
1. the duty of each Participant to pay cash calls issued by the 
Operator; and 
2. the duty of the Operator. 
The reason why these two types of duty are addressed by the Joint 
Operating Agreement is that the consequences of a breach by a Participant 
would be that the non defaulting Participants are left to the remedies 
available at law and in equity. These remedies are "clumpy and unsuitable 
for joint ventures". 
4 
The other duties, which are referred to as secondary duties, are 
rarely, if ever, the subject of the default provisions in a Joint 
Operating Agreements. The Joint Operating Agreement does not spell out 
6 
the consequences of a breach by a Participant of a secondary duty. The 
non defaulting Participants are left to the remedies available at law and 
7 in equity . 
This chapter is concerned with the default provision in a Joint 
Operating Agreement which addresses the breach by a Participant of its 
duty to pay cash calls issued by the Operator. Breach by the Operator of 
its duty is dealt with elsewhere in this thesis. 
The ramifications of the breach by a Participant of its duty to pay 
cash calls issued by the Operator will depend upon the stage the 
Exploration Phase programme has reached. One of the results of such a 
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breach by a Participant is, at best, to impose an unexpected temporary 
financial burden upon the non defaulting Participants and, at worst, to 
entirely destroy the joint venture8. A further consequence would be 
that the Operator could incur the risk of individual liability to third 
parties. This would be contrary to the foundation upon which the Operator 
acts; a "no gain, no loss" basis, with the Operator's liability only for 
loss or damage arising from, inter alia, wilful misconduct. 
9 
Any consideration of the default provisions in Joint operating 
Agreements must be set against the background of the Industry and the 
Exploration Phase. In Monarch Petroleum N. L. v Citco Australia Petroleum 
Limitedly Kennedy J. considered the default provisions in a Joint 
Operating Agreement and said: - 
"It is useful at this stage to comment shortly upon the provisions 
permitting the non-defaulting parties to require an assignment of a 
defaulting party's interest. Oil exploration is an extremely 
high-risk operation, accompanied by high costs. The area to which 
the permit related was an exceedingly high-risk area. Offshore 
drilling, due primarily to weather and drilling conditions, carries 
with it particular risks. The cost of drilling an offshore well can 
vary in a normal case from $5,000,000 to $15,000,000; but the cost 
can blow out, as in the case of the Vulcan well, to a figure in the 
order of $28,000,000. The tendency is to share the risks by having a 
number of participants in each permit. As one witness expressed it, 
it is better to have 10 per cent of 10 wells than 100 per cent of one 
well. High-risk capital is scarce. 
In these circumstances, participants in oil exploration ventures 
cannot contemplate anything other than a commercial operation which 
flows smoothly and is not liable to disruption, for example, by the 
default of any participant. A steady flow of funds is essential. 
Commitments must be made a long time ahead and it is important that 
programmes be adhered to. Any default by one participant places a. - 
heavy burden upon the other participants. Participants normally have 
a budget for the year, which covers all their operations, and to find 
additional funds part of the way through the year can place 
considerable strains upon them, sometimes necessitating cutbacks 
in 
other areas or even necessitating a complete withdrawal, with the 
consequent loss of the permit. 
There is a need perceived within the industry to be able rapidly to 
forfeit a defaulting party's interest, and provisions similar to 
those in the operating agreement are common place, if not standard. 
Indeed, the present tendency is to shorten periods of default for 
this purpose. The acquisition of a defaulter's interest is not seen 
as being beneficial in the exploration stage of a venture. On the 
contrary, it involves an additional financial commitment without 
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necessarily any return on it. If there is eventually any return, it 
will frequently only be revealed after the expenditure of further 
funds to which the defaulting party should have contributed, but to 
which it did not contribute. " (Emphasis added) 
2. DEFAULT PROVISIONS 
The default provisions in a Joint Operating Agreement are aimed at 
establishing a degree of certainty concerning the rights and obligations 
of the Participants and to preserve the joint venture established by the 
Joint Operating Agreement by providing for the adjustment of the rights 
of the Participants per se following the default of a Participant 
11 
The Participants are virtually entitled to provide in the Joint 
Operating Agreement such remedies upon default by a Participant as the 
Participants deem fit. This entitlement is limited by the general 
principles of the law of contract. Any default by a Participant will be 
tantamount to a breach of contract and the courts will enforce contractual 
provisions designed to operate in the event of such default 
12. 
There are many types of default mechanisms13. These may include: - 
1. liability to pay interest; 
2. loss of rights to voting and withholding of information; 
3. acquisition of the Interest of the defaulting Participant; 
4. payment by the non defaulting Participants' under the security 
of cross charges; 
5. liabilty to pay a premium; and 
6. lien. 
A great deal of care will be taken to ensure that provisions 
operational upon default do not give rise to a registerable charge 
14 
If the effect of a default mechanism is to create a charge over the 
Interest of the defaulting Participant such charge will need to be 
registered15. It is not proposed to discuss the circumstances in which 
the mechanism may give rise to a registerable charge or the effect of 
failing to register the charge as such matters fall outside of the ambit 
of this thesis. This is because in nearly all cases, the relevant default 
mechanisms, forfeiture and dilution, will have two primary objects: - 
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1. to adjust the Interests of the Participants in an equitable way 
having regard to their respective contributions to the Operations; and 
2. to remove the defaulting Participant from the joint venture. 
The primary object will not be to secure the repayment of a debt, even 
where a debt exists. 
Likewise, it is not proposed to discuss the situation where a 
liquidator or receiver is appointed to or over the, or the Interest of, 
the defaulting Participant and the effect thereof upon the default 
mechanisms. Again, such matters fall outside of the ambit of this thesis. 
Coupled with the types of default mechanism are a number of deadlock 
breaking mechanisms. These include: - 
1. withdrawal; 
2. sole risk operations; and 
3. non-consent operations 
16) 
and are discussed elsewhere in this thesis. These mechanisms can 
eliminate, or at best minimise, the risk of default by a Participant. 
The default provisions will provide that if a Participant fails to 
pay in full its share of any sum payable by it pursuant to the Joint 
l 
Operating Agreement that Participant is deemed to be in default7. The 
duty to pay is strict. Not only failure, but any shortfall or any delay 
in payment is deemed to be a default. There is no distinction drawn 
between a technical breach and total failure to perform. As a result, it 
18 
is to be implied that time is of the essence. The way in which the 
provisions make use of the types of default mechanism following the 
default by a Participant will vary with each Joint Operating Agreement. 
However, it is possible to discern a pattern in the use of the types of 
default mechanism. They are that: - 
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1. interest shall commence to run on the unpaid amounts as from 
and including the due date until the actual date of payment. The 
interest will be calculated in accordance with a stated formula, 
which will usually provide for all interest unpaid at the end of each 
month to be added to the principal amount and itself bear interest 
19 
until paid 
Care must be taken in determining the formula by which interest is to 
be calculated. It must give rise to such a rate as to be a 
disincentive to a Participant attempting to accept a free ride rather 
than making payment on the due date but not be so excessive as to 
constitute a penalty20. In addition, in the case of Australia, 
care must be taken to ensure that the rate of interest does not 
21 infringe any money lenders legislation. 
In the absence of an express provision in the Joint Operating 
Agreement requiring the payment of interest by the defaulting 
Participant interest will not be payable by it. This is because 
2 
interest is not recoverable at common law upon a debt2. 
The Operator will be authorised to bring suit against the defaulting 
Participant to enforce collection of any indebtedness 
23; 
2. the Operator will be required to give notice to the 
Participants of the default24. The notice will be required to 
state the amount in default25; 
3. the non defaulting Participants will be required to pay to the 
Operator a share of the amount in default26. The amount each non 
defaulting Participant is required to pay will be calculated as the 
proportion that each such Participants' Interest bears to the 
Interests of all such Participants 
27. 
Following payment to the 
Operator, the non defaulting Participants will be subrogated to the 
extent of the payment to the rights of the Operator to collect the 
amount from the defaulting Participant28. 
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The non defaulting Participants will be required to make their 
payment to the Operator within a stated period of time of the giving 
29 of notice by the Operator of the default. 
Should a non defaulting Participant fail to pay to the Operator 
its share of the amount in default within the requisite period, that 
Participant will be deemed to be in default and the default 
provisions of the Joint Operating Agreement will in turn apply30; 
4. pending receipt by the Operator of the amount payable by the 
non defaulting Participants in relation to the default, the Operator 
may be required to make arrangements to meet any commitments falling 
due by borrowing the necessary finance from a third party or by 
making the necessary finance available itself31. The cost of the 
finance will be borne by the non defaulting Participants32. If the 
Operator makes the finance available, it will bear interest 
calculated in accordance with a stated formula33; 
5. the provisions of the Joint Operating Agreement which provide 
for the non defaulting Participants to pay to the Operator a share of 
the amount in default will apply to all subsequent cash calls made by,, -, 
the Operator attributable to the defaulting Participant until such 
time as the defaulting Participant has remedied its default in full 
or until the forfeiture provisions of the Joint Operating Agreement 
have been invoked34; 
6. whilst the Participant is in default it may be deprived of its 
entitlement to be represented and to vote at any meeting of the 
Operating Committee or any sub-committee of the Operating Committee 
or to vote on matters dealt with by written resolution35. Where 
use is made of this type of default mechanism, the non defaulting 
Participants will, whilst a Participant is in default, have a vote 
proportionate to the Interest of the non defaulting Participants 
bears to the combined Interests of the non defaulting 
Participants36. In addition the defaulting Participant may be 
deprived of further access to any data and information relating to 
3 ý 
the Operations 
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If the defaulting Participant remedies its default its right to vote 
3 
will be reinstated8. However, no vote taken or matter decided 
without the vote of the former defaulting Participant during the 
interim will be invalid for want of its vote 
39 
The deprevation by the Joint Operating Agreement of the defaulting 
Participants rights freezes the defaulting Participant out of the 
Operations until the default is remedied. This type of default 
mechanism can cause considerable hardship because even if the default 
is remedied the defaulting Participant has no knowledge of the 
Operations during the time that its rights have been suspended40; 
7. the defaulting Participant will have the right to remedy its 
default until the forfeiture provisions of the Joint Operating 
Agreement are invoked41. To remedy the default the defaulting 
Participant will be required to pay to the Operator, or if the non 
defaulting Participants have paid any amounts in relation to the 
default, the non defaulting Participants, all amounts in respect of 
which the defaulting Participant is in default together with interest 
thereon calculated in accordance with a stated formula42. Interest 
will be calculated from and including the due date for payment of 
such amounts until the actual date of payment 
43 
If a non defaulting Participant needs to borrow from a third 
party in order to meet its share of the amount in default, interest 
will usually be calculated in accordance with a formula which 
includes provision for a percentage equal to the rate charged to the 
non defaulting Participant by the third party plus a percentage to 
cover the cost and expense of arranging the borrowing. If the Joint 
Operating Agreement provides for this method of calculating interest 
a provision will usually be included in the Joint Operating Agreement 
requiring the non defaulting Participants to use reasonable 
endeavours to secure the best rates reasonably obtainable 
44 
8. if the default continues beyond a stated period of time the non 
defaulting Participants will have the right to have forfeited to them 
and to acquire the Interest of the defaulting Participant without 
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45 
compensation 
The right may arise be efluxion of time46 or by the non defaulting 
Participants each having a right to give notice to the defaulting 
Participant and the other Participants to have forfeited to them and 
acquire the Interest of the defaulting Participant47. 
In the former case, the Interest of the defaulting Participant is 
forfeited to and acquired by the non defaulting Participants in the 
proportion that each non defaulting Participants' Interest bears to 
the Interest of the other non defaulting Participants48. In the 
latter case, the Interest of the defaulting Participant is forfeited 
to and acquired by the non defaulting Participants who exercise the 
right to give notice to have forfeited to them and acquire the 
Interest in the proportion that each non defaulting Participants 
Interest bears to the Interests of the other non defaulting 
Participants who have given such notice. If none of the non 
49 
defaulting Participants exercise their right to give such notice then 
the Participants will be deemed to have decided to abandon the 
Operations50. This will be without prejudice to any further rights 
of the non defaulting Participants in relation to the defaulting 
Participant51. Furthermore, each Participant, including the 
defaulting Participant, will be required to pay its share of the 
costs of abandoning the Operations52; 
9. the forfeiture to and acquisition of the Interest of the 
defaulting Participant will be: - 
(i) subject to any necessary consent or approval of, in the 
case of Great Britain, the Secretary of State for Energy, or, 
in the case of Australia, the Joint Authority53; 
(ii) without prejudice to any other rights of the non 
defaulting Participants including rights of the non defaulting 
Participants against the defaulting Participant in relation to 
the amount due and owing by it54; 
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(iii) so forfeited to and acquired by the non defaulting 
Participants as beneficial owners free of all charges and 
encumbrances 
55; 
(iv) subject to the defaulting Participant remaining liable 
for its share under operating programmes and budgets approved 
prior to the default56; 
(v) subject to the defaulting Participant remaining liable 
for its share of all net costs and obligations that in anyway 
relate to abandonment of Operations57; and 
(vi) effective as of the date of default58. 
10. the defaulting Participant will be required to promptly join in 
such action as may be necessary or desirable to obtain any necessary 
consent or approval of, in the case of Great Britain, the Secretary 
of State for Energy, or, in the case of Australia, the Joint 
Authority59. Further, the defaulting Participant will be required 
to execute and deliver any and all documents necessary to effect the 
forfeiture and acquisition60. The costs, stamp duty, transfer 
taxes and other expenses of the forfeiture and acquisition including 
losses incurred by the non defaulting Participants by reason of the 
default and consequent actions will be the responsibility of the 
defaulting Participant61. To give effect to these requirements, 
the Joint Operating Agreement may provide that each Participant 
grants to the Operator an irrevocable power of attorney. This would 
be exercisable after the lapse of the period during which the 
Interest of the defaulting Participant can be forfeited to and 
acquired by the non defaulting Participants 
62. 
In the absence of a 
power of attorney the non defaulting Participants would have to rely 
on an action for specific performance of the provisions setting out 
the requirements; 
11. adjustment may be made between the non defaulting Participants 
of the amounts paid and or incurred by them as a result of the 
63 
default. Such a provision will be apposite when less than all of 
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the non defaulting Participants acquire the Interest of the 
defaulting64 Participants and the acquisition is not in proportion 
65 to their respective Interests 
The default provisions in a Joint Operating Agreement rarely provide 
for what is to occur if the Operator, in this capacity as a Participant 
rather than in its capacity as Operator, were to fail to pay in full its 
share of any sum payable by it pursuant to to the Joint Operating 
Agreement. In such circumstances the Operator would have to look to its 
fiduciary obligations and tread a very cautious and wary path66. There 
is, however, the right of the Participants to remove the Operator in such 
circumstances. This will be discussed later in this thesis. The removal 
of the Operator does take away the conflict but does not remove the 
problem: the default by a Participant. 
A number of Joint Operating Agreements add an additional tier between 
the initial default by a Participant and the forfeiture of and acquisition 
by the non defaulting Participants of the Interest of the defaulting 
Participant. This tier is known as dilution (or withering) of the 
Interest of the defaulting Participant. 
Dilution clauses provide a mechanism whereby the respective Interests 
of the Participants may be adjusted in accordance with their relative 
level of contribution to expenditure67. They usually take effect by 
reducing the Interest of the defaulting Participant in accordance with a 
formula which is based on the relative contributions to the Operations as 
between the defaulting Participants and the non defaulting 
Participants 
68. 
There are two main types of dilution formula: - 
1. straight line formula; and 
1 2. exponential formula. 
In the case of a straight line formula the Interest of the defaulting 
Participant is decreased by a stipulated number of percentage points for a 
fixed amount not contributed69. The Interest of the non defaulting 
70 
Participants' will be increased proportionately . 
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In the case of an exponential formula the Interest of the 
Participants is re-determined by reference to the expenditure of the 
defaulting Participant as a percentage of the total expenditure of the 
Participants in the Operations71. The decrease in the Interest of 
defaulting Participant is brought about by the increase in the 
contribution to expenditure by the non defaulting Participants72 
The speed at which the Interest of the defaulting Participant will be 
decreased will very much depend upon the formula chosen73. However, it 
is usual to provide that once the Interest of the defaulting Participant 
is reduced to a stated percentage, the defaulting Participant will be 
deemed to have elected to withdraw from the petroleum title and the Joint 
Operating Agreement74. In such circumstances the withdrawal provisions 
in the Joint Operating Agreement will apply. These provisions have been 
discussed above. 
The Joint Operating Agreement may allow the defaulting Participant, 
following a decrease in its Interest, 
Interest by remedying the default5. 
7 
to restore itself to is former 
This will involve paying in full 
all amounts due to the Operator and or the non defaulting Participants 
plus a limited punitive element or premium to compensate the non 
defaulting Participants for the extra risk they had assumed as a result of 
the default. 
Dilution clauses are seen to have a number of benefits. To begin 
with they are seen as clauses which mitigate the harshness of 
forfeiture76. They enable the continuation of Operations, 
notwithstanding the default of a Participant, without rendering the 
defaulting Participant liable to forfeiture of the whole of its 
Interest77. Nevertheless, no matter how the dilution clause is phased, 
it is submitted that it will be seen for what it really is; a forfeiture 
of part of the Interest of the defaulting Participant78. It is 
submitted that the courts will not view a dilution clause as the reduction 
of the Interest of the defaulting Participant but rather as a partial 
extinguishment of that Interest79. 
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If a dilution clause is seen to give rise to a partial forfeiture of 
the Interest of the defaulting Participant, the defaulting Participant may 
have recourse to the courts for relief against forfeiture. This latter 
is discussed below. It is not proposed to consider the application of the 
rules relating to relief against forfeiture here. It will suffice to 
point to a number of reasons why a court may be persuaded not to grant the 
defaulting Participant relief against the forfeiture of all or part of its 
Interest pursuant to a dilution clause80: - 
1. the defaulting Participant would have been aware of the 
consequences of the default; 
2. the defaulting Participant and the non defaulting Participants 
would have entered into a purely commercial transaction, acting at 
arms length and on an equal footing; 
3. the defaulting Participant was given the opportunity to remedy 
the default; 
4. by recognising the dilution is an election by a defaulting 
Participant not to contribute to the expenditure rather than a result 
of the default by the defaulting Participant. Use may then be made 
of the principle that relief against forfeiture will only apply where 
there is a breach of contract81; 
5. the result of a dilution clause is to reduce the defaulting 
Participants' liability to contribute to expenditure in the 
future. It does not accelerate or increase that liability; 
82 
6. in assessing the disparity between the value of the Interest of 
the defaulting Participant that is forfeited and the damage caused by 
the default the court will take account of the fact that the non 
defaulting Participants' liability to contribute to expenditure in 
the future will be increased in proportion to the reduction in the 
defaulting Participant's liability in that regard83. The increased 
liability to contribute to expenditure is not necessarily a benefit 
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to the non defaulting Participants. At the Exploration Phase it goes 
without saying that in most cases the level of contribution to 
expenditure is usually significantly in excess of the value of the 
Interest of the defaulting Participant. 
84 
Another issue that must be considered when considering a dilution 
clause is whether the opportunity may arise for the defaulting Participant 
to apply to the court for relief from the effect of the clause on the 
ground that it is a penalty. 
The rules relating to penalties are discussed below. It is not 
proposed to considered their application here although it will be helpful 
to examine a number of reasons, in addition to the reasons discussed above 
in relation to forfeiture, why a court may be persuaded that a dilution 
clause is not penal: - 
1. unless the dilution clause is most virulent, given that the 
purpose of the clause is to provide a quick solution to the default 
by a Participant and given the need for certainty in contribution to 
expenditure in the future, the clause is not included in the Joint 
Operating Agreement to secure the enjoyment of a collateral 
object85. The aim is to provide certainty without having to go 
through lengthy legal proceedings86; 
2. dilution usually only results from a most serious event: the 
failure of a Participant to pay in full its share of sums payable by 
it pursuant to the Joint Operating Agreement87; 
3. at the Exploration Phase it is virtually impossible to 
ascertain at the time when the Joint Operating Agreement is entered 
into by the Participants what the total exploration expenditure 
88 
required by the Operations will be. Likewise, it is virtually 
impossible to ascertain the value of the Interest of the defaulting 
Participant that is forfeited to and acquired by the non defaulting 
Participants9. As such it is most unlikely that the courts will 
8 
intervene in what is a classic situation of the type referred to by 
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Lord Dunedin in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. Limited v New Garage and 
Motor Co. Limited90 -a situation where it is probable that the 
dilution clause will give rise to a genuine attempt to liquidate 
prospective damages of an uncertain amount; and 
4. the minimal period of time within which the defaulting 
Participant may remedy the default will not necessarily be seen as 
penal if, at the Exploration Phase, provision for a longer period of 
time would afford a Participant the opportunity to remain in the 
joint venture if the Operations lead to the discovery of petroleum 
9 
but avoid contributing to expenditure if the Operations do not1 
Where acquisition of the Interest of the defaulting Participant by 
the non defaulting Participants is involved there are two alternatives: - 
1. loss of the Interest of the defaulting Participant, that is, 
forfeiture; or 
2. abatement of the Interest of the defaulting Participant, that 
is, dilution. 
These two alternatives usually consist of at least two elements: - 
1. the recoupment of the cost, expense and loss sustained by the 
non defaulting Participants as a result of the default by the 
defaulting Participant; and 
2. the receipt of a premium over and above such cost, expenses and 
loss. 
The total loss of Interest by the defaulting Participant is an 
extreme result of default2. Where there is a dilution of the Interest 
9 
of the defaulting Participant, the defaulting Participant is allowed to 
remain a Participant on payment in full to the Operator of the full amount 
93 
relating to the default 
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Dilution is a less extreme form of forfeiture and a less extreme 
94 
result of default. It is submitted that there is an essential 
difference between forfeiture and dilution in that forfeiture involves 
divestiture of proprietary rights of the defaulting Participant whilst 
dilution involves a rearrangement of those rights. However, the 
95 
result may be seen as being the same. 
It is submitted that dilution will not be a penalty where the 
dilution formula is one which dilutes the Interest of a defaulting 
Participant in proportion to the amounts paid by the non defaulting 
Participants following the default by the defaulting Participant 
96 
In summary the default provisions discussed above: - 
1. allow the joint venture to continue by giving the Operator the 
right to call on the non defaulting Participants to pay the amount 
that has not been paid by the defaulting Participant97; and 
2. act as a disincentive against default by a Participant in that: - 
(i) interest accrues on the unpaid amount at a high rate98; 
(ii) continuation of the default beyond a stated period of 
time may result in the defaulting Participant forfeiting its 
Interest and that Interest being acquired by the non defaulting 
Participants 
99; 
and 
(iii) the defaulting Participant will lose the right to be 
represented and vote at meetings of the Operating Committee and 
of access to any data and information relating to the 
operations 
100 
The default provisions are a straight forward way of dealing with 
default by a Participant. There is no attempt to disguise the forfeiture 
of the Interest of the defaulting Participant as a deemed withdrawal and 
thereby attempting to soften the notion of penalty by arguing that the 
defaulting Participant forfeits its Interest by election rather than by 
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breach of contract 
101 
The default provision will be without prejudice to any other rights 
and remedies that the Operator and or the non defaulting Participants may 
102 
have 
3. TWO BASIC RULES - PENALTY AND RELIEF AGAINST FORFEITURE 
The default provisions in a Joint Operating Agreement are subject to 
two basic rules: - 
1. where the Participants have agreed in the Joint Operating 
Agreement for the payment by the defaulting Participant of a 
specified sum of money or the transfer of specified property, the sum 
or transfer may be classified by the courts as either penal 
(irrecoverable) or liquidated damages (recoverable). Courts of 
equity have held that if the sum payable or the property transferable 
by the defaulting Participant is really a penalty contained in the 
Joint Operating Agreement to ensure that a promise is not broken the 
non defaulting Participants will only be entitled to receive by way 
of damages the sum which would compensate them for their actual loss; 
and 
2. equity may relieve against forfeiture of the Interest of the 
defaulting Participant, even after termination of the Joint Operating 
Agreement, if in the circumstances it would be oppressive and 
unconscionable for the non defaulting Participants to acquire the 
Interest of the defaulting Participant in such circumstances. 
There is no reason why these two basic rules should not apply to the 
payment of interest and or a premium under the default provisions by the 
defaulting Participant to the extent that such payment is excessive 
103 
They could also apply to any sole risk premium and any non consent 
premium. Further, there is no reason why the right of the non defaulting 
Participants to acquire the Interest of the defaulting Participant may 
involve forfeiture of the Interest if it is acquired at full market 
104 
value 
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The two basic rules are discussed immediately below in this chapter. 
The jurisdictions for each of the rules is distinct. The default 
provisions in a joint Operating Agreement may be penal. The forfeiture by 
the defaulting Participant of its Interest may give rise to relief against 
forfeiture. However, for there to be relief against forfeiture it is not 
necessary that the default provision in the Joint Operating Agreement be 
105 
penal 
4. PENALTY 
4.1 Introduction 
The Participants may agree at the time of entering into the Joint 
Operating Agreement that in the event of default on the part of any 
Participant the damages that will flow from the defaulting Participant to 
the non defaulting Participants. Thus the Participants can introduce into 
their Joint Operating Agreement their own assessment of damages. It is 
both practical and sensible that the Participants provide for assessment 
in this way, as Tindal C. J. in Kemble v Farren106 points out: - 
"... we see nothing illegal or unreasonable in the parties, by their 
mutual agreement, settling the amount of damages, uncertain in their 
nature, at any sum upon which they may agree. In many cases, such an 
agreement fixes that which is almost impossible to be accurately 
ascertained; and in all cases, it saves the expense and difficulty of 
bringing witnesses to that point. " 
The right of the Participants to assess damages as such will be 
accepted and the assessment will be enforced by the courts 
107 
The damages to be paid may amount to the requirement to pay over a 
certain sum ascertained as to amount in a given manner, as was the case 
with Kemble v Farrens108 where the amount was stated to be $1,000 (but 
was held to be penal in nature) and in Suisse Atlantique Societe 
D'Armement Maritime S. A. v N. V. Rotterdamsche Kolen Centrale109 where 
the dermurrage was set at $1,000 per diem, or by the forfeiture of a sum 
already paid, as in the case of Stockloser v Johnson110 where the 
contract called for the forfeiture of installments of the purchase price 
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already paid under the contract prior to default and the repossession of 
the item of sale, or by the transfer of property, as in the case of 
Jobson v Johnson 
ill 
where the contract called for the transfer of 
shares. If damages can include a requirement to transfer property, the 
requirement that the defaulting Participant transfer all of its Interest 
to the non defaulting Participants in the event that the default continues 
beyond a stated period of time could be treated as damages assessed by the 
Participants. 
In allowing the Participants to so provide for damages in the event 
of default the courts will not exclude the application of the rule built 
up over time that damages for breach of contract are intended to 
compensate the aggrieved Participants for the actual loss they have 
suffered. To this end there has developed the practise of distinguishing 
between such provisions as are genuine attempts to liquidate prospective 
damages of an uncertain amount, that is, a genuine pre-estimate of the 
loss which is likely to flow from the breach and called "liquidated 
damages", and such provisions as are not genuine pre-estimates of the loss 
but are in the nature of a penalty, that is, designed to secure 
performance of the contract. 
Before considering the distinction between liquidated damages and 
penalty it is proposed to consider the effect of a provision being held to 
be either liquidated damages or a penalty. 
4.2 Amount Recoverable 
If the sum provided to be paid in the event of default by a 
Participant is liquidated damages then it represents agreed damages and is 
1 
recoverable without the necessity of proving the actual loss suffered12 
In Suisse Atlantique Societe D'Armement Maritime S. A. v N. V. 
Rotterdamesche Kolen Centrale113 Viscount Dilhorne said: - 
"Here the parties agreed that demurrage at a daily rate should be 
paid in respect of the detention of the vessel and, on proof of 
breach of charterparty by detention, the appellants are entitled to 
the demurrage payments without having to prove the loss they suffered 
in consequence. " 
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The fact that loss on default is actually suffered by the non 
defaulting Participants is greater or lesser than the liquidated damages 
stipulated in the Joint Operating Agreement is unimportant. The 
Participants will be bound by the damages stipulated in the Joint 
Operating Agreement and the amount of loss will be, whether greater or 
lesser, the amount of the liquidated damages. Such was the effect of the 
judgement of Kennedy J. in Diestal v Stevenson114 when it was held 
that the liquidated damages was the measure of damages payable for breach 
of the contract, not the amount of actual damage suffered. Kennedy J. 
summed up the rationale: - 
"In this case I have come to the conclusion that what the parties 
really meant was not to leave the matter at large, but in order to 
avoid the difficulty, as between shipper at Newcastle and buyer at 
Lubeck, of proving the value of the goods in a market which is 
constantly fluctuating, to assess the damage beforehand ... But 
it is 
said that there were two classes of coal of different prices, and 
that the loss by the non-delivery of one of those classes of coal 
might be greater than by the non-delivery of the other. It is true 
that they might be different. But that is not enough ... Here there is nothing to shew a priori that the loss in respect of both classes 
of coals might not be the same, and, therefore, nothing to render it 
improbable that the parties should have fixed the same sum of is. per 
ton as representing the damage in both classes., '115 
However, where the damages sought are not within the scope of the 
loss covered by the provision relating to liquidated damages, the non 
defaulting Participants may recover damages over and above the liquidated 
damages 
116 
It is always open to Participants to agree liquidated damages at a 
level which the Participants know, or ought to know, is less than the loss 
that will be suffered in the event of default by a Participant. In such 
cases the Participants will be bound by the liquidated damages provided 
for 
117 
If the sum agreed to be paid in the event of default by a Participant 
is a penalty then the sum is not recoverable and the non defaulting 
Participants must prove what damages they can 
118 
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Lord Justice-Clerk made a similar statement as to the law in 
Commercial Bank of Scotland Limited v Beal 
119 
- 
"A mere penalty will not be enforced according to its terms, but 
inquiry will be allowed as to the real amount which the other party 
has suffered, and the penalty will be modified accordingly. " 
In effect, the courts take the view that equity will grant relief 
against the penalty and as such reduce the amount payable to the non 
defaulting Participants to the extent of the actual damage sustained by 
those Participants. Put another way, the courts in equity assume that a 
penalty is designed to secure performance of the contract and a 
Participant is sufficiently compensated where there has been a breach if 
it is compensated by being indemnified for its actual loss. Such a 
Participant would be seen to be acting unconscionably if it were to demand 
a sum disproportionate to the injury suffered. Thus a Participant in such 
circumstances gains no more than for the damage recovered. In Dunlop 
Pneumatic Tyre Company Limited v New Garage and Motor Company 
Limited 
120 
Lord Parmoor held: - 
"My Lords, there is no question as to the competency of parties to 
agree beforehand the amount of damages, uncertain in their nature, 
payable on the breach of a contract. There are cases, however, in 
which the Courts have interfered with the free right of contract, 
although the parties have specified the definite sum agreed on by 
them to be in the nature of liquidated damages, and not of a 
penalty. If the Court, after looking at the language of the 
contract, the character of the transaction, and the circumstances 
under which it was entered into, comes to the conclusion that the 
parties have made a mistake in calling the agreed sum liquidated 
damages, and that such sum is not really a pactional pre-estimate of 
loss within the contemplation of the parties at the time when the 
arrangement was made, but a penal sum inserted as a punishment on the 
defaulter irrespective of the amount of any loss which could at the 
time have been in contemplation of the parties, then such sum is a 
penalty, and the defaulter is only liable in respect of damages which 
can be proved against him. It is too late to question whether such 
interference with the language of a contract can be justified on any 
rational principle. " 
As to the rationale behind the approach of the courts to the issue of 
penalty, Lord Radcliffe in Bridge v Campbell Discount Co. Limited121 
saw the courts attitude as being one of public policy: - 
"The refusal to sanction legal preceedings for penalties is in fact a 
rule of the court's own, produced and maintained for purposes of 
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public policy (except where imposed by positive statutory enactment, 
as in 8&9 Will. 3, c. 11; 4&5 Anne, c. 16). " 
In the Scottish case of Forrest and Barr v Henderson, Coulborn and 
Company122 the Lord President saw the basis upon which eauitv 
intervened as being one aimed at preventing a claim that was exorbitant 
and unconscionable: - 
ff 
-; for I hold it to 
where parties stipulate 
as a penalty, but shall 
the amount of damage to 
interfere to prevent th 
unconscionable amount. " 
be part of our law on this subject that, even 
that a sum of this kind shall not be regarded 
be taken as an estimate and ascertainment of 
be sustained in a certain event, equity will 
e claim being maintained to an exorbitant and 
and where the amount was exorbitant and unconscionable the court held that 
it had the power to modify the amount. Lord Deas said: - 
"Upon the first of these questions I cannot entertain any doubt, -I 
meant that a stipulation for liquidated damages in such a contract as 
this may be modified upon certain grounds; ..,,, 
123 
Lord Young saw the matter in terms of punishment in Robertson v 
Alexander 
124: 
- 
"But if, again, the penalty be a true penalty - that is, a punishment 
- the Court will not allow that, because the law will not let people 
punish each other. They may contract that the one will be bound to 
reimburse the other for any loss caused, but not for punishment. 
Anything beyond compensation, which is reasonable enough penalty, is 
punishment, and will not be enforced. " 
In assessing the damages where the court has held that the provision 
is a penalty, the court is at liberty to assess the same at a sum either 
greater than or less than that provided for in the penal provision of the 
Joint Operating Agreement 
125 
Where the amount of the penalty would not compensate the non 
defaulting Participants for the actual loss suffered, they must elect 
either to sue on the penalty provision in the Joint Operating Agreement 
and as such recover no more than the sum stipulated therein, or, sue for 
breach of contract and recover damages in full in so far as the same can 
be proved126. As to liquidated damages, such an option may not be 
available to the non defaulting Participants 
127. 
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The fact that the non defaulting Participants may elect to sue on the 
penalty provision in the Joint Operating Agreement, or ignore it and sue 
for damages for breach of contract, particularly where the damage suffered 
exceeds the sum stated, was accepted by Bailhache J. in Wall v 
Rederiaktiebolaget Luggude128. - 
"The right to sue either for the penalty or damages for beach of 
contract disregarding the penalty, or in archaic phraseology to sue 
in debt or in assumpsit, is again expressly asserted by Lord 
Ellenborough in Harrison v Wright ... " 
This being the state of the law as I understand it, one easily 
sees why in charterparty cases no one sues on the penalty clause 
now. You cannot under it recover more than the proved damages, and 
if the proved damages exceed the penal sum you are restricted to the 
lower amount. As the penalty clause may be disregarded it always is 
disregarded and has become a dead letter, or from another point of 
view a "brutum fulmen" as Blackburn J. called it in Godard v Gray. " 
Where the non defaulting Participants elect to sue on the penalty 
provision in the Joint Operating Agreement their damages cannot exceed the 
stipulated amount. This view is supported in the judgement of Bailhache 
J. in Wall v Rederiaktiebolaget Luggude129. - 
"The result of suing for the penalty is therefore that the plaintiff 
recovers proved damages, but never more than the penal sum fixed: see 
Hardy v Bern; Branscombe v Scarbrough; Dimech v Corlett. " 
The onus of establishing that the provision in the Joint Operating 
Agreement is a penalty lies on the defaulting Participant 
130 
4.3. Need for Breach 
The question of whether a provision is a penalty or is liquidated 
damages can only arise when the event upon which the amount becomes 
payable is a breach of contract. Where the Joint Operating Agreement 
provides for a sum to be payable in an event that does not involve a 
breach of contract, such as where a Participant has the option to 
terminate the Joint Operating Agreement or an agreement thereunder, for 
example, withdrawal, sole risk operations and non consent operations, and 
exercises that option, it is suggested that the law as to penalties does 
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not apply and as such the stipulated amount is recoverable by the other 
Participants 
131 
4.4 Distinguishing between liquidated damages and penalty 
As was stated by Upjohn L. J. in Lombank Limited v Excell: -132 
"It is necessary to examine some of the earlier authorities on this 
question of liquidated damages and penalties, and locus classicus is, 
of course, Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. Limited v New Garage and Motor 
Company Limited 
The judgement of Lord Dunedin in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. Ltd. v 
New Garage and Motor Co. Ltd. 
133 
is taken to be the starting point in 
almost all analysis of the distinction between a penalty and liquidated 
damages: - 
"... In view of that fact, and of the number of authorities 
available, I do not think it advisable to attempt any detailed review 
of the various cases, but I shall content myself with stating 
succinctly the various propositions which I think are deducible from 
the decisions which rank as authoritative: - 
1. Though the parties to a contract who have used the words 
"penalty" or "liquidated damages" may prima facie be supposed to mean 
what they say, yet the expression used is not conclusive. The Court 
must find out whether the payment stipulated is in truth a penalty or 
liquidated damages. This doctrine may be said to be found passim in 
nearly every case. 
2. The essence of a penalty is a payment of money stipulated as in 
terrorem of the offending party; the essence of liquidated damages is 
a genuine covenanted pre-estimate of damage (Clydebank Engineering 
and Shipbuilding Co. v Don Jose Yzquierdo y Castaneda). 
3. The question whether a sum stipulated is penalty or liquidated 
damages is a question of construction to be decided upon the terms 
and inherent circumstances of each particular contract, judged as at 
the time of the making of the contract, not as at the time of breach 
(Public Works Commissioner v Hills and Webster v Bosanquet). 
4. To assist this task of construction various tests have been 
suggested, which if applicable to the case under consideration may 
prove helpful, or even conclusive. Such are: 
(a) It will be held to be a penalty if the sum stipulated for is 
extravagant and unconscionable in amount in comparison with the 
greatest loss that could conceivably be proved to have followed from 
the breach. (Illustration given by Lord Halsbury in Clydebank Case. 
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(b) It will be held to be a penalty if the breach consists only in 
not paying a sum of money, and the sum stipulated is a sum greater 
than the sum which ought to have been paid (Kemble v Farren). This 
though one of the most ancient instances is truly a corollary to the 
last test. Whether it had its historical origin in the doctrine of 
the common law that when A. promised to pay B. a sum of money on a 
certain day and did not do so, B. could only recover the sum with, in 
certain cases, interest, but could never recover further damages for 
non-timeous payment, or whether it was a survival of the time when 
equity reformed unconscionable bargains merely because they were 
unconscionable, -a subject which much exercised Jessel M. R. in 
Wallis v Smith - is probably more interesting than material. 
(c) There is a presumption (but no more) that it is penalty when "a 
single lump sum is made payable by way of compensation, on the 
occurence of one or more or all of several events, some of which may 
occasion serious and other but trifling damage" (Lord Watson in Lord 
Elphinstone v Monkland Iron and Coal Co. ). 
On the other hand: 
(d) It is no obstacle to the sum stipulated being a genuine 
pre-estimate of damage, that the consequences of the breach are such 
as to make precise pre-estimation almost an impossibility. On the 
contrary, that is just the situation when it is probable that 
pre-estimated damage was the true bargain between the parties 
(Clydebank Case, Lord Halsbury; Webster v Bosanquet, ... 
). " 
It is proposed to take each of the rules laid down by Lord Dunedin 
and consider them in turn. 
4.4.1 Substance, Not Form 
The first test in the judgement of Lord Dunedin in Dunlop Pneumatic 
Tyre Co. Ltd. v New Garage and Motor Co. Limited134 was: - 
"1. Though the parties to a contract who use the words "penalty" or 
"liquidated damages" may prima facie be supposed to mean what they 
say, yet the expression used is not conclusive. The Court must find 
out whether the payment stipulated is in truth a penalty or 
liquidated damages. This doctrine may be said to be found passim in 
nearly every case. " 
Thus the courts are more concerned with substance than with form. It 
is for the courts to determine what in truth the Participants have 
provided for. 
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In Johnston v Robertson135 the Lord Justice-Clerk said: - 
"The mere use of the word "penalty" is not conclusive as to the true 
character of the stipulation. A consequence may be a penalty, 
although it is not called so; and, on the other hand, it may not be a 
penalty, though it receives that name. " 
However, it is suggested that the terminology used by the 
Participants may well have a bearing on the burden of proof. In Willson 
v Love 
136 
Lord Esher M. R. said: - 
... where the parties themselves call the sum made payable a 
"penalty", the onus lies on those who seek to shew that it is to be 
payable as liquidated damages. " 
It is clear that the intention of the Participants themselves will be 
overruled if the courts consider that the words used by the Participants 
do not represent the real nature of the transaction or what in truth it is 
to be taken to be. Lord Radcliffe so held in Bridge v Campbell Discount 
Co. Limited 
137 
"The intention of the parties themselves is never conclusive and may 
be overruled or ignored if the court considers that even its clear 
expression does not represent "the real nature of the transaction" or 
what "in truth" it is to be taken to be. " 
From what has been said it should not be taken that the expression 
used by the Participants is to be ignored. In Willson v Love138 Lord 
Esher further remarked: - 
"... the term "penalty" or "liquidated damages" is not conclusive; 
but no case, I think, decides that the term used by the parties 
themselves is to be altogether disregarded, .... " 
4.4.2 Difference in Essence 
The second test in the judgement of Lord Dunedin in Dunlop Pneumatic 
Tyre Co. Limited v New Garage and Motor Co. Limited139 was: - 
"2. The essence of a penalty is a payment of money stipulated as in 
terrorem of the offending party; the essence of liquidated damages is 
a genuine covenanted pre-estimate of damage ... " 
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In Law v Local Board of Redditch140 Lopes L. J. said: - 
"The distinction between penalties and liquidated damages depends on 
the intention of the parties to be gathered from the whole of the 
contract. If the intention is to secure performance of the contract 
by the imposition of a fine or penalty, then the sum specified is a 
penalty; but if, on the other hand, the intention is to assess the 
damages for breach of the contract, it is liquidated damages. " 
4.4.3 Construction 
Lord Dunedin, in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. Limted v New Garage and 
Motor Co. Limited, 
141 
applied a third test: - 
"3. The question whether a sum stipulated is penalty or liquidated 
damages is a question of construction to be decided upon the terms 
and inherent circumstances of each particular contract, judged as at 
the time of the making of the contract, not as at the time of breach 
The question referred to is a question of law, as was made clear by 
Wilde C. J. in Sainter v Ferguson 
142 
_ 
"But is is now clearly settled, that, whether the sum mentioned in an 
agreement to be paid for a breach, is to be treated as a penalty or 
as liquidated and ascertained damages, is a question of law, to be 
decided by the judge upon a consideration of the whole instrument. " 
When dealing with the question of construction in Phonographic 
Equipment (1958) Limited v Muslu143 Donovan L. J. said "the contract has 
to be regarded as a whole... " 
This may well give rise to the situation where on different facts and 
in different circumstances, a clause is held to be penal in one instance 
and yet the same clause is held to be liquidated damages in another 
144 
Thus a clause held to be a penalty in Lombank Limited v Excell145 was, 
despite being drafted in, held to be for liquidated damages in 
146 
Phonographic Equipment (1958) Limited v Muslu 
In the Joint Operating Agreement representations of the intention of 
the Participants that the default provisions are not to constitute a 
penalty, in that they are "necessary to ensure maintenance of the 
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[petroleum title] in good standing"147, will be of no avail if the 
criteria for distinguishing between liquidated damages and penalty are not 
satisfied. 
4.4.4 Relation to Loss Suffered 
The fourth test in the judgement of Lord Dunedin in Dunlop Pneumatic 
Tyre Co. Limited v New Garage and Motor Co. Limited148 was: - 
"4. To assist this task of construction various tests have been 
suggested, which if applicable to the case under consideration may 
prove helpful, or even conclusive. Such are: 
(a) It will be held to be penalty if the sum stipulated for is 
extravagant and unconscionable in amount in comparison with the 
greatest loss that could conceivably be proved to have followed from 
the breach 
This guideline is drawn from the judgement of the Earl of Halsbury 
L. C. in Clydebank Engineering and Shipbuilding Company Limited v Don Jose 
Ramos Yzquierdo Y Castaneda149 _ 
My Lords, it is impossible to lay down any abstract rule as to 
what it may or it may not be extravagant or unconscionable to insist 
upon without reference to the particular facts and circumstances 
which are established in the individual case. I suppose it would be 
possible in the most ordinary case, where people know what is the 
thing to be done and what is agreed to be paid, to say whether the 
amount was unconscionable or not. For instance, it you agreed to 
build a house in a year, and agreed that if you did not build the 
house for £50, you were to pay a million of money as a penalty, the 
extravagance of that would be at once apparent. Between such an 
extreme case as I have supposed and other cases, a great deal must 
depend upon the nature of the transaction - the thing to be done, the 
loss likely to accrue to the person who is endeavouring to enforce 
the performance of the contract, and so forth. It is not necessary 
to enter into a minute disquisition upon the subject, because the 
thing speaks for itself. But, on the other hand, it is quite 
certain, and an established principle in both countries, that the 
parties may agree beforehand to say, "Such and such a sum shall be 
damages if I break my agreement... ". 
4.4.5 Payment of Smaller Sum 
The fifth test in the judgement of Lord Dunedin in Dunlop Pneumatic 
Tyre Co. Limited v New Garage and Motor Co. Limited150 was: - 
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"4. To assist this task of construction various tests have been 
suggested, which if applicable to the case under consideration may 
prove helpful, or even conclusive. Such are: 
(b) It will be held to be a penalty if the breach consists only in 
not paying a sum of money, and the sum stipulated is a sum greater 
than the sum which ought to have been paid (Kemble v Farren)... " 
This test has direct relevance to the default provisions in the Joint 
Operating Agreement. The value of the loss of the Interest by the 
defaulting Participant may be substantially greater than the sum which 
15 
ought to have been paid by the defaulting Participant1 
4.4.6 Single Sum for any Breach 
The sixth test in the judgement of Lord Dunedin in Dunlop Pneumatic 
Tyre Co. Limited v New Garage and Motor Co. Limited152 was: - 
"4. To assist this task of construction various tests have been 
suggested, which if applicable to the case under consideration may 
prove helpful, or even conclusive. Such are: 
(c) There is a presumption (but no more) that it is a penalty when 
"a single lump sum is made payable by way of compensation, on 
the occurence of one or more or all of several events, some of 
which may occasion serious and others but trifling damage" 
(Lord Watson in Lord Elphinstone v Monkland Iron and Coal 
Co. ). " 
In the Australian case of Lamson Store Service Co. Limited v Russell 
Wilkins & Sons Limited153 O'Connor J. held: - 
"Where there are covenants to do or refrain from doing several 
things, the performance of some having a definite value such as the 
payment of a sum of money, and the performance of others having an 
uncertain value, and one fixed amount is stipulated to be paid for 
any of the breaches, the fixed amount will be adjudged to be a 
penalty and not liquidated damages. " 
Being a presumption the same can be displaced by other 
considerations, in which case the provision may still be found for 
liquidated damages 
154 
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4.4.7 Difficulty of Estimation 
Finally, the seventh test in the judgement of Lord Dunedin in Dunlop 
Pneumatic Tyre Co. Ltd. v New Garage and Motor Co. Limited155 was: - 
"4. To assist this task of construction various tests have been 
suggested, which if applicable to the case under consideration may 
prove helpful, or even conclusive. Such are: 
On the other hand: 
(d) It is no obstacle to the sum stipulated being a genuine 
pre-estimate of damage, that the consequences of the breach are such 
as to make precise pre-estimation almost an impossibility. On the 
contrary, that is just the situation when it is probable that 
pre-estimated damage was the true bargain between the parties ... " 
In English Hop Growers Limited v Dering156 Scrutton L. J. said: - 
"If in a case where breach of a contract may occasion serious damage 
but damage which is difficult to value exactly, people contracting on 
equal terms agree beforehand to value or ascertain beforehand a 
conventional figure which shall represent on an average the probable 
damage from breaches of the same kind, I see no reason to interfere 
with their "genuine covenanted pre-estimate of damage", as Lord 
Dunedin describes it. That the damages are difficult to estimate is 
all the more reason why the parties should make their agreement 
effective and easy to enforce by previously agreeing a measure of 
damage. That damages of the same kind, but difficult to value 
exactly, may be averaged to avoid the difficulty seems to me also 
reasonable. " 
4.5. Summary 
There is an increasing reluctance on the part of courts to set aside 
commercial arrangments, which do not conflict with other laws or with 
public policy, merely because those arrangments seem harsh or unfair in 
the circumstances prevailing at the time of default. This will be 
particularly true where the Participants are at arm's length, well placed 
to make the business judgements involved, and have access to professional 
legal advice at the time of entering into the Joint Operating Agreement. 
The power of the court to grant relief in appropriate cases, remains as 
ever. However, even when jurisdiction is assumed the exercise of the 
power has always been discretionary, and it is not unlikely that such 
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discretion would be exercised against the enforecability of any default 
provisions which are made amongst participants of any reputation in the 
Industry. 
The background of the Industry against which the default provisions 
in Joint Operating Agreements must be set may be taken as some indication 
that the courts would adopt a more flexible and commercial approach to 
construing default provisions in high risk activities. In the case of 
penalty, the specific nature of the activity undertaken at the Exploration 
Phase makes a genuine attempt to liquidate propsective damages difficult 
and courts may well give effect to a formula which seems to be an attempt 
at such and which in turn differentiates between the consequences for 
trivial and serious breaches of contract. 
The default provisions will not be held to be penal where the 
defaulting Participant is required to pay interest on the unpaid amounts. 
It is submitted that such would be a genuine attempt to liquidate 
prospective damages as well as being a forseeable loss suffered by the 
Operator or the non defaulting Participants as a result of any default. 
However, if the interest rate is seen as excessive at the time the 
Participants entered into the Joint Operating Agreement it is likely that 
it will be viewed as a consequence of breach of contract and is liable to 
be attacked as a penalty. 
The default provision will not be viewed as penal where the non 
defaulting Participants are required to, and do, pay to the Operator a 
share of the amount in default, and are thereafter subrogated to the 
extent of the payment to the rights of the Operator to collect, and they 
seek to collect, the amount from the defaulting Participant together with 
interest thereon at a commercial rate. It is submitted that this would be 
a genuine attempt to liquidate prospective damages as well as being a 
forseeable loss suffered by the non defaulting Participants as a result of 
the default by the defaulting Participant. However, if the interest rate 
is seen to be excessive at the time the Participants entered into the 
Joint Operating Agreement it is a consequence of breach of contract and 
liable to be attacked as a penalty. 
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It is submitted that, on balance, default provisions of the type 
discussed above in a Joint Operating Agreement will not be considered as 
penal. The next issue to consider is whether equity will grant relief 
against forfeiture of the Interest of the defaulting Participant. 
5. FORFEITURE 
The jurisdiction of the courts to grant relief against forfeiture was 
discussed by Lord Wilberforce in Shiloh Spinners Limited v Harding 
157 
_ 
"There cannot be any doubt that from the earliest times courts of 
equity have asserted the right to relieve against the forfeiture of 
property. The jurisdiction has not been confined to any particular 
type of case. The commonest instances concerned mortgages, giving 
rise to the equity of redemption, and leases, which commonly 
contained re-entry clauses; but other instances are found in relation 
to copyholds, or where the forfeiture was in the nature of a 
penalty. Although the principle is well established, there has 
undoubtedly been some fluctuation of authority as to the 
self-limitation to be imposed or accepted on this power. There has 
not been much difficulty as regards two heads of jurisdiction. 
First, where it is possible to state that the object of the 
transaction and of the insertion of the right to forfeit is 
essentially to secure the payment of money, equity has been willing 
to relieve on terms that the payment is made with interest, if 
appropriate, and also costs (Peachy v Duke of Somerset (1721) 1 
Stra. 447 and cases there cited). Yet even this head of relief has 
not been uncontested: Lord Eldon L. C. in his well-known judgement in 
Hill v Barclay (1811) 18 Ves. Jun. 56 expressed his suspicion of it 
as a valid principle, pointing out, in an argument which surely has 
much force, that there may be cases where to oblige acceptance of a 
stipulated sum of money even with interest, at a date when receipt 
has lost its usefullness, might represent an unjust variation of what 
had been contracted for: see also Reynolds v Pitt (1812) 19 Ves. 
Jun. 140. Secondly, there were the heads of fraud, accident, mistake 
or suprise, always a ground for equity's intervention, the inclusion 
of which entailed the exclusion of mere inadvertence and a fortiori 
of wilful defaults. 
Outside of these there remained a debatable area in which were 
included obligations in leases such as to repair and analogous 
obligations concerning the condition of property, and covenants to 
insure or not to assign... 
... 
it remains true today that equity expects men to carry out their 
bargains and will not let them buy their way out by uncovenanted 
payment. But it is consistent with these principles that we should 
reaffirm the right of courts of equity in appropriate and limited 
cases to relieve against forfeiture for breach of convenant or 
condition where the primary object of the bargain is to secure a 
- 255 - 
stated result which can effectively be attained when the matter comes 
before the court, and where the forfeiture provision is added by way 
of security for the production of that result. The word 
"appropriate" involves consideration of the conduct of the applicant 
for relief, in particular whether his default was wilful, of the 
gravity of the breaches, and of the disparity between the value of 
the property of which forfeiture is claimed as compared with the 
damage caused by the breach. " 
Some ten years after the decision in Shiloh Spinners Limited v 
Harding158 the jurisdiction of the courts to grant relief against 
forfeiture was considered in Scandinavian Trading Tanker Co. A. B. v Flota 
Petrolera Ecuatoriana (The Scaplade)159 Shortly thereafter followed 
Sport International Bussum B. V. v Inter-Footwear Limited160 and 
B. I. C. C. PLC v Burndy Corporation161 Each of these decisions cast 
doubt in one way or another on the jurisdiction of the courts to grant 
relief against forfeiture. They have particular relevance to Joint 
Operation Agreements and whether a defaulting Participant can seek relief 
against forfeiture of its Interest under the default provisions. 
In Scandinavian Trading Tanker Co. A. B. v Flota Petrolera 
Ecuatoriana (The Scaptrade) 
162 
Robert Goff L. J. reading the judgement 
of the Court of Appeal sought to explain the basis of the jurisdiction of 
the courts to grant such relief. His Honour then turned to consider 
whether the jurisdiction extended to intervening and relieving time 
charterers from the consequences of default, saying: - 
"... we have come to the conclusion (as indeed we were urged by 
counsel to do) that the time has come when, in the interests of 
certainty, the courts must face up to the question whether they have 
jurisdiction to grant relief in cases such as the present. 
We proceed upon the basis that the equitable jurisdiction which 
the charterers invoke should not be regarded as rigidly confined to 
certain specific circumstances, or as incapable of development. Even 
so, we must have regard to the fact that, so far as is relevant to 
the present case, the principal areas in which courts of equity have 
been prepared to grant relief in the past are (1) relief against the 
forfeiture of property, notably in cases concerning mortgages and 
leases, and (2) relief against penalties. 
... equitable relief may be available 
in the context of a transaction 
which can be described as commercial; for example, in the case of 
leases of commercial premises, and of penalties in contracts which 
may be described as commercial (though foreign parties to English 
commercial contracts are sometimes startled to discover that this is 
so). 
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... However the cases where equity 
has intervened are cases where 
parties were frequently not at arm's length; and frequently also 
where the relevant contract conferred an interest in land, the loss 
of which could have serious personal consequences. 
... The mere fact that 
its application in the cases of leases has led 
to its being capable of application to some commercial transactions 
of the same kind provides, we consider, little or no justification 
for its extension to commercial contracts such as time charters. The 
question whether it should be so extended must be considered on its 
merits, as a matter of policy, taking into account the relatively 
slight assistance available to us from the authorities, though the 
fact that the jurisdiction has never been extended to purely 
commercial transactions must surely cause us to regard the extension, 
which we are now invited to make, with a considerable degree of 
caution. 
... Indeed, when we come to consider the nature of a contract such as 
a time charter, and the circumstances in which it is likely to be 
made, we see the most formidable arguments against the proposed 
extension of the equitable jurisdiction. In the first place, a time 
charter is a commercial transaction in the sense that it is generally 
entered into for the purposes of trade between commercial 
organisations acting at arm's length. 
... It 
is of the utmost importance in commercial transactions that, 
if any particular event occurs which may affect the parties' 
respective rights under a commercial contract, they should know where 
they stand. The court should so far as possible desist from placing 
obstacles in the way of either party ascertaining his legal position, 
if necessary with the aid of advice from a qualified lawyer, because 
it may be commercially desirable for action to be taken without 
delay, action which may be irrevocable and which may have 
far-reaching consequences. It is for this reason, of course, that 
the English courts have time and again asserted the need for 
certainty in commercial transactions - for the simple reason that the 
parties to such transactions are entitled to know where they stand, 
and to act accordingly. 
... The policy which favours certainty 
in commercial transactions is 
so antipathetic to the form of equitable intervention invoked by the 
charterers in the present case that we do not think it would be right 
to extend that jurisdiction to relieve time charterers from the 
consequences of withdrawal. We consider that the mere existence of 
such a jurisdiction would constitute an undesirable fetter upon the 
exercise by parties of the contractural rights under a commercial 
transaction of this kind. " 
On appeal, in Scandinavian Trading Tanker Co. A. B. v Flota Petrolera 
163 
Ecuatoriana (The Scaptrade), Lord Diplock said on behalf of the 
House of Lords: - 
"... your Lordships have heard argument upon one question only: "Has 
the High Court any jurisdiction to grant relief against the exercise 
by a shipowner of his contractual right, under the withdrawal clause 
in a time charter, to withdraw the vessel from the service of the 
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charterer upon the latter's failure to make payment of an instalment 
of the hire in the manner and at a time that is not later than that 
for which the withdrawal clause provides? " I call this the 
jurisdiction point. 
My Lords, the judgement of the Court of Appeal ..., delivered 
by Robert Goff L. J., on the jurisdiction point was the first direct 
decision by any English court, given after hearing argument, upon the 
question that I have set out at the beginning of this speech. For 
reasons admirably expressed, and which, for my part, I find 
convincing, the Court of Appeal held that there was no such 
jurisdiction. 
To grant an injunction restraining the shipowner from 
exercising his right of withdrawal of the vessel from the service of 
the charterer, though negative in form, is pregnant with an 
affirmative order to the shipowner to perform the contract; 
juristically it is indistinguishable from a decree for specific 
performance of a contract to render services; and in respect of that 
category of contracts, even in the event of breach, this is a remedy 
that English courts have always disclaimed any jurisdiction to 
grant. This is, in my view, sufficient reason in itself to compel 
rejection of the suggestion that the equitable principle of relief 
from forfeiture is juristically capable of extension so as to grant 
to the court a discretion to prevent a shipowner from exercising his 
strict contractual rights under a withdrawal clause in a time charter 
which is not a charter by demise. 
My Lords, Shiloh Spinners Limited v Harding was a case about 
a right of re-entry upon leasehold property for breach of a covenant, 
not to pay money but to do things on land. It was in a passage that 
was tracing the history of the exercise by the Court of Chancery of 
its jurisdiction to relieve against forfeiture of property that Lord 
Wilberforce said, at p. 722: 
"There has been much difficulty as regards two heads of 
jurisdiction. First, where it is possible to state that the 
object of the transaction and of the insertion of the right to 
forfeit is essentially to secure the payment of money, equity 
has been willing to relieve on terms that the payment is made 
with interest, if appropriate, and also costs ... 
" 
That this mainly historical statement was never meant to apply 
generally to contracts not involving any transfer of proprietary or 
possessory rights, but providing for a right to determine the 
contract in default of punctual payment of a sum of money payable 
under it, is clear enough from Lord Wilberforce's speech in The 
Laconia [1977] A. C. 850. 
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For all these reasons I would dismiss the appeal. I do so with 
the reminder that the reasoning in my speech has been directed 
exclusively to time charters that are not by demise. Identical 
considerations would not be applicable to bareboat charters and it 
would in my view be unwise for your Lordships to express any views 
about them. " 
Robert Goff L. J. and Lord Diplock, taken together, can be said to 
have laid down the following principles in relation to the jurisdiction of 
the courts to grant relief against forfeiture: - 
1. the basis of the jurisdiction is not confined to specific 
circumstances and nor is it incapable of development 
164; 
2. up to that point in time the principle areas in which the 
courts had been prepared to grant relief against forfeiture 
165 
were 
(i) where there was to be forfeiture of property, most 
noticeably in cases concerning mortgages and leases; and 
(ii) to relieve against penalties; 
3. frequently the courts have been prepared to grant relief 
against forfeiture where: - 
(i) the parties were not at arm's length166; 
(ii) the relevant contract conferred an interest in land167; 
and 
(iii) the loss could have had serious personal 
consequences 
168; 
and 
4. the courts would not be prepared to grant relief against 
forfeiture in the case of purely commercial transactions, that is, 
transactions entered into for the purposes of trade between 
commercial organisations acting at arm's length169 This is 
particularly so where there was a need for certainty in that the 
parties need to know where they stand: it being desirable to avoid 
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delay while determining whether or not a court would grant 
l7 
relief 
0. 
This was the approach adopted by the Supreme Court of 
the Northern Territory in considering whether to grant relief against 
forfeiture upon the default of a Participant in Monarch Petroleum 
171 
N. L. v Mid East Mineral N. L. 
In addition, Lord Diplock made a number of observations which merit 
mention: - 
1. the decision was confined to time charters. His Honour 
reserved his position in relation to bare boat charters172; 
2. the relationship between relief against forfeiture and the 
availability of other equitable remedies, such as specific 
performance was noted3. A court would not grant relief against 
17 
forfeiture where the effect of so doing would amount in practice to 
an order for specific performance of a contract for services174; and 
3. a court would not grant relief against forfeiture where the 
essential aim of the right of forfeiture was to secure the payment of 
money if the contract concerned did not in,, -lve the transfer of 
175 
or possessary rights75 
About the same time, in Austalia, the High Court of Australia handed 
down its decision in Legione v Hateley176 reaffirming the essential 
features for the application of the jurisdiction of the courts to grant 
relief against forfeiture laid down by Lord Wilberforce in Shiloh 
Spinners Limited v Harding177. 
The issue of the jurisdiction of the courts to grant relief against 
forfeiture was also addressed by Lord Templeman, in the House of Lords, in 
Sport International Busrum B. V. v Inter-Footwear Limited78. Lord 
1 
Templeman said: - 
"In Scandinavian Trading Tanker Co. A. B. v Flota Petrolera 
Ecuatoriana, The Scaptrade ..., this House declined to apply the 
equitable doctrine of relief against forfeiture to a time charter. 
Lord Diplock confined that power to contracts concerning the transfer 
of proprietary or possessory rights ... Counsel submitted that 
in 
the present case the licences to use the trade marks and names 
created proprietory and possessory rights in intellectual property. 
He admits, however, that so to hold would be to extend the boundaries 
of the authorities dealing with relief against forfeiture. I do not 
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believe that the present is a suitable case in which to define the 
boundaries of the equitable doctrine of relief against forfeiture. 
It is sufficient that the appellant cannot bring itself within the 
recognised boundaries and cannot establish an arguable case for the 
intervention of equity. The recognised boundaries do not include 
mere contractual licences and I see no reason for the intervention of 
equity. 'l79 
Oliver L. J., in the Court of Appeal, had considered the judgement of 
Lord Diplock in Scandinavian Trading Tanker Co. A. B. v Flota Petrolera 
Ecuatariana (The Scaptrade) 
180 
and saw no reason why the jurisdiction 
of the courts to grant relief should extend to property other than 
interests in land181. Oliver L. J. did not hold that the jurisdiction 
could not so extend; His Honour saw no reason to so extend it182. This 
went beyond the decisions in Scandinavian Trading Tanker Co. A. B. v Flota 
Petrolera Ecuatoriana (The Scaptrade) 
183 
where Robert Goff L. J. and 
Lord Diplock did not rule out the possibility of relief against forfeiture 
184 
being granted in commercial contracts. In nearly all other respects, 
the decision of Oliver L. J. and Lord Templeman can be seen as reaffirming 
the earlier decisions of Robert Goff L. J. and Lord Diplock. 
The certainty that had been established was then eroded185 by the 
judgements in Scandinavian Trading Tanker Co. A. B. v Flota Petrolera 
Ecuatariana (The Scaptrade) 
186 
and Sport International Bussurn B. V. v 
Inter-Footwear Limited 
187 
by Dillon L. J. in B. I. C. C. PLC v Burndy 
Corporation and Another . Dillon L. J. 
held: - 
188 
" There are here two questions, viz.: has the court jurisdiction 
to grant Burndy relief against forfeiture by an extension of time 
and; if so, is it appropriate that the court should exercise that 
jurisdiction in Burndy's favour? 
The judge decided, in reliance especially on the judgment of 
the Court of Appeal in Scandinavian Trading Co. A. B. v Flota Petrola 
Ecuatoriana (The Scaptrade) ..., that the court 
had no such 
jurisdiction, because the assignment was a commercial agreement 
between commercial parties. The decision of the Court of Appeal in 
The Scaptrade was, as the judge noted, affirmed by the House of 
Lords ... As I understand the 
decision of the House of Lords, 
however, and the decision of the House of Lords in the subsequent 
case of Sport International Bussum B. V. v Inter-Footwear Ltd. ..., 
their effect was to confine the court's jurisdiction to grant relief 
against forfeiture to contracts concerning the transfer of 
proprietary or possessory rights: see the speech of Lord Templeman in 
the latter case ... The present case, however, 
is distinguishable 
from those cases in that clause 10(iii) of the assignment is 
concerned with a transfer of property rights. 
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... There 
is no clear authority, but for my part I find it difficult 
to see why the jurisdiction of equity to grant relief against 
forfeiture should only be available where what is liable to 
forfeiture is an interest in land and not an interest in personal 
property. Relief is only available where what is in question is 
forfeiture of proprietary or possessory rights, but I see no reason 
in principle for drawing a distinction as to the type of property in 
which the rights subsist. The fact that the right to forfeiture 
arises under a commercial agreement is highly relevant to the 
question whether relief against forfeiture should be granted, but I 
do not see that it can preclude the existence of the jurisdiction to 
grant relief, if forfeiture of proprietary or possessory rights, as 
opposed to merely contractual rights, is in question. I hold, 
therefore, that the court has jurisdiction to grant Burndy 
relief.,, l89 
Kerr L. J. 
190 
and Ackner L. J. 
191 
expressed their approval of the 
judgment of Dillon L. J. 
In his judgement, although obiter192, Dillon L. J. saw no reason why 
courts could not grant relief even though: - 
1. the forfeiture arose pursuant to a purely commercial transaction; 
2. the contract involved the transfer of proprietory or possessory 
rights and not merely contractual rights; and 
3. the interest concerned was an interest in personal property rather 
193 
than land 
Dillon L. J. regarded the fact that the case involved a purely commercial 
transaction as having a bearing upon the exercise of the discretion to 
grant relief against forfeiture rather than upon the jurisdiction of the 
courts to grant relief against forfeiture194. In this instance the 
common feature with the judgements of Robert Goff L. J., Lord Diplock, 
Oliver L. J. and Lord Templeman discussed above was that relief against 
forefeiture would only be granted where the contract involves the transfer 
19 
of proprietary or possessary rights and not merely contractual rights5 
Turning again to the default provisions in Joint operating 
Agreements, there can be little doubt that they provide for forfeiture, 
and as such the question must be asked as to whether the Interest of a 
Participant creates proprietary or possessory rights. As has been 
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submitted earlier 
196, 
the Interest of a Participant is both proprietary 
and contractual 
197. 
A further point for examination must be whether the default 
provisions in Joint Operating Agreements have as their primary purpose the 
securing of the payment by the Participants of their respective full share 
of any sum payable by them pursuant to the Joint Operating Agreement. It 
is submitted that one of the objects of the default provisions in a Joint 
Operating Agreement - but not the primary object - is to ensurgithe prompt 
payment by the Participants of their respective full share of any sums 
payable by them pursuant to the Joint Operating Agreement198. This is 
to assist the Participants in attaining the primary object of a Joint 
Operating Agreement entered into at the Exploration Phase: the discovery 
of petroleum. One of the disincentives against default by a Participant 
in the performance of its duty to make such prompt payment is the 
possibility that its Interest may be forfeited to and acquired by the 
199 
other Participants, without compensation. 
Furthermore, it is submitted that the primary object of the default 
provisions in a Joint Operating Agreement is to secure payment by the 
Participants of their respective full share of any sum payable by them 
pursuant to the Joint Operating Agreement200. The right of forfeiture 
can also be seen as providing security over an easily available asset of 
the defaulting Participant201. A secondary, although nevertheless very 
important, object of the default provisions in a Joint Operating Agreement 
is to sever the relationship between the defaulting Participant and the 
non defaulting Participants so as to allow the non defaulting Participants 
to rearrange their interests and funding obligations, thereby relieving 
them of the burden of relying upon the defaulting Participant and 
providing them with continuing and regular support for the Operations202. 
To the extent it is still open to argument that courts do not, or 
will only in very rare circumstances, have jurisdiction to grant relief 
against forfeiture, or, if they do have such jurisdiction, will not 
exercise their discretion to grant relief, where the participants have, at 
arm's length, entered into a purely commercial transaction it is submitted 
that the Joint Operating Agreement is just such an agreement. The 
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entering into Joint Operating Agreement is very much a purely commercial 
transaction entered into by the Participants acting at arm's length203 
If the entering into of a Joint Operating Agreement is considered against 
the background of the Industry and the Exploration Phase it is difficult 
to see how it can be argued otherwise and that the Participants should not 
be free to make enforceable arrangements as between themselves regulating 
the events which follow the default of a Participant 
204 
In the event the courts did hold that they had jurisdiction to grant 
relief against forfeiture they will nevertheless grant relief in 
appropriate and limited case205, and the following matters will be taken 
into consideration before granting relief against the forfeiture of its 
Interest to a defaulting Participant 
206 
_ 
1. the defaulting Participant would have been aware of the 
consequences of the default; 
2. the defaulting Participant and the non defaulting Participants 
would have entered into a purely commercial transaction, acting at 
arm's length and on an equal footing; 
3. the defaulting Participant was given the opportunity to remedy 
the default; and 
4. the conduct of the defaulting Participant 
207. 
In Southern 
Cross Exploration N. L. v Bennett208 the court was influenced by 
the past record of default by the Participant. The defaulting 
Participant had a continuous record of default in the payment of cash 
calls with the result that the non defaulting Participants had been 
forced over a period of time to continue in a relationship of joint 
venture with a Participant who was once again in default. In such 
circumstances the court was not prepared to exercise its discretion 
and grant relief against forfeiture. 
One particular aspect of the defaulting Participants' 
conduct which the courts will scrutinise is the nature of the 
default; was it wilful or inadvertant09? Wilful is taken 
2 
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to mean a failure by the defaulting Participant to act with 
reasonable diligence and prudence210. For example, the 
inability, as opposed to the unwillingness, of a Participant to 
pay will not be seen as a wilful default and as such the courts 
may be more willing to grant relief against forfeiture 
211 
The question of the conduct of the Participant seeking 
relief was addressed in passing by Mocatta J. in C. V. G. 
Siderurgicia Del Orinoco S. A. v London Steamship Owners' Mutual 
212 
Insurance Association Limited (The "Vainqueur Jose") .- 
"... it is in my judgement clear that the member's 
conduct in this case, an extraordiary amalgam of action 
and inaction, inexplicable on any rational basis, denies 
him or those standing in his shoes any right there might 
otherwise have been to relief against forfeiture. " 
In so far as wilful breaches are concerned Lord 
Wilberforce said: - 
"... wilful breaches should not, or at least should only 
in exceptional cases, be relieved against, ... ýý213ý 
5. the gravity of the default; and 
6. the discrepancy existing between the value of the Interest of 
the defaulting Participant that is forfeited to and acquired by the 
non defaulting Participants, and the damage caused by the 
default214. Simply, a comparison will be made between the 
defaulting Participant's loss and the non defaulting Participants' 
gain in the event of the forfeiture and acquisition of the Interest 
of the defaulting Participant. 
At the Exploration Phase, until such time as petroleum is 
discovered, the Interest of the defaulting Participant that is 
forfeited to and acquired by the non defaulting Participants may be 
of insignificant value or even worthless215. Hence, a challenge by 
the defaulting Participant to the forfeiture and acquisition of its 
Interest may well depend upon the likelihood of petroleum being 
discovered. Such would appear to have been the case in Monarch 
Petroleum N. L. v Citco Australia Petroleum Limited216. The 
mr 
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defaulting Participant appears not to have challenged the imminent 
forfeiture and acquisition until petroleum was discovered. The 
decision reached by Kennedy J. in that case did not require 
consideration of whether the applicant's action in seeking relief 
against forfeiture had merit. Nevertheless, where a Participant is 
in default and in such circumstances seeks relief against forfeiture, 
it may be estopped from obtaining relief by the doctrine of laches. 
Where the Interest of a defaulting Participant is forfeited to and 
acquired by the non defaulting Participants, it would not be correct 
to say that the defaulting Participant has not received any benefit 
under the Joint Operating Agreement. The defaulting Participant will 
have received the benefit of all exploration up to the date upon 
which its Interest is forfeited to and acquired by the non defaulting 
Participants 
217. 
A slight discrepancy, though clear and predictable, between the value 
of the Interest of the defaulting Participant that is forfeited to 
and acquired by the non defaulting Participants and the damage caused 
by the default will be insufficient to persuade the courts to grant 
relief against forfeiture218. 
In considering the defaulting Participants' application for relief 
against forfeiture the courts will look at all the facts and 
circumstances at the time of the forfeiture. They will not be 
constrained, as is the case when considering the issue of penalty, to 
the facts and circumstances at the time the Participants entered into 
the Joint Operating Agreement 
219 
Courts have a discretion as to whether or not they will exercise 
their jurisdiction to grant relief against forfeiture. The relief granted 
may go so far as to remould the provisions of the Joint Operating 
Agreement to the extent necessary to avoid the otherwise unconscionable 
aspects of the default provisions220. However, before courts grant 
relief against forfeiture it is usual for them to require the defaulting 
Participant to pay in full the amount in default, or to obtain an 
assurance that the amount will be paid, and to seek an assurance that all 
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future amounts payable by the defaulting Participant pursuant to the Joint 
Operating Agreement will be paid when due221. The effect of granting 
relief against forfeiture is not to stike out the default provisions in 
the Joint Operating Agreement which gave rise to the forfeiture, but to 
afford more time in which the defaulting Participant may remedy the 
222 
default 
If in exercising its discretion to grant relief, the court fixes a 
time limit for performance of any condition attached to that relief, the 
court can similarly extend such time limit. In Chandless-Chandless v 
Nicholson 
223 
Lord Greene M. R. said: - 
"I hold the view without hesitation that notwithstanding the omission 
of the words "liberty to apply" an order of this kind, which gives 
relief on terms to be performed within a specified time, is one in 
respect of which the court retains jurisdiction to extend that time 
if circumstances are brought to its notice which would make it just 
and equitable that extension should be granted. " 
If it later appears that the relief granted by way of an extension of 
time ought to be further extended and that this can be done without 
prejudicing the interests of the other Participants the court has 
jurisdiction to so grant an extension. In Staraide Properties Limited v 
Mustapha224 Edmund Davies L. J. said: - 
"... the court grants relief against the forfeiture which would 
otherwise follow from it in such circumstances as justice requires, 
and it grants relief on such terms as are equitable in those 
circumstances. If it should later appear that the relief by way of 
an extension of time first granted ought to be extended, and that in 
fairness to the other party that can be done, I see no difficulty in 
holding that the court has the jurisdiction to do that which the 
justice of the case is seen to require. " 
The fact that relief against forfeiture confers more time for the 
defaulting Participant to remedy the default may pose problems for the 
defaulting Participant when making its application for relief. After all, 
the default provisions in a Joint Operating Agreement give the defaulting 
Participant time to remedy the default before even the forfeiture 
mechanism applies. The defaulting Participant would need to show: - 
1. the default was not wilful; 
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2. there was a genuine failure to raise funds after using all 
reasonable endeavours to obtain finance; and 
3. there was a genuine intent to pay in full all amounts giving 
2 
. rise to and arising as a result of the default25 
The Joint Operating Agreement will often provide for a stated period 
of time in which the defaulting Participant may make good its default thus 
rendering spurious the avenue of relief against forfeiture. 
Default by a Participant during the Exploration Phase, where nothing 
has as yet been found, is unlikely to attract much opposition to the 
strict exercise of the default provisions in the Joint Operating Agreement 
by either the courts or the defaulting Participant. At the Exploration 
Phase there will usually be either no joint venture property or it will be 
of insignificant value. Furthermore, there will be no cash flow. Once 
the joint venture moves on to the appraisal phase or the Development 
Phase, the stance of the defaulting Participant and the courts may be 
different. However, such considerations are outside the ambit of this 
thesis. 
6. CROSS CHARGES 
A Joint Operating Agreement at the Exploration Phase may provide a 
mechanism whereby each Participant charges its Interest in favour of the 
other Participants and the Operator to secure the payment in full of any 
sum payable by it pursuant to the Joint Operating Agreement226. Thus 
the cross charge mechanism may be used to protect the interest of the non 
defaulting Participants in the event of a default227. The cross charge 
will be a fixed charge over the Participant's interest in the petroleum 
title and other property and a floating charge over stocks and 
consumables228. As such, the charge will be registerable229. The 
cross charge will usually have first priority as against all other charges 
or encumbrances created by the Participant and will provide by agreement 
for all pre-existing charges or encumbrances to be postponed to it 
230 
It is outside of the scope of this thesis to address the somewhat complex 
priority arrangements between creditors and other matters that arise from 
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the cross charge mechanism. Primarily this is because it is most unusual 
to find the cross charge mechanism used in Joint Operating Agreements 
23 
entered into to undertake the Exploration Phase1 
7. PREMIUM 
It is not usual for the Joint Operating Agreement to impose a premium 
upon the defaulting Participant as part of what is required to remedy its 
default232. Premiums may, however, appear in relation to Sole Risk 
Operations, non consent operations and dilution clauses. Sole Risk 
Operations and non consent operations are discussed in this thesis. 
Dilution clauses have been discussed above in this chapter. 
8. LIENS 
Where there has been a default by a Participant, until the default is 
remedied, the early Joint Operating Agreements usually provided for the 
non defaulting Participants to have a lien over that part of the Interest 
of the defaulting Participant as constitutes its share of the property as 
owned by the Participants in undivided shares as tenants in common 
233 
This would include all equipment, plant and machinery in which the 
defaulting Participants has an interest. 
The provision in the Joint Operating Agreement which provides for the 
lien is a hangover from the various North American model form Joint 
Operating Agreement234. For reasons that will be obvious from the 
discussion which follows, such a provision is rarely provided for now. 
A lien is the right of the non defaulting Participants to retain the 
property of the defaulting Participant which they have in their possession 
until the demands on the defaulting Participant by the non defaulting 
Participants are satisfied235. One of the problems with a lien is that 
it does little more than provide security for the payment by the 
defaulting Participant of the amounts paid by the non defaulting 
Participants to the Operator to meet the defaulting Participant's share of 
the sums payable by it pursuant to the Joint Operating Agreement 
236 
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Another of the problems with a lien is that it is founded in 
possession237. At the Exploration Phase there is usually no specific 
property held by the defaulting Participant. As mentioned each 
Participant usually has an undivided share as tenant in common in the 
property held by the Participants under the Joint Operating Agreement. 
For obvious reasons, the non defaulting Participants cannot take 
possession of the defaulting Participant's interest in property held in 
238 
way8 
Moreover a lien does not carry the right for the non defaulting 
Participants to sell and therefore realise the property of the defaulting 
Participant 
239. 
Any right of sale is at the discretion of the 
240 
courts. However, the sale of the property of the defaulting 
Participant would largely defeat the object of the joint venture as it 
could deprive the non defaulting Participants of essential equipment, 
plant and machinery 
241 
The final problem with a lien is that in most cases it will 
constitute a registerable charge242. 
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CHAPTER IX 
ASSIGNMENT OF INTEREST BY A PARTICIPANT 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The capacity of a Participant to assign1 all or part of its 
Interest to a third party is dependent upon the nature of that 
Interest2. In the main, the Interest of a Participant is made up of 
three elements :- 
1. a petroleum title interest; 
2. a property interest; and 
3. a Joint Operating Agreement interest. 
The Interest of a Participant, as is evidenced by these elements, has 
both proprietary and contractual aspects4. Each of these aspects must be 
considered separately. 
In so far as the Interest is made up of proprietary rights, in the 
absence of statutory restraint, a Participant has the capacity to assign 
all or part of those rights5. Whether it is possible for the Joint 
Operating Agreement to place a restraint upon the capacity of a 
Participant to assign all or part of those rights is a question which will 
be considered later in this chapter. 
In so far as the Interest is made up of contractual rights, the 
general rule is that a Participant has the capacity to assign all or part1 lJ 
of those rights in equity6. The Participant may not be able to assign 
all or part of those rights at law. It is because the burdens undertaken 
are not severable from the benefits conferred, that the capacity of a 
Participant to assign all or part of its Interest is confined to an 
equitable assignment, in so far as that Interest is made up of contractual 
rights7. To avoid the inconvenience of being confined to an equitable 
assignment, it is necessary for specific provisions governing the 
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capacity of a Participant to assign all or part of those rights to be set 
out in a contract between the Participants. This is usually one of the 
matters that the Joint Operating Agreement addresses. In any event the 
Joint Operating Agreement will often seek to place a restraint upon the 
capacity of a Participant to assign all or part of its contractual 
rights. The effectiveness of such a restraint is a question which will be 
considered later in this chapter. 
In seeking to restrain the capacity of a Participant to assign all or 
part of its Interest, the question immediately posed is, what is the 
provision in the Joint Operating Agreement specifically designed to 
prohibit? It is submitted that it is designed to prohibit the situation 
arising whereby, other than with the consent of the other Participants, a 
third party steps into the shoes of the Participant, for all purposes, in 
respect of all or part of the Interest of the Participant: that is, where 
the Participatnt assigns both the benefit (the rights) and the burden (the 
duties) of the contract between the Participants, in respect of all or 
part of the Interest of the Participant, to a third party without the 
consent of the other Participants. 
In considering the purpose of the provision yet another question is 
posed: If, as it is submitted, the provision is designed to prohibit the 
situation arising whereby, other than with the consent of the other 
Participants, a third party steps into the shoes of the Participant, for 
all purposes, in respect of all or part of the Interest of the 
Participant, is it correct to speak in terms of assignment? That is, is 
it indeed possible in law for a Participant to assign both the benefit 
(the rights) and the burden (the duties) of the contract between the 
Participants in respect of all or part of the Interest of the Participant 
to a third party? 
The answer to this second question requires a consideration of what 
is meant by the term "assignment". An assignment is "the immediate 
transfer of an existing proprietary right, vested or contingent, from the 
$ 
assignor to the assignee". The contractual rights that arise under the 
Joint Operating Agreement between the Participants are proprietary 
rights: they are, it is submitted, legal choses in action9. This is 
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not the place to discuss the distinction between legal and equitable 
choses in action, the historical distinction as to their respective 
assignability and the formal requirements to effect an assignment 
thereof10. It will suffice to point out that it is possible to assign a 
legal chose in action in the absence, in the main, of statutory 
prohibition, prohibition on the ground of public policy or an express 
contractural prohibition. What is important to appreciate is that the use 
of the term "assignment" is primarily concerned with the transfer of 
rights: the benefit of the contract. 
1.1 Assignment of the benefit 
For the time being, considering only the transfer of rights - the 
benefit of contract - it is apposite to point out that two of the 
prohibitions against the assignment of a chose in action already referred 
to are present in the context of the Joint Operating Agreement, viz., a 
prohibition on the ground of public policy and an express contractual 
prohibition. 
In this context one of the prohibitions against the assignment of the 
benefit of the contract depends upon whether, on the construction of the 
Joint Operating Agreement, taking into account the facts (including the 
subject matter of the Joint Operating Agreement) and circumstances 
surrounding the relationship between the Participants, the contract 
between the Participants is one which requires the personal performance of 
each of the Participants 
ll. 
Whether the contract will be so construed 
is a question of law12. If, however, the contract is construed as one 
which requires the personal performance of each of the Participants, it 
would appear that such a legal chose in action could not be assigned by a 
Participant without the consent of the other Participants, irrespective of 
whether the Joint Operating Agreement prohibited an assignement13. The 
transfer of the benefit of the Joint Operating Agreement can only be 
effected in such cases by novation of the contract. 
In determining whether the Joint Operating Agreement constitutes a 
contract between the Participants which requires the personal performance 
of each Participant, it is submitted that the courts will take into 
- 296 - 
account such matters as: - 
(i) whether the skill, experience and judgement of the Participant 
formed a material part of the consideration for the contract 
14; 
(ii) the extent to which the rights of the other Participants under 
the contract would be altered by an assignment15; 
16 (iii) the good faith and credit-worthiness of the Participant ; and 
(iv) the non-pecuniary character of the right sought to be 
17 
assigned 
Along side such matters must be placed the matters in rebuttal: if 
the Joint Operating Agreement itself expressly deals with the possibility 
of assignment or if the terms of the Joint Operating Agreement, when 
properly construed, are seen to provide for assignment18, then the 
contract ought not to be deemed to be one requiring the personal 
performance of the Participant 
19 
However, it is submitted that the Joint Operating Agreement does give 
rise to a contract between the Participants that requires the personal 
performance of each of the Participants. There can be little doubt that a 
material consideration in the coming together of the Participants to form 
a joint venture to undertake activities at the Exploration Phase is the 
skill, experience and judgement of the Participants and the good faith and 
credit-worthiness of the Participants. This is particularly apposite when 
the management of the joint venture established by the Joint Operating 
Agreement is considered. 
To the extent that the Joint Operating Agreement calls for personal 
performance, a Participant lacks the capacity to assign all or part of the 
contractual rights which make up the Interest of the Partcipant, unless 
the Joint Operating Agreement provides otherwise20. 
Coupled with the prohibition on the ground of public policy is the 
express prohibition against assignment in the Joint Operating Agreement. 
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If the submission that the Joint Operating Agreement would give rise to 
the prohibition on the ground of public policy is correct, then the 
coupling of the two prohibitions would put beyond doubt that a Participant 
could not assign any rights under the Joint Operating Agreement. If, on 
the other hand, the submission is incorrect, it would be necessary to 
consider whether the express contractual prohibition is binding so as to 
render any assignment void and inoperative21. One must consequently 
look to the construction of the Joint Operating Agreement, taking into 
account the facts and circumstances surrounding the relationship between 
the Participants. 
The mere presence of the prohibition will not necessarily prevent the 
assignment of all beneficial interests under the Joint Operating 
Agreement22. If the prohibition is not a condition but is rather a 
stipulation in the nature of a warranty, a breach of the provision will 
give rise to a claim for damages without invalidating the assignment 
constituted by the breach23. On the other hand, if the prohibition is a 
condition and is an essential part of the contract to the extent that the 
Participants would not have entered into the contract with each other 
unless assured of strict observance of the prohibition24, or the 
prohibition goes to the substance and foundation of the contract25, then 
the effect of breach of the provision ought to be treated as voidable and 
inoperative as between the Participants 
26. 
For the same type of reason 
as mentioned above it is submitted that the express contractual 
prohibition is a condition, not a warranty, of the Joint Operating 
Agreement and as such breach thereof would give rise to the assignment 
being held to be void and inoperative. 
1.2 Assignment of the burden 
So much for the assignment of rights under the Joint Operating 
Agreement. What about the transfer of the duties - the burden of the 
contract? 
To begin with, it is necessary to consider the distinction between 
conditional benefits and independent obligations, or "the pure principle 
27 
of benefit and burden" discussed in Tito v Waddell (No. 2) . 
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Megary V. C. held that the conditional benefits principle applied 
where the assignment conferred a conditional or qualified right, the 
condition or qualification being that certain restrictions shall be 
observed or certain burdens assumed, such being an intrinsic part of the 
right assigned, so that if the assignee were to take the benefit of the 
right as it stands it must also take the burden: the benefit is a 
conditional benefit28. It is submitted that this principle does not 
conflict with the general rule as to the assignment of the burden of a 
contract discussed below 
29 
On the other hand, the pure principle of benefit and burden does not 
sit well with the general rule. Megary V. C. applied the pure principle of 
benefit and burden to the situation where, although the right and the 
burden may arise under the same instrument, they are in fact independent 
of each other. If, for example A grants a right to B and by the same 
instrument B independently covenants with A to perform a certain act there 
is no doubt that B is bound by its covenant to perform the act. The 
question that arises is, if B assigns its right, does the assignee take 
the right free of B's obligation to perform the act or is the asignee 
bound by the obligation under the "pure principle of benefit and 
30 
burden" 
The pure principle of benefit and burden is said to arise only where 
the construction of the transaction or instrument 
31 
which creates 
benefits and burdens leads to the decision that the conditional benefits 
principle does not apply. If the conditional benefits principal does not 
apply then it is a case of determining whether the pure principle of 
benefit and burden applies. If it does not apply then the general rule as 
to the assignment of the burden of a contract discussed below will 
3 
apply2 
Whether the pure principle of benefit and burden will apply will 
depend upon the circumstances surrounding which the assignee comes into 
the assignment transaction33 and in particular whether the assignee 
expressly agreed to assume not only the benefits but also the burdens. 
This is to be determined, in the main, from the documentation evidencing 
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the transaction but the surrounding circumstances will also play their 
part in the construction process 
34 
In applying the pure principle of benefit and burden in Tito v 
Waddell (No. 2) 
35 
Megarry V. C., having decided that the conditional 
benefits principle did not apply, posed two questions 
36 3 7. 
- 
(i) did the circumstances in which the assignee became connected 
with the original agreement show that the assignee ought not to be 
able to take the benefit without accepting the burden?; and 
(ii) did the assignee have a sufficient title to the benefit? 
In the final analysis, Megarry V. C. held that the assignee did not 
intend to accept the benefits without the burdens38, but that in one 
case the pure principal of benefit and burden, which was a broad principle 
of justice to be satisfied by what is real and substantial39, did not 
apply as the real benefits enjoyed by the assignee did not arise under the 
terms of the original agreement that imposed the burden, whilst in another 
the assignee did enjoy real benefits under the terms of the assigned 
40 
agreement 
The general rule would hold that a Participant cannot transfer its 
duties under the Joint Operating Agreement in such a way that the 
41 
contractual duties are tr . To transfer the ansferred to a third party 
contractual duties under the Joint Operating Agreement would require the 
novation of the contract between the Participants. This means that, with 
the consent of the other Participants, a third party would be substituted 
for the Participant42 and the Participant would cease to have any rights 
and duties in relation to the other Participants, in the absence of 
conditions to the contrary in any agreement effecting the novation. 
It is submitted that it is not correct to speak of an assignment in 
such circumstances. A new contract is substituted for the existing 
contract. There is not a transfer of any property at all. There is the 
annulment of one contract and the creation of a substitute in its 
place 
43. 
The new contract may be between the original participants or 
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different participants. However, the important point is that the existing 
contract is discharged by the new contract 
44 
The reason given for the Participants' consent to the novation could 
be the discharge of existing contract and the substitution of a new 
contract therefor and could also include the condition that the 
Participant remains responsible to the Participants for the conduct and 
performance by the third party45 of the rights and duties it assumes and 
is required to undertake and perform as a Participant under the new 
contract. Otherwise, the other Participants would merely be consenting to 
the extinguishment of the Participant's rights and duties under the Joint 
Operating Agreement with the result that the substitution of the third 
party would amount to the acceptance of the third party as the sole person 
liable thereafter under the Joint Operating Agreement. It is important to 
appreciate that novation acts as a complete release: no rights can be 
reserved and no right of recovery can remain46. On the other hand, it 
is important to appreciate that by novation both the benefit and the 
burden can, in effect, be passed from the Participant to the third party. 
The requirements for a valid novation can be summarised as follows47: - 
(i) the consent of the other Participants is required to the 
substitution of the third party48; 
(ii) there must be a total extinction of the original contract 
between the Participants; 
49 
and 
(iii) the novation must be supported by consideration 
50 
Even if all the requirements are satisfied it is still necessary to 
demonstrate, although the satisfying of the requirements may in themselves 
so demonstrate, that the Participants intended to effect a novation5l 
The novation may be express or implied52. One consequence of this 
is that in many cases what is referred to as an assignment is in fact a 
novation. Agreements executed as assingments on closer examination turn 
out to be novations with a condition imposed that the Participant is to 
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remain responsible to the other Participants for the conduct and 
performance by the third party of the rights it assumes and the duties it 
is required to undertake and perform. 
If the Participant were to purport to "transfer" the duties under the 
Joint Operating Agreement without the consent of the other Participants 
the agreement between the Participant and the purported transferee would 
Lnot amount to a novation. The purported transfer, which may operate as an 
assignment, may well be binding as between the Participant and the 
purported transferee53, but it could not per se deprive the other 
Participants of their right to proceed against the Participant as the 
contracting party with the other Participants. 
The transfer of the burden of the Joint Operating Agreement should 
not be confused with the delegation by a Participant of its duties under 
the Joint Operating Agreement to a third party: so called "vicarious 
performance"54. Such is something quite different as will be 
demonstrated later in this thesis. There is no shifting of the burden 
from the shoulders of one person and onto those of another in such 
circumstances55. The Participant will remain contractually liable to 
the other Participants for the non-performance of the vicarious person. 
Furthermore, the vicarious person does not thereby acquire the right to 
sue the Participants as it is merely fulfilling the duties of another; it 
is not party to the Participants' contract, only to that between it and 
the Participant for whom it has undertaken to discharge specified duties. 
Returning to the three elements which make up the Interest of a 
Participant, it is evident that the right of a Participant to assign all 
or part of its petroleum title interest is, in addition to being governed 
by the terms of the Joint Operating Agreement, governed by the terms of 
the petroleum title and is subject to all of the consents and approvals 
required by the petroleum title or any Act or regulations to which it is 
subject and or pursuant to which it was granted56. The right of a 
Participant to assign all or part of its property interest and its Joint 
Operating Agreement interest is governed by the terms of the Joint 
Operating Agreement57. The right of a Participant to assign all or part 
of its Joint Operating Agreement interest, in so far as that interest 
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flows from the petroleum title, must take into account the fact that the 
right to assign all or part of a petroleum title interest is governed by 
the terms and subject to the consents and approvals mentioned above58. 
The Joint Operating Agreement usually addresses the assignment by a 
Participant of all or part of its Interest to: - 
(i) a third party that is an affiliate of the Participant; and 
(ii) a third party that is not an affiliate of the Participant. 
The discussion which follows does not consider the various methods by 
which a Participant can assign all or part of its Interest or the various 
methods by which such may be wholly or partially restrained, nor the 
taxation implications, the competition implications or, in the case of 
Australia, the foreign investment implications that may arise in the 
context of the assignment by a Participant of all or part of its Interest. 
2. ASSIGNMENT TO AN AFFILLIATED THIRD PARTY 
2.1 Interest to be assigned 
The Joint Operating Agreement will usually permit a Participant to 
assign or transfer all or part of its Interest to a third party that is 
affiliated to it. 
59 
2.2 Definition of an "affiliate" 
The Joint Operating Agreements will usually define the term 
"affiliate". The definition will, in most cases, follow the basic formula 
set out below: - 
(i) where a Participant is a subsidiary60 of another 
company61 ("the holding company"), the holding company62 
and all other companies that are subsidiaries of the holding 
company63 are deemed to be affiliates of the Participant; and 
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(ii) where a Participant is not a subsidiary of another 
company, all companies that are subsidiaries of the Participant 
are deemed to be affiliates of the Participant 
64 
The test as to when a company will be deemed to be a subsidiary of 
another company is usually caste in the mold of control, both direct and 
indirect. One company is usually seen to have control of another company 
when it can control: - 
(i) the composition of the board of directors of the other 
65 
company ; or 
(b) fifty per cent (50%) or more of the equity share 
capital66 of the other company67. 
There are, of course, many variations of circumstances that can be 
used to provide the test pursuant to which a company is deemed to be a 
subsidiary of another for the purpose of a Joint Operating Agreement. The 
question of how tight the definition is drafted will depend largely upon 
the desire of the Participants. 
An interesting factor common to most Joint Operating Agreements is 
that there is no attempt made to control the transfer of ownership or 
control of a Participant68. Take, for example, a Participant which has 
an interest in numerous petroleum titles or Joint Operating Agreements and 
wishes to dispose of one only of its interests to a third party without 
triggering the first right of acquisition provisions contained in a Joint 
Operating Agreement. What is to stop the Participant forming a 
subsidiary, assigning the interest to the subsidiary and then transferring 
ownership or control of the subsidiary to a third party? Bearing in mind 
that once all or part of Interest is assigned to an affiliate that 
affiliate, for the purposes of the Joint Operating Agreement, becomes "the . 
{.. 
Participant"69, it would appear that, in so far as the Joint Operating 
Agreement is concerned, what may not be possible to achieve directly as 
between the Participants could be achieved indirectly. 
However, in the case of Great Britain, the model clauses do give to 
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the Secretary of State for Energy power, after a person has effected a 
change in the control70 of a corporate71 Participant, to serve written 
notice on the Participant stating that he proposes to revoke the Licence 
unless such further change in the control of the Participant as is 
specified in the notice takes place within three months beginning with the 
date of service of the notice72. In the event that the further change 
in control of the Participant does not occur within the period of time, 
the Secretary of State for Energy may revoke the Licence73. 
For the purpose of the model clauses a change of control arises when 
a person attains control of the Participant who did not have control when 
the Licence was granted74. The test of whether a person has or had 
control of a Participant75 is, in effect, whether the person exercises 
or at the time exercised , or 
is or at the time was able to exercise or is 
or at the time was entitled to acquire direct or indirect control over the 
Participant's affairs76. 
There is no procedure for obtaining the prior clearance of the 
Secretary of State for Energy to a proposed change in the control of the 
Participant. However, it has been suggested, that the practice is for 
suitable assurances to be 
considered appropriate77. 
change sought, by the not 
to restore the status quo 
given by the Secretary of State for Energy where 
Furthermore, there is no requirement for the 
ice served by the Secretary of State for Energy 
78 
ante 
2.3 Consent of the other Participants. 
The general practice in the Industry is that the consent of the other 
Participants is not required where a Participant is assigning all or part 
of its Interest to an affiliate79. However, the situation can arise 
where consent is, in effect, required. By making it a condition of such 
an assignment that the Participant demonstrate "to the satisfaction of the 
other"80 Participants the affiliate's "financial capability to meet its 
prospective obligations"81 under the Joint Operating Agreement it is 
possible for an assignment of such Interest or part thereof to be rejected 
on the limited basis that the other Participants are not so satisfied. 
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2.4 Compliance with general requirements 
The assignment of all or part of the Interest of a Participant to an 
affiliate will be required to comply with the general requirements 
discussed later in this chapter. 
3. ASSIGNMENT TO AN INDEPENDENT THIRD PARTY 
3.1 Interest to be assigned 
A joint venture formed to undertake activities at the Exploration 
Phase is usually, but not always, made up of companies which have a long 
standing and close relationship82. In such circumstances the identity 
of the other participants of the joint venture is important to each 
participant83. On the other hand, by the very nature of a joint venture 
each Participant owns an undivided share as tenant in common of the assets 
and as such there is no reason why the right to assign that share should 
not be available to them. One of the aims of the Joint Operating 
Agreement is, therefore, to strike a balance between not unduly 
restricting the future activities of each Participant and ensuring that 
unsuitable persons cannot be introduced by a Participant into the joint 
venture84. In seeking to strike this balance it is usually considered 
inappropriate for an independent third party to be introduced into the 
joint venture by a Participant when other Participants desire to take up 
all or part of the Interest of the Participant on fair terms85. In 
addition, the Joint Operating Agreement will usually seek to ensure the 
indivisibility of the Interest of the Participant by seeking to guard 
against any assignment whereby rights and obligations under the Joint 
Operating Agreement would be split between different parties86. 
The Joint Operating Agreement may also seek to provide the 
opportunity for the other Participants, who have invested in the 
activities at the Exploration Phase at a time of high risk, to increase 
their respective percentage Interest in an area that may have turned out 
to be successful or to be highly prospective when a Participant is 
desirous of assigning all or part of its Interest. This may be so 
notwithstanding that they may have to pay a fair and reasonable price to 
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do so87. To this end the Joint Operating Agreement will not usually 
permit a Participant to assign all or part of its Interest to an 
independent third party without first allowing the other Participants the 
opportunity to acquire the Interest or part thereof sought to be assigned 
and without the consent of the other Participants 
88. 
3.2 First right of acquisition 
The Joint Operating Agreements will usually require a Participant 
desirous of assigning all or part of its Interest to an independent third 
party to allow the other Participants the opportunity to acquire the 
Interest, or part thereof, before it is assigned to the independent third 
party89. A wide variety of mechanisms have been developed by which the 
first right of acquisition operates90. However, it is possible to 
discern a pattern in the various mechanisms: - 
(i) it matters not how the desire to assign the Interest or 
part thereof arose, be it voluntary, compulsory, solicited or 
otherwise 
91; 
(ii) the Participant desirous to assign its Interest or part 
thereof ("the transferor") must notify the other Participants 
of the terms and conditions upon which it desires to assign its 
Interest or part thereof92; 
(iii) the other Participants have the 
time-period, to notify the transferor 
transferee") desire to acquire the In 
the same or similar (in the financial 
conditions 
93; 
right, within a given 
of their ("the 
terest or part thereof on 
sense) terms and 
(iv) if there is more than one transferee, the transferees 
must either acquire the Interest or part thereof in proportion 
to the total proportion of their Interests or in such other 
proportions as they may themselves agree94; 
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(v) the transferee must acquire the whole of the Interest or 
part thereof that the transferor is desirous of assigning95; 
(vi) if the other Participants do not give notice to acquire 
the Interest or part thereof within the limited time period, 
the transferor is free to assign the Interest or part thereof, 
within a limited time period, to the independent third party on 
terms no more favourable to the independent third party than 
those contained in the notice given by the transferor to the 
other Participants 
96; 
and 
(vii) the right to assign the Interest or part thereof to the 
independent third party is not unfetted in that no assignment 
of the Interest or part thereof to the third party will be 
effective or binding upon the other Participants unless the 
assignment has the written consent of the other 
Participants97 and there has been compliance with the general 
requirements discussed later in this chapter98. 
The Joint Operating Agreement may except, from the operation of the 
first right of acquisition mechanism, a proposed assignment of all or part 
of the Interest of a Participant to the other Participants. 
Once again, an interesting factor common to most Joint Operating 
Agreements, is that no attempt is made to control the transfer of 
ownership or control of a Participant. A transfer of ownership or control 
of a Participant does not usually trigger the first right of acquisition 
99 
mechanism 
The first right of acquisition mechanism is not always seen as being 
commercially favourable100 The existence of such a right can have the 
effect of considerably depressing the price that an independent third 
party is willing to offer for all or part of the Interest of a 
Participant. The independent third party may not be prepared to spend the 
time, effort and money involved in properly investigating and evaluating 
the Interest or part thereof which may be necessary for it to obtain an 
idea as to the value of the Interest or part thereof and in negotiating 
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terms and conditions acceptable to the Participant and itself. This is 
largely because there is no guarantee that its offer will be successful. 
What is more, the independent third party will be aware that its offer may 
only serve to indicate to the other Participants a fair market price to be 
paid for all or part of the Interest of the Participant. A further 
disincentive to the independent third party may also be the time period 
that must elapse before the first right of acquisition granted to the 
other Participants lapses. 
To overcome this difficulty, the first right of acquisition mechanism 
may be altered to provide that there need not be an offer from an 
independent third party before the mechanism is triggered. The 
Participant may merely indicate a desire to assign all or part of its 
Interest. The other Participants are then given the right to acquire the 
Interest or part thereof on the terms and conditions stipulated by the 
Participant. If the other Participants do not desire to acquire the 
Interest or part thereof on the terms and conditions stipulated, the 
Participant is free to assign the Interest or part thereof to an 
independent third party on terms and conditions no more favourable to the 
101 
independent third party then those stipulated by the Participant 
3.3 Consent of the other Participants 
As has been mentioned above, any assignment by a Participant of all 
or part of its Interest to an independent third party will usually require 
the consent of the other Participants. It is usual to provide that such 
consent can be either: - 
(i) withheld at the absolute unfetted discretion of the other 
Participants; 
(ii) withheld where it is reasonable to do so; or 
(iii) withheld only where certain criteria have been satisfied. 
The first type of provision is rarely seen in Joint Operating 
Agreements in this day and age. Apart from other matters which may have 
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resulted in the fading from the scene of the absolute right of the other 
Participants to withhold consent to an assignment, by a Participant to an 
independent third party of an Interest or part thereof, it is suggested 
that the major reason for this fading is to be found in the reluctance of 
the courts to enforce provisions that would, in effect, restrain the right 
of a Participant to alienate all or part of its Interest. This is more 
the case where proprietary rights are concerned than where contractual 
rights are concerned. The doctrine of restraint on alienation is 
discussed later in this chapter. 
The Apea proforma provides an example of the second type of provision 
10 
by stating that such "consent shall not unreasonably be withheld"2 
Where the other Participants have a first right of acquisition as 
well as a right to withhold their consent to any assignment by a 
Participant of all or part of its Interest, it will be difficult to 
establish that such consent has been withheld where it is reasonable to do 
so if the other Participants have failed to exercise the first right of 
acquisition 
103 
What is reasonable in a particular case will depend on the 
surrounding facts and circumstances. There can be little doubt that 
consent can be withheld where the independent third party cannot 
demonstrate that it has the knowledge applicable to the activity being or 
to be undertaken (lack of which may frustrate or restrain the exploration 
programme) or the financial resources to meet its contributions to an 
approved programme, budget or otherwise in relation to the activities 
being or to be undertaken 
104 
or, where the admission of the independent 
third party as a Participant would damage the commercial interests of the 
other Participants105 
The other Participants are not bound to give reasons for refusing 
consent 
106 
However, a court may imply that consent is withheld in 
circumstances where it is not reasonable to do so if no reasons for a 
refusal are given 
107 
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The Britoil proforma provides an example of the third type of 
provision by stating that such: - 
"consent may only be withheld on grounds of lack of financial 
responsibility and capability of the proposed assignee to discharge 
the obligations under this agreement as they relate to the interest 
to be assigned"108 
This type of provision considerably restrains the other Participants 
when considering whether to grant consent to the assignment. 
If the Participant is of the opinion that consent has been withheld 
without satisfying the test of reasonableness in the second type of 
provision or the criteria in the third type of provision, it can bring an 
action for a declaration that it is entitled to assign without consent. 
The onus of establishing that consent has been withheld in such 
circumstance would be on the Participant which is bringing the 
109 
action 
Once again, an interesting factor common to most Joint Operating 
Agreements is that there is no attempt made to control the transfer of 
ownership or control of a Participant. A transfer of ownership or control 
of a Participant does not usually require the consent of the other 
Participants110 However, as discussed above, in Great Britain the 
model clauses do give to the Secretary of State for Energy certain powers 
in relation to the transfer of ownership or control of a Participant. 
4. THE DOCTRINE OF RESTRAINT ON ALIENATION AND THE RULE AGAINST 
PERPETUITIES 
As has been discussed above, the Interest of a Participant is an 
amalgum of proprietary and contractual rights. In the context of the 
right of a Participant to assign all or part of its Interest to an 
independent third party it is necessary to examine the attitude of the 
courts to restraints on the alienation of proprietary interests and 
contractual interests. For the purpose of this examination it is presumed 
that there is no statutory restriction upon the right of a Participant to 
assign all or part of its Interest to an independent third party and, as 
such, all that is being examined is any restraint as between the 
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Participants inter se. Any statutory restraint would, in most cases, 
overcome the issues discussed below. 
4.1 Proprietary Rights 
4.1.1 Contractual Restrictions 
The general position of the courts of England on restraints on the 
alienation of real property is to be found in the judgement of Fry L. J. in 
Stogdon v Lee 
ill 
_ 
"It must be borne in mind that the Courts have always leaned against 
a restraint on alienation, and for this very obvious reason, that to 
give property to a person involves giving him a power to alienate it, 
and an instrument which, while giving property, takes away that 
incident to it must always be construed strictly. " 
In re Rosher. Rosher v Rosher112 Pearson J. said: - 
"I find that the original rule which says that you cannot annex to a 
gift in fee simple a condition which is repugnant to that gift is a 
plain and intelligible rule. " 
In re Elliot. Kelly v Elliot113 Chitty J. held: - 
"The owner of property has as an incident of his ownership the right 
to sell and to receive the whole of the proceeds for his own 
benefit. But this testator says that if the owner sells a part only 
of the proceeds shall belong to her, and the residue shall go to 
other persons. This direction is, I think repugnant and void. " 
In re Forder. Forder v Forder114 Sargant L. J. said: - 
"" it is impossible to give the ownership of property to a person 
in possession, and at the same time to direct that he shall not have 
the ordinary rights and incidents of ownership, that he shall not be 
able to dispose of it, and that it shall not vest in his trustee in 
bankruptcy. " 
In re Dugdale. Dugdale v Dugdale115 Kay J. said: - 
"The general law is that a defeasance, either by condition or by 
conditional limitation or executory devise, cannot be well limited to 
take effect in derogation, not merely of the right of alienation, but 
of any of the natural incidents of the estate which it is intended to 
divest. ... The events upon which the executory devise 
in this case 
is to take effect seem to be, 1. alienation, and 2. bankruptcy, or 
judgement and execution. The alienation contemplated is any 
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alienation whatever by the devisee, not limited in any way. This is 
clearly invalid. " 
A similar approach has been taken in respect of personal property, as 
is illustrated by the judgement of the Master of the Rolls (Sir R. P. 
Arden) in Bradley v Peixoto 
116 
(where the court was dealing with the 
disposition of bank stock): - 
"I have looked into the cases, that have been mentioned; and 
find it laid down as a rule long ago established, that where there is 
a gift with a condition inconsistent with and repugnant to such gift, 
the condition is wholly void ... In all these cases the gift stands, 
and the condition or exception is rejected. " 
In Metcalfe v Metcalfe 
117 
Kekewich J. said in relation to 
absolute gifts of personal property: - 
"You cannot limit an estate to a man and his heirs until he shall 
conveny the land to a stranger, because it is of the essence of an 
estate in fee that it confers free power of alienation, and it has 
long been settled that the same principle is applicable to gifts of 
personalty. " 
It may, therefore, be said that in so far as the courts of England 
are concerned it is a well established principle that an estate of 
inheritance in real property or an absolute gift of personal property, 
cannot be restrained from alienation by its owner 
118. 
It would appear 
that the principle applies only to conditions subsequent attached to the 
estate granted119 The general principle is said to be based on the 
proposition that to attempt to deprive, either directly or indirectly, 
ownership of real or personal property of its essential incidents, is 
contrary to public policy and, being contrary to public policy, such an 
attempt is void 
120 
In view of the general principle of the doctrine of restraint on 
alienation, whether it be a direct restraint on the right to exercise the 
power of alienation or an indirect restraint on the same by, say, creating 
a future interest in property in such a manner as to suspend the power of 
alienation for an unreasonable period 
12l, 
the question of exceptions to 
the general principle must be considered to see whether a first right of 
acquisition amounts to a direct or indirect fetter on the power of 
alienation. In other words, is it possible to have a partial restraint on 
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alienation which will not be rendered void? 
A consideration of the issue of partial restraints on alienation 
involves a consideration of three types of restraint: - 
(i) restraints as to the class of individuals to whom alienation 
may be made; 
(ii) restraints as to the mode of alienation; and 
(iii) restraints as to the time at which alienation may be effected. 
In In re Macleay122 Jessel M. R. said: - 
"Now, you may restrict alienation in many ways. You may 
restrict alienation by prohibiting a particular class of alienation, 
or you may restrict alienation by prohibiting it to a particular 
class of individuals, or you may restrict alienation by restricting 
it to a particular time. In all those ways you may limit it, ... " 
having earlier in his judgement held123 that it was possible to restrain 
the power of alienation provided that the restraint was a partial 
restraint: - 
"So that, according to Littleton, the test is, does it take away all 
power of alienation? " 
and 124__ 
"So that, according to the old books, Sheppard's Touchstone being to 
the same effect, the test is whether the condition takes away the 
whole power of alienation substantially: it is a question of 
substance, and not of mere form. " 
Although the decision of Jessel M. R. was criticised by Pearson J. in 
In re Rosher. Rosher v Rosher125 it would appear that provided the 
restraint on alienation does not amount to a total restraint, that is, it 
is a partial restraint, such would not be held to be void as being against 
public policy. The question of to what extent a restraint on alienation 
is partial or total is a question of degree in each case. However, from 
the decision in In re Macleay126, it is possible to illustrate what 
- 314 - 
Jessel M. R. had in mind, particularly in relation to a restraint as to the 
class of individuals to whom alienation may be effected: - 
(i) A provision that a proprietor shall not alienate to anyone is 
void; 
(ii) A provision that a proprietor shall not alienate to a stated 
person or class of persons is not void as it does not take away the 
power to alienate; 
(iii) A provision that a proprietor shall only alienate to a stated 
person or class of persons with the knowledge that the person or 
class of persons will not or cannot acquire the property is void as 
it is achieving indirectly what cannot be achieved directly; a total 
restraint on alienation. In Muschamp v B1uet127, Bridgman, J. 
said: 
"... I conceive that the condition is void; for to restrain 
generally, and that he shall not alien to any but to J. S. is all one: 
for them the feoffer may restrain him from aliening to any except to 
himself, or such other person by name, whom he may well know cannot, 
nor never will, purchase the land : so that this condition shall take 
away all his power, and shall make a perpetuity in the feoffee, which 
is quite contrary to law, neither is there any authority to warrant 
this restraint... " 
And in Attwater v Attwater128 the Master of the Rolls said: - 
"The question is, whether such a condition is a valid one? 
Notwithstanding the case of Doe d. Gill v Pearson (6 East 173), 
this appears to me to be a condition repugnant to the quality of the 
estate given. It is obvious, that if the introduction of one 
person's name, as the only person to whom the property may be sold, 
renders such a proviso valid, a restraint on alienation may be 
created, as complete and perfect as if no person whatever was named; 
inasmuch as the name of a person, who alone is permitted to purchase, 
might be so selected, as to render it reasonably certain that he 
would not buy the property, and that the property could not be 
aliened at all. " 
(iv) Subject to (iii) above, a provision that a proprietor shall 
only alienate to a stated person or class of persons is not void as 
it does not take away the power to alienate 
129 
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As to a restraint on the modes of alienation, it is really a process 
of working backwards from an absolute prohibition on any assignment, legal 
or equitable, to a prohibition on one or more of the modes of disposal. 
130 
fessel M. R., in In re Macleay, made comment on this issue: - 
"... in two ways, at all events, this condition is limited. First, 
it is limited as to the mode of alienation, because the only 
prohibition is against selling. There are various modes of 
alienation besides sale; a person may lease, or he may mortgage, or 
he may settle; therefore it is a mere limited restriction on 
alienation in that way. " 
The implication to be drawn from the judgement is that an absolute 
restraint as to all of the modes of alienation is void as is a provision 
which, although appearing to allow a mode or modes of alienation, is, in 
effect, an absolute restraint as to all of the modes of alienation. 
However, a prohibition on a mode or modes of alienation that does not 
amount in theory and in fact to an absolute restrain on alienation will be 
13 
valid, as was the case in In re Macleay1 
Restraint on alienation imposed by time has been mentioned in the 
context of the discussion above and the issue of the rule against 
perpetuities will be discussed later in this chapter. As such it is not 
necessary to state anything further in relation thereto at this juncture 
other than that a provision that amounts to a restraint on alienation is 
not made good by being limited in respect of time as to how long the 
restraint is to be operative. In In re Rosher. Rosher v Rosher132 
Pearson J. said the question he had to consider was: - 
"... is it or is it not the law that to a devise in fee simple you 
may annex a condition that during a limited period the devisee shall 
not sell at all? " 
After severely criticising 
Macleay133, whilst admitti 
obiter134, Pearson J. went 
restrained the time within 
the judgement of Jessel M. R. in In re 
ng that much of his criticism was 
on to hold 
135 
that a condition that 
which or before which absolute alienation could 
be made was void. 
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It is not necessary for the purpose of this thesis to consider the 
merits of the judicial argument between the judgements of Jessel M. R. and 
Pearson J. as it is most uncommon for a restraint on alienation of all or 
part of an Interest to be restricted by a time limitation. It is the 
restrictions as to class of individuals and mode of alienation that are 
prevalent in Joint Operating Agreements. It is interesting to note that 
in In re Dugdale. Dugdale v Dugdale136 Kay J. referred to the 
conflicting dicta of the two protagonists on the question of limitation as 
to time and, whilst accepting that a "total restriction of alienation for 
a limited time may be good"137 and "that there is no decision to this 
effect"138 and as such the doctrine might be doubtful, made no attempt 
to decide the issue by adopting in whole or in part the rationale of 
either judge. 
What must be guarded against is the approach which seeks to take each 
issue in isolation. A court will look at the overall effect of the 
provision, all of the issues of restraint and, judge whether or not as an 
amalgum, the issues give rise to a restraint on alienation that is so 
substantial as to be void as against public policy. There is more 
likelihood of a partial restraint on alienation being held to be valid if 
the purpose for the provision is a collateral purpose, such as in the case 
of a first right of acquisition, which confers a benefit upon both the 
holder and the grantor of the right. 
In arriving at the above conclusion, due cognizance is taken of the 
dicta in Hall v Busst139 and the fact that all the members of the High 
Court of Australia did not reach the same conclusion. This decision is 
discussed in more detail later in this chapter. It is submitted that it 
is a fair summary of the provisions under consideration by the High Court 
to say that what was, in effect, provided was a first right of 
acquisition. If the participant wished to dispose of the property it had 
first to be offered to the other participant who had a given time within 
which to either agree to purchase the property or not. There was concern 
about the drafting of the various clauses but this does not detract from 
the rationale of the dicta. 
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Dixon C. J., by holding the right to be unenforceable per se as it was 
140 
void for lack of certainty, did not have to consider whether such a 
right was a restraint on alienation. However, in holding that the right 
was of a recurring nature, that is, 
consent to a sale to a third party, 
if not exercised it did not imply 
so that the participant having the 
benefit of the right, in effect, by not exercising it, retained the right, 
Dixon C. J. said141 
"The conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing considerations 
as to the meaning of [the clauses] is that an indefinite prohibition 
is intended of alienation without consent of the fee simple of the 
land or any part of it and of the creation of any less estate or 
interest therein whether legal or equitable. " 
Other members of the High Court took the view that the right was not 
of a recurring nature, that is, if the participant failed to exercise it 
its consent to the sale to the third party was to be implied. 
Fullagar J. held that notwithstanding that the right was available 
only once, it amounted to a restraint on alienation 
142 
"But I am of opinion that the restriction, even so construed, 
is void. " 
Fullagar J's reasoning was based on the fact that in Attwater v 
Attwater143 In re Rosher. Rosher v Rosher144 and Crofts v 
Beamish145 and notwithstanding In re Elliot. Kelly v Elliot 
146, 
provisions of partial restraint were held to be void. In re 
Macleay147 is not distinguished as such, although it is put aside, due 
to the criticism of the judgement by Pearson J. It is difficult to accept 
that Fullagar J's. analysis is correct. The cases are not necessarily 
clearly in support of the proposition he draws from them. The cases deal 
with the class to whom alienation may be effected. This is different in 
degree from what was at issue. 
However, if the first right of acquisition is such as to create a 
restraint on alienation in that it confers no benefit on the grantor, such 
will be void as a restraint on alienation. This is clearly illustrated by 
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the decision of Pearson J. in In re Rosher. Rosher v Rosher148 _ 
of The restriction upon selling is this, that if the son ... is 
minded to sell during the lifetime of the testator's widow, the 
estate intended to be sold, whether it is the whole or only part of 
the devised estates, must be offered to the widow at the price of 
£3,000 for the whole, or at a proportionate price for a part. It is 
agreed that the value of the whole estate at the death of the 
testator was £15,000. It is, therefore, in effect a condition that, 
if the son desires to sell, he shall offer the estates to the widow, 
and that she is to be at liberty to buy them at one-fifth of their 
value. I consider that (and I mean to decide the case upon that 
conclusion) as an absolute restraint against sale during the life of 
the widow. I mean to treat it as if it had been, "during the life of 
the widow you shall not sell, " because to compel him, if he does 
sell, to sell at one-fifth of the value, and to throw away 
four-fifths of the value of the estate is, to my mind, equivalent to 
a restraint upon selling at all. " 
The general position of the courts of Australia on restraints on 
alienation of property, although encompassing the approach of the courts 
of England, would seem to be wider than that of the courts of England. It 
would appear that the law has been widened to apply to contractual 
covenants in restraint of alienation 
149 
Despite some criticism of the decision, the leading Australian case 
is Hall v Busst150 This case dealt with the provisions of a contract 
for the sale and purchase of real estate. Clause 3 of the contract 
provided that the purchaser: - 
"shall not at any time transfer assign set over or lease any part of 
the said lands (other than by way of mortgage to a banking 
institution) without the consent in writing of the [vendor] first 
obtained. " 
Clause 4 of the contract required one month's notice to be given of 
any intention to deal with the real estate in the manner provided in 
clause 3 of the contract, during which notice period: - 
"... the [Purchaser] Doth Hereby Give and Grant to the [Vendor] the 
first option of purchasing the said fee simple 
Clause 5 of the contract stated that the purchase price relating to 
the option was fixed at the sum of £3,157 4s. Od. to which was to be added 
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the value of all additions and improvements to the real estate since the 
15 date of purchase and from which certain deductions were to be made1 
Dixon C. J. held 
152 
it But the question arises whether, considered as an obligation 
binding the purchaser ... cl. 3 
is not void as an attempt wholly to 
restrain alienation. It could not of course bind an alienee once an 
alienation was made: for the alienee would not be a party to the 
contract: and ex hypothesi we are not concerned with any question of 
the effect it might have upon the land in the hands of a alienee not 
taking for value without notice. But we are concerned with a 
contract always operating upon the defendant and her "estate", that 
is, upon her legal personal representatives (upon whom the land may 
devolve) until an alienation occurs. The question whether a bond or 
covenant or contract purporting to impose a total contractual 
restraint upon alienation is void does not seem to be settled. A 
condition doing so attached as a condition subsequent to an estate is 
of course void. The invalidity may be put on the ground of repugancy 
to the grant or upon public policy or for that matter it may 
conceivably be attributed to an indirect effect of Quia Emptores. 
That is immaterial, for it is a known rule that the condition is 
void. But with contractual restraints there is no fetter upon 
alienation which does more than sound in damages, that is, unless a 
doctrine of equity intervenes to make it bind the land. 
... The ground for denying the validity of a contractual restriction 
upon alienation is that it is a principle of law that private 
property should be fully alienable. See per Jessel M. R. in In re 
Ridley: Buckton v Hay [(1879) 11 Ch. D. 648] and Sweet (1917) 33 
L. Q. R. 236. Cruise, 2 Dig. p. 6, in effect expresses a view that a 
contractual restriction upon the alienation of an absolute estate is 
if unqualified should be considered void and this seems to accord 
with modern views of policy. Cruise, after referring to the supposed 
distinction between a condition and a covenant or contract, says 
this: "This doctrine appears extremely questionable, as it offers an 
obvious mode of restraining a person from those rights over an estate 
which the common law gives him; consequently of frustrating the 
common law, as fully as if a condition of this kind were allowed to 
be inserted in a conveyance of land; and in some cases it appears not 
to have been allowed. " Indeed it is impossible to doubt that a 
fetter on alienation may be imposed by covenant which is as effective 
over a very long period of time to prevent alienation of land as a 
condition subsequent would have been had it been valid. I think 
therefore that cl. 3 should be considered void as an independent 
restraint on alienation. ... " 
Fullagar J. held153: _ 
"... the restraint on alienation imposed by cl. 3 of the deed on the 
owner of the fee simple is repugnant to the estate and void. 
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It seems a little strange that, in all the cases in which 
restrictions of this character have been considered, the restriction 
has been imposed by way of condition. The restriction in the present 
case is imposed not by way of condition or conditional limitation but 
by covenant. I agree, however with the Chief Justice, whose 
judgement I have had the advantage of reading, that, for the reasons 
given by him, the principle applicable to a condition or a 
conditional limitation must be equally applicable to a covenant by a 
transferee of a fee simple. The outstanding question then is whether 
the covenant in the present case so restricts alienation that it is 
void at common law. The first step must be to construe the deed 
which contains the covenant. 
If cl. 3 stood alone, I should say that it would be obviously 
void, for it is absolute in terms: consent could, of course, be 
withheld at will - for any reason or no reason at all. ... " 
Kitto J. held154: _ 
"Whether the clause [clause 3] would be void as against public policy 
if it were construed as imposing an unqualified prohibition upon 
alienation by the appellant or her representatives without the 
consent of the respondent or his representatives, is a question upon 
which I express no opinion. " 
Menzies J. held155: _ 
"Standing along by itself, cl. 3 is certain enough and it seems to me 
that it is valid unless it is void as an unlawful restraint upon 
alienation. I agree with the Chief Justice and Fullagar J. that cl. 
3 is an unlawful restraint upon alienation, and to the reasons which 
they give for treating a covenant in restraint of alienation in the 
same way as a condition in restraint of alienation ... 
" 
The final member of the High Court of Australia, Windeyer J., said156: _ 
"The next question ... 
is whether cl. 3 of the deed may not be void 
as repugnant to the freeholder's right of alienation ... It 
is enough 
for me to say that if I construed the deed as the Chief Justice does 
I would respectfully agree that it is void for the fundamental 
reasons that he gives. I have, however, with much hesitation, come 
to a different conclusion as to the meaning of the deed. " 
The members of the High Court in Hall v Busst157, except Kitto J. 
who expressed no opinion, had no difficulty in holding that a contractual 
covenant which restrained the alienation of property could be void158 
The provisions of a Joint Operating Agreement which provide that the prior 
consent of the other Participants is required before a Participant can 
assign all or part of its Interest to an independent third party is, 
therefore, an example of a contractual covenant which seeks to act as a 
restraint on alienation 
159 
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The question must, therefore, be asked is whether, if the first right 
of acquisition mechanism discussed above can be construed as a contractual 
covenant which acts as a restraint on alienation, such could be void. 
In Hall v-Busst160" the minority161 considered the contract for 
the sale and purchase of the real estate as a whole and held that the 
intention of the vendor and purchaser, although somewhat unclear, was to 
give to the vendor the first right of acquisition over the real estate in 
the event of the purchaser desiring to sell it. The contract was, in 
162 
their view, valid and enforceable. 
Fullagar J. approached the issues in the same manner as the minority: 
by considering the contrast as a whole. However, His Honour went on to 
hold that the first right of acquisition was void for being a restraint on 
alienation. A prime reason for this view was that the real estate might 
have been worth a great deal more at the relevant time than the purchase 
price fixed by the terms of the first right of acquisition 
163 
The other members of the majority164 did not consider the contract 
as a whole. Their Honours focused attention on the clause which 
prohibited the disposal of the real estate without the prior consent of 
the vendor. They did not view the clause as being a first right of 
acquisition, but as a contractual restraint on alienation, which was 
165 
void 
It is arguable that all first rights of acquisition are a restraint 
on alienation. Nevertheless, not all such rights should be held to be 
void. If it is accepted that the aim of the doctrine is that the right of 
the owner of property to freely alienate that property should not be taken 
away then it is a case of examining the terms of the first right of 
acquisition to see whether it breaches the doctrine166 As was pointed 
out by Sweet 
167 
:- 
"A restraint on alienation may be good, if it is imposed, not for the 
purpose of making the property inalienable, but in order to effect an 
object which is itself lawful. " 
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Applying the views expressed in Hall v Busst168 to the Joint 
Operating Agreement, it is considered unlikely that the first right of 
acquisition mechanism discussed above would be construed as a contractual 
covenant which acts as a restraint on alienation by a Participant of all 
or part of its Interest so as to be void, provided that the price payable 
upon exercise of the first right of acquisition does not depart materially 
from the value of the proprietary rights to be assignedl69 A price 
which departs materially from the value of the proprietary right would 
indicate that the first right of acquisition was granted to the other 
Participants for other than a valid collateral purpose. Such a price 
would be a powerful restraint on alienation and would tend to evidence the 
purpose of the restraint as being to make the Interest of the Participant 
170 
inalienable 
Therefore, setting aside material departure from the value of the 
proprietary rights to be assigned, it is arguable that the purpose of a 
first right of acquisition is to ensure the stability, financial or 
otherwise, of the Participants 
171. 
The first right of acquisition is a 
necessary point of commercial life in so far as a joint venture 
established to undertake the Exploration Phase is concerned: the identity 
of the Participants is most important. The aim of the doctrine of 
restraint on alienation is not breached: the purpose of the first right of 
acquisition mechanism is not to make the Interest of the Participant 
unalienable. --l) 
One of the difficulties with a first right of acquisition is its 
enforcement. Such a right may be enforced by injunction before 
breach172, that is, prior to completion of the assignment by the 
Participant to an independent third party with notice of the first right 
of acquisition. In the absence of injunction, an independent third party 
may acquire all or part of the Interest of a Participant in breach of the 
first right of acquisition and notwithstanding that the independent third 
party had notice of that right 
173, 
unless there is a restraint which is 
incidental to the conferring of the interest of the independent third 
party in all or part of the Interest of the Participant or the acquisition 
of all or part of the Interest of the Participant by the independent third 
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party depends upon some form of registration or consent 
174: 
as in the 
case with the petroleum title interest. Even where such a restraint or 
such dependence does exist, it may be possible to separate beneficial 
enjoyment of all or part of the Interest of the Participant from legal 
title and as such have the independent third party obtain an equitable 
interest in the Interest of the Participant that is assigned to it175. 
If it is desired by the Participants that a Participant not be in a 
position to separate beneficial enjoyment of all or part of its Interest 
from legal title, the prohibition against assignment must be 
comprehensively drawn and so drawn as to confer an interest on the other 
Participants that will survive the breach of the prohibition against 
176 
assignment 
Assignment in breach of the terms of the Joint Operating Agreement 
may therefore amount to nothing more than breach of a warranty which will 
give rise to a claim for damages as against the Participant. The breach 
will not invalidate the assignment and nor will it give rise to a remedy 
which would allow the other Participants to exercise a first right of 
177 
acquisition as against the independent third party . 
4.1.2 Proprietory Restrictions 
In In re Ridley. Buckton v Hay178 Jessel M. R. said: - 
"In the first place, the law of this country says that all 
property shall be alienable; but there has been one exception to that 
general law, for restraint on anticipation or alienation was allowed 
in the case of a married woman. 
Then there was another rule, also invented by the Chancellors, 
in analogy to the common law. That was an invention of a different 
kind from the other, and was this time in favour of alienation and 
not against it. The law does not recognise dispositions which would 
practically make property inalienable for ever ... That 
is called 
the rule against perpetuities. This rule, therefore, was established 
directly in favour of alienation: it merely carried out the principle 
of law that property is alienable. " 
A proprietary restriction on the alienation of property by its owner, 
such as an option to purchase, does not suffer the problems mentioned 
. However, 
in so far as above in relation to contractual restrictions79 
1 
a joint venture established to undertake the Exploration Phase is 
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concerned, the rule against perpetuities will apply to any proprietary 
18 
restrictions involving contingent rather than vested rights0 
The rule of perpetuities can be summarised in two propositions as 
follows 
181 
(i) any future interest in any real or personal property is void 
from the outset if it may possibly vest after the perpetuity period 
has lapsed; and 
(ii) the perpetuity period consists of any life or lives in being 
together with a further period of twenty one years and any period of 
gestation. 
This rule, like the doctrine of restraint on alienation, evolved from 
the common law to ensure that private property remained freely alienable. 
4.1.2.1 The rule against perpetuities - common law 
The rule against perpetuities applies to interests182 in real and 
personal property183. If a contract does not create an interest in 
property, the rule against perpetuities has no application 
184 
The question must, therefore, be asked whether the first right of 
acquisition mechanism discussed above creates an interest in the property 
over which it is granted and as such is subject to the rule against 
perpetuities185 
An option granted over property does create an equitable interest in 
that property. In London and South Western Railway Company v Gomm186 
Jessel M. R. explained why: - 
"The right to call for a conveyance of the land is an equitable 
interest or equitable estate. In the ordinary case of a contract for 
purchase there is no doubt about this, and an option for repurchase 
is not different in its nature. A person exercising the option has 
to do two things, he has to give notice of his intention to purchase, 
and to pay the purchase money; but as far as the man who is liable to 
convey is concerned, his estate or interest is taken away from him 
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without his consent, and the right to take it away being vested in 
another, the covenant giving the option must give that other an 
interest in the land. ". 
It is the factors mentioned by Jessel M. R. that distinguish an option 
and the first right of acquisition contained in a Joint Operating 
Agreement. 
The grantee of an option over property acquires a right to call for a 
conveyance of the property, without any further intervention by the 
grantor187. The obtaining of the property is completely within the 
grantee's power 
188. 
The grantee of a first right of acquisition acquires no right to call 
for a conveyance of the property. The grantee has: - 
189 
"a mere spes which the grantor of the right may either frustrate by 
choosing not to fulfil the necessary conditions or may convert into 
an option and thus into an equitable interest by fulfilling the 
conditions. "190 
This distinction was recognised by Goff L. J. in Pritchard v 
Briggs 
191. 
Goff L. J. stated that a first right of acquisition did not 
create an interest in the property over which it was given because it gave 
no present right, even a contingent one, to call for a conveyance of the 
property. The grantor of the right was free to decide for himself whether 
or not he wished to sell2 
The distinction was also recognised by Street J. in Mackay v 
Wilson 
193 
:- 
"Speaking generally, the giving of an option to purchase land prima 
facie implies that the giver of the option is to be taken as making a 
continuing offer to sell the land, which may at any moment be 
converted into a contract by the optionee notifying his acceptance of 
that offer. The agreement to give the option imposes a positive 
obligation on the prospective vendor to keep the offer open during 
the agreed period so that it remains available for acceptance by the 
optionee at any moment within that period. It is more than a mere 
contractual operation and confers upon the optionee an equitable 
interest in the land, the subject of the agreement: see, for example, 
per Williams J. N. Sharp v Union Trustee Company of Australia 
Limited. 
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"But an agreement to give "the first refusal" or "a right of 
pre-emption" confers no immediate right upon a prospective 
purchaser. It imposes a negative obligation on the possible vendor 
requiring him to refrain from selling the land to any other person 
without giving to the holder of the right of first refusal the 
opportunity of purchasing in preference to any other buyer. It is 
not an offer and in itself encloses no obligation on the owner of the 
land to sell the same. He may do so or not as he wishes. But if he 
does decide to sell, then the holder of the right of first refusal 
has the right to receive the first offer which he also may accept or 
not as he wishes. The right is merely contractual and no equitable 
interest in the land is created by the agreement. " 
The common law rule against perpetuity applies in the Australian 
Capital Territory, New South Wales, the Northern Territory, South 
Australia and Tasmania194. It also applies in Western Australia, other 
than with regard to options granted over property195, and in Queensland 
and Victoria, other than with regard to real property. 
It is submitted that, for the reasons discussed, the first right of 
acquisition mechanism discussed above does not create an interest in 
property and as such, at common law, the rule against perpetuities has no 
application to the first right of acquisition contained in a Joint 
Operating Agreement. 
4.1.2.2. Rule against perpetuities - Legislation 
Queensland has introduced legislation which deals with options 
granted over real property and first rights of acquisition 
196 
Victoria 
1 
has introduced very similar legislation97. Western Australia has 
introduced very similar legislation but only in respect of options granted 
198 
over property 
The legislation applies to make void after twenty-one years from the 
date of grant, options granted and first rights of acquisition in respect 
of real property 
199 
It is submitted that where all or part of the Interest of a 
Participant includes real property, the legislation will apply to a first 
right of acquisition in respect of that Interest200. The mere fact that 
the first right of acquisition is, in respect of other property, in 
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addition to real property does not mean that the right loses its character 
20 
as a first right of acquisition in respect of land1 
It is submitted that to the extent a Permit is not a right in respect 
of real property for the purpose of the legislation (and it is submitted 
that it is extremely doubtful whether a Permit is such a right), the first 
right of acquisition mechanism discussed above will not be subject to the 
rule against perpetuities as amended by the legislation. 
4.2 Contractual Rights 
The doctrine of restraint on alienation and the rule against 
perpetuities aside, where the Joint Operating Agreement seeks to place a 
restraint upon the capacity of a Participant to assign all or part of its 
contractual rights, the question is, how effective is such a restraint: if 
breached, is it enforceable? 
The answer to the question would appear to turn upon whether the 
Joint Operating Agreement calls for personal performance by the 
Participant. The question of whether the Joint Operating Agreement calls 
for personal performance by a Participant has been discussed above. From 
that discussion it would appear that if the Joint Operating Agreement does 
call for personal performance by the Participant, any purported assignment 
of all or part of a Participant's contractual rights in breach of the 
restraint would be void and inoperable unless the Joint Operating 
Agreement expressly provides for the assignment of such contractual 
rights202. However, if the Joint Operating Agreement, or the material 
aspects thereof, does not call for personal performance by the Participant 
the restraint may amount to nothing more than a warranty, the breach of 
which will give rise to a claim for damages as against the Participant but 
will not invalidate the assignment constituted by the breach203. The 
breach will not give rise to a remedy which would allow the other 
Participants to exercise a first right of acquisition as against the 
independent third party. 
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5. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS 
5.1 Consents and approvals 
Whether a Participant is assigning all or part of its Interest to an 
affiliate, the other Participants or an independent third party, in so far 
as the Interest is made up of a petroleum title interest, such assignment 
requires the consent or approval of, in the case of Great Britain, the 
Secretary of State for Energy204 or, in the case of Australia, the Joint 
20 
Authority5. The Joint Operating Agreement will usually make it a 
condition precedent of any such assignment or transfer that such consent 
or approval as is necessary be obtained206. This is, in part, because 
failure to obtain the necessary, consent or approval could jeopardize the 
entire petroleum title, not only the interest therein of the Participant, 
who may have purported to assign all or part of its Interest, in so far as 
the Interest is made up of a petroleum title interest207. 
In Great Britain the prohibition against assignment without the 
consent of the Secretary of State for Energy extends to equitable as well 
as legal assignments wheresoever entered into and whether under the law of 
part of the United Kingdom or of any other country or place 
208. 
Therefore, even if the Joint Operating Agreement does not restrict 
the equitable assignment by a Participant of all or part of its Interest, 
209 
such would require the consent of the Secretary of State for Energy . 
Any consent granted by the Secretary of State for Energy may be 
granted subject to conditions, in which case, any assignment must be 
210 
effected in accordance with the conditions 
One of the conditions that the Secretary of State for Energy has 
imposed in the past211 is a condition which precludes the assignment by 
a Participant of all or part of its Interest, in return for the assignee 
agreeing to do work of some kind on the acreage concerned, where the work 
to be done is the performance of any working obligation under the 
Licence212. Further, the Secretary of State for Energy has imposed in 
the past a condition which precludes the assignment, in such circumstances, 
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taking place until the work obligations under the Licence have actually 
been performed or, at least, all obligation wells have been 
spudded-in 
213 
What is more, in Great Britain, the terms of all documents giving 
effect to the assignment must be approved by the Secretary of State for 
Energy before entered into by the Participants214. The documents 
involved, in most cases, will be 
215 
_ 
(i) the contract between the assignor and assignee to effect the 
assignment; 
(ii) the assignment of the petroleum title interest, which is 
effected by the existing Participants assigning to themselves (other 
than the assigning Participant) and the assignee; 
(iii) the assignment of the property interest and the Joint Operating 
Agreement interest 
216; 
and 
(iv) the novation of the Joint Operating Agreement. 
Hence, there is a need for the consent of the Secretary of State for 
Energy to both the transaction and the terms of every document evidencing 
the transaction 
217. 
One effect of this is that the Secretary of State 
for Energy can control the adjustment by the Participants of their 
Interests inter se after the Licence has been granted218. 
The Secretary of State for Energy will be keen to be made a party to 
the document of assignment in respect of the Licence so as to have the 
assignee enter into direct covenants with him219. 
It is evident that the need for the consent of the Secretary of State 
for Energy to the assignment by a Participant of all or part of its 
Interest is very widely worded220. Broad though the power may be, it is 
not absolute221. In such circumstances, where there are no indications 
as to permissible reasons for withholding consent222, it is necessary 
for the Secretary of State for Energy to properly exercise the 
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discretionary power in conformity with natural justice and for a proper 
purpose223. It is submitted that if the Secretary of State for Energy 
were to use the need for consent to satisfy himself as to the good 
management and financial soundness of an assignee, such would be a valid 
exercise of the discretionary power224. 
In Australia, the position is a little more complex. The Petroleum 
(Submerged Lands) Act 1967 (C'th) distinguishes between the absolute 
transfer of a Permit225 and a dealing that would have one or more of the 
following effects: - 
(i) the creation or assignment of an interest in a Permit226; 
(ii) the creation or assignment of a right (conditional or 
227 
otherwise) to the assignment of an interest in a Permit ; 
(iii) the determining of the manner in which persons may exercise the 
rights conferred by, or comply with the obligations imposed by or the 
conditions of, a Permit228; 
(iv) the creation or assignment of an interest in relation to a 
Permit being an interest known as an overriding royalty interest, a 
production payment, a net profit interest or a carried interest229; 
(v) (a) the creation or assignment of an option (conditional or 
230 
otherwise) to enter into a dealing ; 
(b) the creation or assignment of a right (conditional or 
otherwise) to enter into a dealing231; and 
232 
(c) the alteration or termination of a dealing 
each such dealing being a dealing that has one or more of the effects 
referred to in (i), (ii), (iii), and (iv) above. 
Dealings of the nature discussed above are, in effect, dealings with 
legal or equitable interests in or affecting a Permit 
233 
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The transfer of a Permit is deemed to be of no force 
234 
until it 
has been 
235 
_ 
(i) approved by the Joint Authority; and 
(ii) an instrument of transfer has been registered. 
What is more, the mere execution of an instrument of transfer of a 
Permit creates no interest in the Permit236. That is, neither a legal 
nor equitable interest 
237. 
To transfer a Permit it is necessary for one of the participants to 
the transfer to make written application to the Designated Authority for 
approval by the Joint Authority to the transfer238. The application 
must be accompanied by 
239 
- 
(i) an instrument of transfer 
240 
executed by the Participants and 
by the transferee241; and 
(ii) if the transferee is not one of the Participants an instrument 
setting out the technical qualifications of242, details of the 
technical advise that is or will be available to 
243 
and details of 
the financial resources 
244 
that are or will be available to that 
transferee. 
The applications must have been lodged with the Designated Authority 
within three months245 after the day on which the last participant to 
246 
execute, executed the instrument of transfer. Failure to observe the 
time period will mean that the Joint Authority cannot approve the 
247 
transfer 
The Joint Authority is required to consider the application for 
approval of the transfer of the Permit and decide whether to approve the 
transfer248. In addition, the Joint Authority is required to determine 
whether approval of the transfer should be made subject to security being 
lodged by the transferee for compliance with the provisions of the 
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Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 (C'th), of the regulations 
249 
and 
of any conditions to which the Permit may, from time to time, be 
250 
subject 
Having considered the application and decided to approve the 
transfer, the Designated Authority must notify, in writing, to the person 
whom made the application, the Joint Authority's decision and must set out 
in the notice details of any security required to be lodged by the 
transferee251. Where security is required to be lodged, once the 
security has been lodged, the Joint Authority is deemed to have approved 
the transfer 
252. 
Where the Joint Authority approves the transfer of the Permit, upon 
the entry in the register maintained by the Designated Authority253 of a 
memorandum of the transfer of the Permit and of the name of the 
transferee254, the transfer is deemed registered255 and the transferee 
becomes the holder of the Permit256. Where the transfer is registered, 
the instrument of transfer, endorsed with the memorandum of approval, must 
be returned to the person who lodged the application for approval of the 
257 
transfer 
It is important to note that it is the transfer of the Permit (that 
is, the transaction) and not the instrument of transfer (that is, the 
instrument evidencing that transaction) to which the provisions of the 
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 (C'th) are addressed258. This is 
to be contrasted with the situation in Great Britain where it is both the 
transfer of the Licence and the instrument of transfer to which model 
clause 41 of Schedule 4 to the Petroleum (Production) (Seaward Areas) 
Regulations 1988 is addressed. 
Furthermore, the transfer need not be the absolute transfer of all 
the Interest of a Participant and as such the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) 
Act 1967 (C'th) contemplates the possibility of the transfer of a legal 
259 
interest in the Permit by way of security . 
A dealing of the type referred to above in relation to a Permit is 
- deemed to be of no force 
260 
until it has been 
261 
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(i) approved by the Joint Authority; and 
(ii) an entry has been made in the register maintained by the 
Designated Authority262 in relation to the dealing. 
To give effect to a dealing of the type referred to above, it is 
necessary for one of the participants to the dealing to lodge with the 
Designated Authority a written application for approval by the Joint 
Authority to the dealing263, The application must be accompanied 
by264 the instrument evidencing the dealing265 and an instrument 
setting out such particulars (if any) as are prescribed for the purpose of 
an application for approval of a dealing of that type266. There is no 
requirement that the instrument evidencing the dealing be executed by all 
26 
the participants of the dealing7. 
The application must have been lodged with the Designated Authority 
within three months268 after the day on which the last participant to 
26 
execute, executed the instrument evidencing the dealing9. Failure to 
observe the time period will mean that the Joint Authority cannot approve 
the dealing 
270. 
The Joint Authority may approve or refuse to approve a dealing271. 
The Designated Authority must notify in writing, to the person whom made 
the application for approval of a dealing, the Joint Authority's 
decision 
272. 
Where the Joint Authority approves a dealing, the Designated 
Authority must enter the approval of the dealing in the register273 
maintained by it, on the memorial relating to the Permit in respect of 
which the approval was sought, endorse the inst ument evidencing the 
dealing274, and return the endorsed instrument t the person whom made 
27 
the application, for approval5. 
Once again it is the dealing (that is, the transaction) and not the 
instrument evidencing the transaction to which the provisions of the 
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 (C'th) are addressed. 
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In accordance with the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 
(C'th) 
276 
the decisions of the Designated Authority and the Joint 
Authority are not capable of review by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. 
It would appear that to the extent that there is to be an assignment 
of all or part of the Interest of a Participant, it would be possible to 
effect the assignment under either section 78 or section 81 of the 
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 (C'th). However, if all the 
Participants do not join in the instrument of transfer, the assignment can 
only be affected under section 81 of the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 
2 
1967 (C'th)77. 
5.2 Acceptance and assumption of obligations 
Whether a Participant is assigning all or part of its Interest to an 
affiliate, the other Participants or an independent third party, such 
assignment is usually not to be effective unless and until the assignee 
has executed a covenant in form and content satisfactory to and in favour 
of the other Participants to accept, assume, observe and perform all the 
obligations under the petroleum title and the Joint Operating Agreement of 
the Participant in so far as the Interest or part thereof assigned is 
concerned 
278. 
5.3 Costs and expenses 
Whether a Participant is assigning all or part of its Interest to an 
affiliate, the other Participants or an independent third party, the 
costs, stamp duty, transfer taxes279 and other expenses of the 
assignment or transfer are the obligation of either the participants to 
the transaction280 or the Participant assigning all or part of its 
Interest281. It is clearly the intention of the Joint Operating 
Agreement that the other Participants shall not be required to bear any 
282 
part of such costs, stamp duty, transfer taxes and other expenses 
V 
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5.4 Minimum Interest 
The Joint Operating Agreement may prohibit the assignment of part of 
the Interest of a Participant where to do so would result in a large 
number of Participants holding relatively small percentage Interests283 
5.5 Assignment of Interest in part only of the area to which the 
petroleum title relates 
The Joint Operating Agreement may only permit the assignment by a 
Participant of all or part of its Interest in so far as it relates to the 
whole of the area to which the petroleum title relates. This would 
prevent a Participant assigning all or part of its Interest in so far as 
it relates to part only of the area to which the petroleum title relates 
and, as such, create two joint ventures for the different areas with 
different Participants holding different percentage Interests284. 
6. FURTHER ACTION 
The Joint Operating Agreement will usually provide that where a 
Participant desires to assign all or part of its Interest, and the 
consent, if necessary, of the other Participants to the assignment has 
been granted, the other Participants shall join in such reasonable actions 
as may be necessary or desirable to obtain any consents or approvals, 
including, in the case of Great Britain, that of the Secretary of State 
for Energy and, in the case of Australia, that of the Joint 
Authority285. Furthermore, the other Participants will usually be 
required to execute and deliver any and. all documents reasonably necessary 
to effect the assignment286. 
The action taken by the other Participants are to be at the cost and 
expense of the participants to the transaction 
287. 
In Offshore Oil N. L. v Gulf Resources N. L. 
288 it was held that 
such provisions related to matters affecting the Interest itself. They 
did not extend to private dealings in the Interest in that the provisions 
could not be invoked to force the consent of the other Participants to an 
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assignment of all or part of an Interest. 
7. CONTINUING OBLIGATIONS 
The distinction between assignment and novation has been discussed 
above in this chapter, as has the issue of assigning the burden of a 
contract. It is not proposed to repeat that discussion here. However, 
the issues are of equal application to the matters discussed here. 
Notwithstanding that a Participant may assign all or part of its 
Interest to an affiliate, the other Participants or an independent third 
party, the Participant will always remain liable to the other Participants 
under the Joint Operating Agreement, by virtue of privity of contract, 
unless a specific release is obtained from the other Participants 
289. 
This situation is often reiterated by the Joint Operating Agreement to 
overcome any suggestion of the Participant being released by implication 
from all the obligations that arise after the date on which the assignment 
becomes effective290. The argument is that most Joint Operating 
Agreements allow a Participant to assign all or part of its Interest 
subject to satisfying certain terms and conditions. The Interest of a 
Participant is usually defined to include the obligations which correspond 
to the Participants' rights, the result being the Joint Operating 
Agreement contemplates that contractual obligations owed amongst 
Participants will be assumed by the assignee, with the consent of the 
other Participants. This, it has been submitted, raises the presumption 
29 
that the assigning Participant will be released upon that assumption1 
One of the difficulties that arises in such circumstances is that if 
the assignee fails to perform its obligations under the Joint Operating 
Agreement, the assignor may be sued, as a result of the failure, without 
necessarily having a readily exercisable means of rectifying the 
292 
breach 
The Joint Operating Agreement may provide that the assignor shall 
remain liable for all obligations attaching to all or the part of the 
Interest that it assigned which were incurred prior to the date on which 
the assignment became effective293. Furthermore, the Joint Operating 
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Agreement may provide that the assignee shall, in addition assume, 
liability for such obligations notwithstanding that they were incurred 
294 
prior to the date on which the assignment became effective 
Usually, where a Participant is assigning all of its Interest, the 
Participant will desire a release from all the obligations that arise 
after the date on which the assignment becomes effective295. This is 
effected by a deed of novation and is generally unobjectionable to the 
other Participants. However, this desire does reinforce the concern of 
the other Participants as to the financial standing of the assignee and 
the need for their consent of the Participants to the assignment. 
The deed of novation will also amend the Joint Operating Agreement by 
setting out the post assignment percentage Interests of the 
Participants 
296. 
In addition, the deed of novation will require the assignee to assume 
the obligations attaching to the Interest assigned to it by direct 
covenant with the other Participants. 
The entering into of deed of novation will, in the case of Great 
Britain, require the prior approval of the Secretary of State for 
Energy297, and, in the case of Australia, the prior consent of the Joint 
298 
Authority 
8. THE EFFECTIVE DATE 
In Great Britain it is unusual for the Joint Operating Agreement to 
provide that an assignment is not effective or binding upon the 
Participants until the date upon which the Participants receive: - 
(i) a copy of all documents relating to the assignment, together 
with the necessary consents and approvals of the Secretary of 
State 
for Energy299; and 
(ii) a covenant whereby the assignee accepts and assumes all 
assignor's the obligations under the Licence and the Joint 
Operating 
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Agreement in so far as the interest assigned is concerned300 
In Australia, it is unusual for the Joint Operating Agreement to 
provide that an assignment is not effective until all necessary 
governmental consents and approvals have been obtained. This, presumably, 
addresses the fact that the transfer of a Permit or a dealing of the type 
mentioned above in relation to a Permit is of no force until: - 
(i) approved by the Joint Authority, and 
(ii) the relevant entry has been made in the register maintained by 
the Designated Authority. 
This approach follows the view express in Franov v Deposit and 
Investment Company Limited301 which would hold that approval and 
registration does not confer upon the transfer or dealing any 
effectiveness or validity which antedates such approval and 
registration 
302 
9. SECURITY303 
Although the Joint Operating Agreement has shown itself to be 
compatible with large-scale financings, not every Joint Operating 
Agreement is designed to do so. The Joint Operating Agreement will 
usually address the right of a Participant to mortgage, pledge, charge, 
assign by way of security or otherwise encumber all or part of its 
Interest. The right will either be unfetted304 or subject to the prior 
consent of the other Participants 
305 
Where the right is subject to the 
v 
prior consent of the other Participants it is usually provided that such 
consent cannot be unreasonably withheld306 In addition, the right may 
be limited to providing finance for the particular project 
307 
The right will usually be subject to a number of conditions: - 
(i) the creation of the security interest shall be subject to the 
308 
obtaining of all required governmental consents and approvals 
In the case of Great Britain, this means the consent of the Secretary 
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of State for Energy309. In the case of Australia, this means the 
approval of the Joint Authority and the appropriate entry being made 
in the register maintained by the Designated Authority in relation to 
the dealing310; 
(ii) the Participant creating the security interest over all or part 
of its Interest shall remain liable for all obligations relating to 
its Interest 
311; 
(iii) the Interests of the other Participants must be in no way 
affected by the creation of the security interest312; 
(iv) the rights conferred by the instrument creating the security 
interest and the security interest itself shall be expressly 
subordinated to the rights of the other Participants under the Joint 
Operating Agreement, for example, cross-charges as between the 
Participants to secure their obligations as between themselves313 
The person in whose favour the security interest is created may have 
to enter into an agreement with the other Participants to this 
effect 
314; 
(v) the person in whose favour the security interest is created 
must agree in writing with the other Participants to be bound by the 
provisions of the Joint Operating Agreement in realising its security 
315 
or otherwise exercising any rights in relation to its security . 
This would include, inter alia, the first right of acquisition 
mechanism; 
(vi) the person in whose favour the security interest is created 
must agree with the other Participants, in writing, to release its 
security immediately upon the Participant creating the security 
interest, ceasing to be a Participant 
316; 
and 
(vii) the Participant creating the security interest paying all costs 
and expenses incurred in relation to the creation or release of the 
317 
security . 
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